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PREFACE
This S.J.D. dissertation, written by Nawzad Yasin, is being published
posthumously with the permission of his widow. Jill Nehrkorn. Nawzad
died on March 6, 2020, following a battle with cancer. He received his
L.L.B. degree from Salahaddin University College of Law in 2003, his
LL.M. degree from the University of Oklahoma College of Law in 2014,
and his S.J.D. degree from Southern Methodist University in 2020. He had
completed his studies and his dissertation except for a final bibliography
and conclusion. Ms. Piper B. Hampton,1 Editor in Chief of ONE-J,
completed the final bibliography and edited the dissertation. Ms. Hampton
and Professors John S. Lowe,2 Nawzad’s dissertation supervisor, and Owen
L. Anderson,3 Nawzad’s LL.M. supervisor and member of Nawzad’s
dissertation committee, prepared the conclusion.
Nawzad’s dissertation, which focuses on cross-border unitization, is
important to the future prosperity of both Iraq, especially the Kurdish
region, and Iran. More importantly, cross-border unitization can serve as a
catalyst for peace between Iraq and Iran. Nawzad intended to return to Iraq
and devote himself to teaching and to the peace and prosperity for the
Kurdish region and for all of Iraq. This dissertation is dedicated to these
goals, which were Nawzad’s first and foremost desires and to which he was
singularly committed.
John S. Lowe
Owen L. Anderson
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2. George W. Hutchison Chair in Energy Law and Professor of Law, Southern
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3. Distinguished Oil & Gas Scholar, The University of Texas School of Law, the
Eugene Kuntz Chair of Oil, Gas & Natural Resources Emeritus and George Lynn Cross
Research Professor Emeritus, The University of Oklahoma.
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CHAPTER ONE: ENERGY SECURITY AND GLOBAL APPROACHES TO
RESOLVE ENERGY CRISES
I. Introduction
Energy has been a prerequisite for humans to obtain life necessities since
the beginning of mankind. Abraham Maslow generated the theory of the
Hierarchy of Needs in 1943, emphasizing both “physiological needs” and
“safety needs” as the foundations of the human hierarchical needs
pyramid.4 Among these needs, energy has been a primary source for human
survival, holding the same value as water and air. Food is the primary energy
source for humans; however, it was fire that enabled early humans and their
small groups to promote to the modern generation. The discovery of fire by
early species of hominids, Homo erectus, allowed for various
developments. The hominids could prepare healthier food with a higher
source of energy through cooking, develop social behaviors through regular
meetings around campfires, facilitate survival in cold climates, and protect
themselves from predators.5 Human civilizations and modern societies
would not have developed if the early hominids had not ensured energy
supply and resources.
Today, human life ultimately depends on energy supply to generate
required services, such as electricity, transportation, air conditioning,
cultivation, and manufacturing.6 On the other hand, energy deprivation
could easily cause a dramatic increase in morbidity and mortality rates
worldwide.7 As a result, modern governments need to access adequate
energy supplies for their economic development. Governments, to
guarantee such procurements, construct and employ energy policies
primarily aimed at ensuring energy security.8
In the first section of this chapter, the researcher presents a thorough
description of the energy security concept and how the main elements of
energy security have evolved. The second sub-chapter addresses the
4. Abraham H. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 42 & 103 (Kindle ed., Start
Publishing 2012).
5. Juli G. Pausas & Jon E. Keeley, A Burning Story: The Role of Fire in the History of
Life, 59 Bioscience 593 (2009).
6. Benjamin K. Sovacool & Marilyn A. Brown, Competing Dimensions of Energy
Security: An International Perspective, 35 Ann. Rev. Envtl. Resources. 77, 79 (2010).
7. Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Assessment of Energy Security
Performance, 88 Ecol. Econ. 148, 148 (2013).
8. See Janusz Bielecki, Energy Security: Is the Wolf at the Door? 42 Q. Rev. Econ. &
Fin. 235, 235-36 (2002).
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magnitude of energy crises’ impact on the global economy and ends with a
study of the cause and effects of energy conflicts in the world. Finally, the
research covers the legal structure created by the international community
to resolve energy discord among sovereign countries. The last sub-chapter
analyzes the importance of energy-related intergovernmental agencies and
energy treaties to manage energy crises. In addition, the researcher
introduces unitization agreements as helpful instruments to resolve fairness
concerns regarding the distribution of energy deposits straddling borders of
neighboring states.
II. The Modern Overview of Energy Security
Energy security is one of the most important goals of human security
because modern civilization depends upon energy to ensure the quality of
life.9 For example, the modern existence of food, shelter, and transportation
would not exist without energy. Economic statistics show that the need for
energy supplies will increase by forty-five percent through 2030, and by
more than 300 percent by the end of the century.10 At the same time, energy
security is accepted as an essential matter for governments and businesses
who will severely suffer when energy supply interrupts.11 Energy institutes
and scholars have correspondingly investigated the concept of energy
security.
Many scholars have studied energy security since the beginning of the
Twenty-First Century, and numerous definitions were offered for the
concept of energy security.12 That said, the concept of energy security has
not been defined unanimously,13 because the concept of energy security is
“dynamic” in nature.14 The reason for the dynamic nature of the concept of
energy security has probably stemmed from continuous conversions in
modern human life.15 The conversation is of importance because there is a
close relationship between a countries’ energy security and its political and

9. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 79.
10. Sovacool, supra note 7.
11. B.W. Ang et al., Energy Security: Definitions, Dimensions and Indexes, 42 Renew.
Sustainable Energy Rev. 1077, 1078 (2015).
12. Id. at 1077 (analyzing and comparing 104 studies that were published on the
concept of energy security from 2001 to 2014).
13. Id. at 1078.
14. André Månsson et al., Assessing Energy Security: An Overview of Commonly Used
Methodologies, 73 Energy 1, 2 (2014).
15. B.W. Ang, supra note 11, at 1078.
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economic status.16 Daniel Yergin, a famed expert in the global energy
security, believed that a central element to describe the idea of energy
security was the interconnection between energy consuming countries and
energy-producing states to remove primary threats of energy supply.17
Factors such as developments in technology and social consciousness
implicating efficiency and environmental protection, directly impact the
definition of energy security.18 Thus, the elastic nature of the energy
security concept allows it to comport with new practical factors. However,
a profound drawback of the dynamic nature of the concept is that scholars
and institutes have been unable to agree on an abstract definition of energy
security.
Energy researchers explained that the lack of consensus on a single
definition of energy security derived from the distinctive nature of the
energy security concept. For example, Bert Kruyt stated that the nature of
energy security is “elusive” and “highly context-dependent” because there
is a strong relationship between energy security and other energy policy
issues.19 Lynne Chester expressed that the slippery feature of energy
security likely generated several definitions because energy security was
“polysemic in nature” and various dimensions impacted on the concept of
energy security.20 Andreas Loschel said that the concept of energy security
was “blurred” which made it complicated for researchers to provide a
coherent delineation of energy security.21 André Månsson confirmed that
“multiple, vague and often diverging meanings” of the energy security
concept prevented researchers from providing a single description of the
concept.22 Finally, Professor Ang and his colleague from National
University of Singapore say that “[t]he definition and dimensions of energy
security appear to be dynamic, and evolve as circumstances change over
time.”23
It should also come as no surprise that each energy player: energyexporting countries, energy-importing countries, energy-transit countries,
16. See, e.g., Bielecki, supra note 8, at 235.
17. Daniel Yergin, Ensuring Energy Security, 85 Foreign Affairs no.2 69 (2006).
18. B.W. Ang, supra note 11, at 1078.
19. Bert Kruyt et al., Indicators for Energy Security, 37 Energy Pol’y 2166 (2009).
20. Lynne Chester, Conceptualizing Energy Security and Making Explicit its Polysemic
Nature, 38 Energy Pol’y 887, 893 (2010).
21. Andreas Loschel et al., Indicators of Energy Security in Industrialised Countries, 38
Energy Pol’y 1665 (2010).
22. Månsson, supra note 14, at 1.
23. B.W. Ang, supra note 11, at 1078.
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and energy companies, as well as energy organizations and scholars,
developed a version of the definition for energy security in the Twenty-First
Century. “Security of demand” play a pivotal role in describing energy
security for exporting countries since their economy entirely depends on
energy revenue.24 For energy-importing countries — e.g., China and
India — energy security patently means better management of their energy
dependence.25 Transit states — e.g., Tunisia and Turkey — describe their
energy security based on the stability of energy resources in exporting
countries, the unceasing economic development of importing countries, and
the security of pipelines in their own countries, through the imposition of a
transit fee as a source of revenue and the access to a portion of the
transiting energy for their own economic needs.26
The longevity of energy projects last up to forty years: and the
installment and management of energy projects in all different stages —
upstream, midstream, and downstream — require colossal amounts of
capital.27 For energy investors and companies, a stable and high energy
price in the market certifies the security of their investment in energy
sectors.28 Many scholars have introduced the notion of energy security as
“security of energy supply,” “security of supply,” or in an abbreviated term
of “SOS.”29 These studies on energy security concur with the view that
energy security deals with threats to energy supply.30 Nonetheless, the
concept of energy security, in the form of security of energy supply,
probably will not include pervasive influences of energy on the modern
human lifestyle. Many scholars reason that security of supply cannot
represent the term “energy security” completely; because the notion of
security of supply is limited in physical aspects of energy.31 These scholars
propose that any description of energy security should also involve impacts

24. Yergin, supra note 17, at 71.
25. Id.
26. Richard Wheeler, Energy Security and Intergovernmental Organizations, 12 OGEL
no. 2, Apr. 2014, at 3.
27. Id.
28. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), A Quest for Energy Security in the
21st Century, p. 35 (2007), https://aperc.or.jp/file/2010/9/26/APERC_2007_A_Quest_for_
Energy_Security.pdf.
29. A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts, 6 OGEL, no. 3,
Nov. 2008, at 2.
30. See e.g., Christian Winzer, Conceptualizing Energy Security, 46 Energy Pol’y 36,
36 (Jul. 2012).
31. B.W. Ang supra note 11, at 1078.
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of energy on downstream aspects of human life, such as the “economic and
social welfare.”32
Energy security or security of supply traditionally implied “security of
oil supply” until natural gas started playing an essential role in the energy
market in the late Twentieth Century.33 During World War I and II,
governments focused on their armies and military demands. Among the
demands, oil supply and its refined fuels were recognized as the most
significant military need in both wars.34 Oil remained an essential supply
for the economic and industrial development of Western countries until the
late 1970s.35 The great importance of oil supply in the first three-quarters of
the Twentieth Century restricted governments’ objective of energy security
to dispelling threats of oil disruptions.36 In 2014, crude oil and natural gas
constituted thirty-one percent and twenty-one percent of the global energy
demand.37 Moreover, oil and natural gas together supply the majority of the
global energy market. Approximately sixty-four percent of oil and twentynine percent of natural gas supply were traded in the global market in
2014.38 This research will level the focus of energy security into the
security of oil and natural gas supplies.
Energy security, in its traditional notion, concentrated only on the
physical safety of supply and “diversification of energy fuels and
services.”39 Over different eras, the definition of energy security evolved
with three dominant outlooks: political, technical, and economic.40 In the
late Twentieth Century, the environmental factor became a fundamental
element of energy security because activities of the petroleum industry

32. Id.
33. Alhajji, supra note 29.
34. Aleh Cherp & Jessica Jewell, The Three Perspectives on Energy Security:
Intellectual History, Disciplinary Roots and the Potential for Integration, 3 Curr. Opin.
Envtl. Sustainability 202 (2011).
35. Id.
36. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28 (stating that the
definition of energy security has changed over time).
37. International Energy Agency (IEA), Key World Energy Trends – Excerpt From:
World Energy Balances 4 (2016), http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/
publication/KeyWorldEnergyTrends.pdf.
38. British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2015, 19 & 29
(June 2015) http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review2015/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2015-full-report.pdf.
39. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6.
40. Cherp, supra note 34.
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harmed the environment, engendering health and economic side-effects.41
Energy institutions and scholars have presented many definitions for the
concept of energy security.42 Some of these delineations have become
prevalent in the industry and academia; nonetheless, they only include
limited elements of the energy security concept.
A. Customary Definitions of Energy Security
A definition for the concept of energy security from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) has become popular among scholars needing an
institutional reference to use in their energy security research. The IEA was
founded after the 1973-1974 oil crisis by the world’s most developed
countries to plan a better strategy for securing energy demands of Western
countries.43 The IEA defines energy security as “the uninterrupted
availability of energy sources at an affordable price.”44 Any threats to the
quantity and rate of energy supplies are considered major energy policy
concerns for the IEA members. For instance, most European countries who
are members of the IEA import petroleum, and any supply interruption —
even for a short time — is critical for European economic development.45
Furthermore, ensuring energy supplies requires being commensurate with
the purchasing power of private and public entities of an economy.46
With little modifications, other intergovernmental institutes such as the
Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC) and the European
Commission have endorsed the IEA's definition of energy security. The
APERC, a research center of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) forum, described the concept of energy security as “securing
adequate energy supplies at reasonable and stable prices to sustain
economic performance and growth.”47 The Asian-Pacific countries believe
that the price stability of energy supply along with the availability of supply
are two crucial factors for ensuring their economic development.
41. A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Economic, Environmental, Social, Foreign
Policy, Technical and Security Dimension, 6 OGEL, no. 3, Nov. 2008, at 2.
42. B.W. Ang supra note 11, at 1078.
43. International Energy Agency (IEA), Our History (Sep. 10, 2016), http://www.iea.
org/about/.
44. International Energy Agency (IEA), What Is Energy Security? (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://www.iea.org/topics/energysecurity/subtopics/whatisenergysecurity/.
45. Eur-Lex, Green Paper – Towards A European Strategy for The Security of Energy
Supply (Nov. 2000), http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A
52000DC0769#document1.
46. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 85.
47. .Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 4.
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The European Commission, the executive organ of the European Union
(EU), in early the 2000s added a new element to the definition of energy
security. Considering Articles 2 and 6 of the Treaty of European Union, the
Europeans included environmental concerns within their energy security
policy.48 A primary reason the European amendment originated from the
fact that a rapid growth of energy industry caused environmental disasters,
such as the global climate change, water and land contamination, and waste,
threatening the global energy security.49 In addition, the world was appalled
by man-made environmental catastrophes, for instance, the 1991 oil spill in
the Persian/Arabian Gulf, when the Iraqi Army poured up to 10 million
barrels of oil into the Persian Gulf in 1991 while retreating from their
invasion of Kuwait.50 To prevent the same failures in the future, the
European Union, proffered an environmental element by defining energy
security as: “the uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on
the market, at a price which is affordable for all consumers (private and
industrial), while respecting environmental concerns and looking towards
sustainable development, . . . .”51 Since then, the environmental element
became an important factor in defining energy security, along with original
elements of energy security.
Slightly different than the definition of energy security from the
European Commission, the World Bank Group depicted three critical pillars
in the concept of energy security; (1) energy efficiency, (2) diversification,
and (3) price stability of energy supplies.52 The World Bank Group
suggested that international cooperation on these three aspects of energy is
required to assure a long-term global energy security.53 The World Bank
Group alleged that a comprehensive plan to develop efficiency in all levels
of energy industry would be a pivotal factor to overcome the environmental
challenges and at the end, to guarantee long-term energy security.54
In addition to the active intergovernmental institutes, many scholars have
studied energy security and provided recommendations to governments on
48. Eur-Lex, supra note 44.
49. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 84.
50. Mark Tutton, Lessons Learned from the Largest Oil Spill in History, CNN (Jun. 4,
2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/06/04/kuwait.oil.spill/ (stating that the
Iraqi troops also set fire to the giant oil fields of Kuwait and opened the valves on the oil rigs
and pipelines).
51. Eur-Lex, supra note 44.
52. The World Bank Group, Energy Security Issues 1 (Dec. 5, 2005).
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 7-8.
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ensuring their energy supply security. In the early 21st Century, some
intellectuals concentrated on elements and dimensions of energy security
besides the physical availability of energy supply sources. Janusz Bielecki,
Energy Charter Secretariat, mainly focused on the economic aspect of oil
supply security. For instance, Bielecki tried to answer the question of how
to avoid impacting the early 2000 oil price increase on the global energy
security.55 Daniel Yergin, who presented new points in the evaluation of the
energy security concept, argued that both market and politics have the most
influence on the energy security.56 Correspondingly, many energy scholars
viewed that the notion of energy security was embossed with a close
relationship between energy policy and national security.57
Parallel to energy institutes, energy researchers have also presented
multiple definitions of energy security. In 2004, Barry Barton, an energy
law researcher, defined energy security "as a condition in which a nation
and all, or most, of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient
energy resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future free from
the serious risk of major disruption of service."58 Along with the physical
and economic aspects, the environmental aspect appeared in studies of
scholars to define the energy security concept in the early 21st Century. By
combining the definitions provided by the IEA and the Europeans, Sascha
Muller-Kraenner — an environment expert in the energy industry —
defined energy security in his 2007 book as “the provision of reasonably
priced, reliable and environmentally friendly energy.”59 Finally, energy
scholars came up with multi-dimensional definitions for energy security. To
illustrate, Anas F. Alhajji indicated that the notion of energy security was
comprised of economic, environmental, social, foreign policy, technical,
and security dimensions.60 Containing all these dimensions, Alhajji offered
the following elaborate definition of energy security: "[t]he steady
availability of energy supplies in a way that ensures economic growth in
both producing and consuming countries with the lowest social cost and the
lowest price volatility."61
55. Bielecki, supra note 8, at 235.
56. Yergin, supra note 17, at 71.
57. See e.g., Barry Barton et al., Introduction to Energy Security: Managing Risk in a
Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment, 3 & 4 (2004).
58. Id. at 4.
59. Sascha Müller-Kraenner, Energy Security: Re-Measuring the World, xi (Earthscan
Publications 2008).
60. Alhajji, supra note 41, at 2.
61. Id. at 3.
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Major disasters and crises of the Twentieth Century prompted a variety
of conceptual modifications in energy security.62 These changes also
introduced new elements and dimensions which evolved the definition of
energy security conception over time. Next, the author will explicate how
geopolitical, economic, and natural events in the last century developed the
notion of energy security, and what the main elements and dimensions of
energy security are.
B. Concept Evolution and Elements of Energy Security
With the massive growth in the human population and political systems,
the significance of energy security has been emphasized to assure the
fundamental needs of human societies and their economies. The notion of
energy security, like most socioeconomic conceptions, gradually evolved
over the past century. Starting with the physical elements, the concept of
energy security has been growing with the economic and environmental
elements in the last three decades. Through adding and analyzing new
elements over time, institutes and scholars discovered various descriptions
of energy security. In conjunction with these definitions, this paper explores
the main elements of energy security appended to the concept of energy
security over previous decades.
1. Physical Elements: Availability and Accessibility
Until the mid-twentieth century, governments narrowed the definition of
energy security to exclusively the physical supply. Adherence to such a
limited definition in the energy policy was likely a primary factor in
triggering conflicts of interest between European colonialists in previous
centuries. Super-power governments deliberated over securing sufficient
and efficient fuels to prepare for such ineluctable collisions.63 Therefore,
the ability of governments to access energy supplies became an original
element to describe the energy security concept. Daniel Yergin explained
that physical energy security attempted to eliminate threats to the adequacy
of energy supply in the market.64 Physical energy security encompasses
both geopolitical and geological concerns over energy supply, and the
ability to reduce “accessibility” and “availability” risks.65

62. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 80.
63. Id. at 81.
64. See Daniel Yergin et al., Energy and Security: Strategies for a World in Transition,
69, 74 (2nd ed. 2013).
65. Kruyt, supra note 19, at 2167.
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a) Accessibility
Energy consumers need to maintain their ability to possess the required
volume of energy supply for their economic development and consistency.
Accessibility is the ability of an economy to ensure continuous access to
energy supply to meet their expected demand.66 For that, governments have
aimed to secure access to diversified energy sources. Daniel Yergin
expounded that “diversification” of energy supplies had been a primary
objective of the global energy policy since World War I.67 The competition
between governments to acquire oil resources located in different regions of
the world inevitably generates geopolitical concerns. The accessibility
element of energy security seeks to obviate the geopolitical concerns of
energy policy to secure economic growth through diversification of energy
supply. Today, scholars and institutes apply “accessibility” or “reliability”
to illustrate the geopolitical element within the security of energy supply.68
Accessibility to various oil resources, as one of the elements of physical
energy security, is identified as a classic view of governments over the
concept of energy security.69 Perhaps, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of
Admiralty of the British Empire in World War I, was a political leader who
had highlighted the first element of energy security.70 After Churchill
decided to switch the British Navy’s power source from coal to oil, he
stated that “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone.”71 It is
inferable from Churchill’s statement that the government’s ability to ensure
diverse oil resources was a crucial element of energy security during World
War I.72 States targeted oil-producing regions to secure oil supply for their
armies and governments. Since WWI, the central element to define the
energy security concept has been the ability to remove geopolitical threats.
Pascual and Elkind described the geopolitical element of energy security as

66. See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 6.
67. Yergin, supra note 17, at 76.
68. See e.g., Jonathan Elkind and Carlos Pascual, Energy Security: Call for a Broader
Agenda, Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications, 119, 124
(2010); see e.g., World Economic Forum, Energy Access and Security (Jan. 18, 2016)
http://reports.weforum.org/global-energy-architecture-performance-index-report-2016/ener
gy-access-and-security/.
69. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 81.
70. Yergin, supra note 17.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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the management of “the energy-related relationships that exist among
states.”73
The concept of physical energy security evolved after WWI. In 1939,
Adolf Hitler planned to use his close relationships with Reza Shah Pahlavi,
the Shah of Iran (from1925-1941), to access the enormous Iranian oil
resources and subsequently control the assets of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company to inflict major harm to the energy security of the British
Empire.74 The Allied Powers prevented Hitler from accessing the Middle
Eastern oil supplies by overthrowing Reza Shah and his pro-Nazi followers
in 1941.75 The failure to secure the Middle Eastern oil supplies was
probably a reason why Hitler’s army invaded the Soviet Union to take over
the Azeri oil fields of Baku and meet German petroleum demand.76 On the
Asian side, in 1942, Japan attacked the Dutch East Indies — now
Indonesia — to secure their petroleum demand. During WWII, not only
was the physical safety of oil reservoirs an urgent priority for countries, but
the security of oil transportation and storage facilities also became an
important part of energy security.77 The Allied members were only able to
stop the Nazi Army on several occasions by attacking their fuel supply
storages.78
After WWII in the 1950s, geopolitical tensions in the Middle East,
especially in Iran, put the oil security of Western nations in jeopardy.
Western countries with major oil enterprises intensively reacted to the
Middle Eastern events to eliminate threats to their petroleum security. The
U.S. and British intelligence agencies managed a plot to overthrow
Mohammad Mossadegh, the Iranian Prime-Minister from 1951 to 1953,
after he nationalized the Iranian oil industry in 1951.79 Mossadegh
terminated the absolute ownership and control of the Anglo-Iranian Oil

73. Carlos Pascual & Jonathan Elkind, Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies,
and Implications 2, 2-3 (Carlos Pascual & Jonathan Elkind eds. 2010).
74. See Robert Mabro, On the Security of Oil Supplies, Oil Weapons, Oil Nationalism
and All That, 32 OPEC ENERGY REV. 1, 4 (2008).
75. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 164 (Princeton University
Press 1982).
76. See Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power, 319 (Free
Press 2011).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Saeed Kamali Dehghan & Richard Norton-Taylor, CIA Admits Role in 1953 Iranian
Coup, The Guardian (Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/19/ciaadmits-role-1953-iranian-coup.
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Company (now British Petroleum or BP) over giant oil fields in Iran.80
Western countries built VLCCs and ULCCs supertankers to ship crude oil
to Europe around the Cape of South Africa after Gamal Abdel Nasser, the
President of Egypt from 1956-1970, removed a joint British-French
company from controlling one of the essential oil transportation lines by
nationalizing the Suez Canal Company in 1956.81
However, developed countries with traditional energy security policies
were unable to cope with the next petroleum crisis in the 1970s. The
developed countries’ economies faced major crises in 1973 when Arab oilproducing countries embargoed the exportation of oil to the U.S. and
Holland for about six months.82 The 1973-1974 Oil Embargo proved how
oil could be used as a weapon to strain the economies of the U.S., Europe,
and Japan. Developed countries, which already established the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1961,83 realized
that their complete reliance on the Middle East oil supply imperiled their
economic development.84 As a result, OECD members decided to assess
and implement new precautionary settings for any future oil crises. 85 More
recently, European countries faced a similar crises when Russia stopped
exporting its natural gas to Ukraine and Europe in 2008.86 Additionally,
global energy security encountered serious threats to the safety of oil
tankers in major water choke points, particularly when Iran in 2011-2012
threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz, in which about forty percent of
the world oil exports pass through.87
Many political crises and wars have occurred since the beginning of the
twentieth century because governments were determined to ensure
accessibility to the oil supply by any means necessary. States traditionally
presumed that their energy policy had to be considerably constricted by
geopolitical concerns to access diverse oil resources. With that traditional
perspective of energy security, Western countries aimed to reduce energy
threats through oil diversification when enough oil supply was provided

80. Id.
81. Mabro, supra note 74, at 4.
82. Id.
83. The Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), About the
OECD (Sep. 10, 2016) http://www.oecd.org/about/.
84. Chester, supra note 20, at 888.
85. Yergin, supra note 17, at 75.
86. Mabro, supra note 74, at 7.
87. See BBC News, Iran Threatens to Block Strait of Hormuz Oil Route (Dec. 28,
2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16344102.
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without any disruption.88 At the same time, governments attempted to
reduce their foreign energy reliance.89
The geopolitical risks are not the only physical concern of the energy
security concept. The physical threats to the security of energy supplies also
consist of geological risks over energy resources which are classified under
the “availability” element of energy security.90
b) Availability
Intellectuals and institutes introduced the term “availability” primarily
to cover geological threats within energy security.91 The fearsome idea of
the world approaching the maximum rate of oil production, or “peak oil,”
has been one of the principal concerns oil consumers have struggled with
since the end of WWI.92 That fundamental concern impelled both oilexporting and oil-importing countries to deliberate on an independent
element in their energy security policy. That element was the availability
of energy resources. Availability was distinguished from the accessibility
element in a definition that scholars presented for energy security:
“maintaining and enhancing access to where the oil exists in such obvious
abundance.”93
Discoveries of giant oil fields in Iraq (during the 1920s) and Texas
(during the 1930s), however, eliminated global concerns respecting the
depletion of the world’s oil reservoirs for two to three decades.94 After
World War II, the world resumed worrying about the depletion of the main
oil reservoirs due to the increase in oil demand by the global economic
powers who were developing quickly. Additionally, the growth of the car
industry in the United States resulted in a forty-two percent increase in
gasoline demand in 1950 from its previous record in 1945.95 The post-war
reconstruction of Europe and a shortage in coal production during the
longest and coldest winter in Europe (1946-47) rapidly made European
countries more dependent on the Middle East oil reservoirs.96
88. Yergin, supra note 17, at 76.
89. Chester, supra note 20, at 888.
90. See, e.g., Bert Kruyt et al., Indicators for Energy Security, 37 ENERGY POL’Y
2166, 2167 (2009); see also Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 25,
at 6.
91. See e.g., Sovacool, supra note 7, at 151.
92. Mabro, supra note 74, at 7.
93. Alhajji, supra note 29, at 3.
94. Mabro, supra note 74, at 7.
95. Yergin, supra note 76, at 391.
96. Id. at 404.
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In the 1960s, the Japanese economy astonishingly developed eleven
percent per year, during which Japanese oil demand had increased ten times
compared to demand in the 1950s.97 In the 1990s, the dramatic economic
development of China and India generated substantial growth in global oil
demand.98 For instance, energy consumption of China was about twentyseven quadrillion British thermal units (BTU) in 1990.99 In 2013, Chinese
energy usage increased to about 100 quadrillion BTUs.100 The Cambridge
Energy Research Associates (CERA) projected that oil “demand shock”
would continue in upcoming years due to the development of the Asian
economy, and that it would subsequently demand for more than half of total
global oil production.101 Furthermore, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) — through its research center, the APERC —
expressed concern regarding the future availability of oil supply because the
global reliance on oil has grown rapidly, and adequate oil reservoirs have
yet to be discovered.102 The APERC projected that energy demand in the
Asia-Pacific region would increase about “three-fold, growing at an annual
rate of 2.1% to reach 6,759 Million Tons of Oil Equivalent (Mtoe) by
2030.”103
The geological concern became apparent to the world when Professor
King Hubbert, in his 1956 Theory of Peak Oil, used a bell-shaped logistic
curve to illustrate that the world had already produced half of its oil
resources.104 In 1972, the Club of Rome, an international think tank
studying global crises, endorsed the theory of natural resources depletion in
the world.105 However, a growing amount of optimistic perspectives on
global oil reserve depletion claimed that the depletion was closely
interconnected with the market and technology.106 For instance, advanced

97. Id. at 527.
98. Yergin, supra note 17, at 71.
99. See Michael T. Klare, Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of
Energy, 71 (Kindle ed. Metropolitan Books 2008).
100. See U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), International Energy Statistics
(Jul. 8, 2016) https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/#?iso=CHN&c=00000002
&ct=0&ord=CR&cy=2013&v=H&vo=0&so=0&io=0&start=1980&end=2013&vs=INTL.44
-1-CHN-QBTU.
101. See Yergin, supra note 17, at 72.
102. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 7.
103. Id. at pg. 5.
104. Id. at pg. 9.
105. Mabro, supra note 74, at 4.
106. See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 9.
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techniques in the exploitation of Canadian tar sand, an unconventional oil
supply, dramatically increased the world’s oil resources capacity.107
Today, energy security does not only focus on geological matters but
also addresses the lack of capital investments, lack of advanced
technologies to develop the supply resources, and lack of appropriate
governmental regulations for the energy industry, which also constitute the
availability element of energy security.108 Furthermore, the global refining
capacity is slight compared to the extraordinary demand for “middle
distillates,” while many oil reserves in the world produce heavy oil.109 The
physical energy security, consisting of both accessibility and availability
elements, exclusively depicted the concept of energy security until the
1980s when energy market crises expanded the notion of energy security to
include an economic factor.
2. Economic Element: Affordability
In the 1980s, an economic perspective emerged to diminish the
traditional influence of the political outlook in the energy market.110
Repetitious disruptions of energy supply based on political impetus was a
principal reason for opponents of the economic outlook to “depoliticize
energy supply” and thus, evaluate energy supply as a mere trade
commodity.111 The economic viewpoint changed the traditional focus from
the physical elements of energy security to the price of stocks,112 and
modified the traditional definition of energy security to “securing adequate
energy supplies to sustain economic performance and growth.”113 As a
result of that modification, the concepts of “economic welfare,” “price,”
and “affordability” were embedded in the definition of energy security in
the 1980s.114
An objective definition of energy security appeared as “the uninterrupted
availability of energy sources at an affordable price” was pronounced by
the International Energy Agency (IEA) to be their official definition of

107. Yergin, supra note 17, at 74.
108. Elkind & Pascual, supra note 68, at 123.
109. Yergin, supra note 17, at 73.
110. Cherp, supra note 34, at 205.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), Energy Security Initiative: Some
Aspects of Oil Security, p. 4 (2003), https://aperc.or.jp/file/2010/9/26/Energy_Security_
Initiative_2003.pdf. .
114. Cherp, supra note 34, at 205.
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energy security.115 The primary meaning of the economic element of energy
security is that energy consumers have access to energy at a price they can
afford.116 Producing and consuming countries, however, conferred different
interpretations on the affordability of energy prices given their economic
interests in energy transactions.117 In general, the global energy market sets
prices of energy supply based on the demand and supply balance as well as
supply cost.118
“Reasonability” of oil prices was an initial interpretation identified
through the affordability element of energy security.119 Alhajji, however,
rebutted the idea of using “reasonable prices” because it was unclear since
the prices might be “volatile,” and the interpretation of reasonable prices
might differ between oil producers and consumers.120 The price volatility
could constrict the energy policy to propose their short-term economic
growth based on a determined energy price.121 Moreover, unstable prices
make it highly problematic for companies to invest in ultra-expensive longterm plans such as unconventional and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)
projects.122 That is probably why the World Bank accented “mitigation and
efficient management” of price volatility as one of three main pillars of
energy security.123 The 1986 crude oil price collapse, which evolved out of
an inactive economic status of developing countries and market oversupply,
intensified the discussion over the importance of the economic element of
energy security.124 The 1986 oil market shock, as a significant threat to the
economy, impelled both oil exporting and oil importing countries to pay
more attention to securing price stability of supplies.125

115. International Energy Agency, supra note 44.
116. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 82-83.
117. Yergin, supra note 17, at 70-71.
118. Bielecki, supra note 8, at 236.
119. See e.g., Chester, supra note 20, at 891.
120. Alhajji, supra note 29, at 4.
121. B.W. Ang supra note 11, at 1082.
122. See Sovacool and Brown, supra note 6, at 80; see also Asia Pacific Energy Research
Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 36.
123. See The World Bank Group, supra note 52, at 1 (recommending that the global
community to focus on three main pillars of “energy efficiency,” “diversification of energy
supplies,” and “dealing with volatility” to elevate the global energy security).
124. See U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Petroleum Chronology of
Events 1970-2006 (May 2002), http://www.eia.gov/pub/oil_gas/petroleum/analysis_publica
tions/chronology/petroleumchronology2000.htm (stating that in July 1986, the oil price fell
from $23.29 in December 1985 to under $10 per barrel).
125. Cherp, supra note 34, at 205.
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Daniel Yergin recommended that a “large, flexible, and wellfunctioning” market could generate the security of both demand and supply
which would survive at any price shock.126 Alhajji advocated that a
collaborative relationship between energy-producing and energyconsuming countries was an essential factor to decrease price volatility and
to stabilize energy prices.127 APERC, the research center of the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC), suggested the Asia-Pacific countries deal
with all risks creating an uncertain energy market within the economic
element of energy security.128 At last, a more comprehensive definition of
energy security — “that of securing adequate energy supplies at reasonable
and stable prices to sustain economic performance and growth” —
including both physical and economic elements became customary in the
mid-1990s.129 This definition was, however, proclaimed even more
expandable later at the end of the 1990s when a new aspect, environmental
protection and sustainability, was debated as being in a firm
interconnectedness with the concept of energy security.
3. Environmental Element: Acceptability
In the early 1990s, the global concern increased over crucial
environmental issues such as global climate change, along with the
pollution and the waste of water and land, which subsequently bashed the
traditional structure of energy security.130 The world community, through
the United Nations, took many steps to combat devastating consequences of
global warming and climate change. The United Nations proposed a draft of
the international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), to the governments on the climate change and
environmental issues at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992.131
Until today, 197 countries have signed the UNFCCC treaty that applied for
“precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of
climate change and mitigate its adverse effects.”132 To achieve the
126. Yergin, supra note 17, at 79.
127. A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts, 6 OGEL, no. 3,
Nov. 2008, at 4.
128. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 35.
129. Id.
130. Sovacool & Brown, supra note 6, at 84.
131. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, First Steps to a
Safer Future: Introducing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(Sep. 20, 2016), http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php.
132. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (New York, 9 May
1992) 1771 U.N.T.S.
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objectives of the UNFCCC, the United Nations issued the Kyoto Protocol
in 1997 to commit the signatory members to reduce the emission of
greenhouse gases (GHGs).133 Correspondingly, the 2000 Green Paper of the
European Union identified energy supply damages — whether they occur
by accident such as oil slicks, nuclear accidents, and methane leaks or they
directly cause pollution — as extremely hazardous to the environment.134
Notably, the ecological disasters stemmed from human-made oil spills such
as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989 and the Persian/Arabian Gulf oil spill
in 1991 enhanced the global consciousness on the necessity of
environmental protection plans and policy in the petroleum industry
worldwide.135
Among energy supplies, the health and economic side effects of fossil
fuels, from production to consumption levels, on the environment have
been measured highly critical to the extent that many governments,
predominantly the European Union, apply their energy policy in
compliance with environmental protection standards.136 Many energy
academics and institutes expressed that the “acceptability” element was a
term representing the admixture of energy security and environmental
stewardship objectives.137 Among energy-emphasized scholars and
organizations, “sustainability” is another common term representing the
ecological and social concerns within energy security.138 The APERC, the
research center of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), described
“environmental sustainability” as the method of employing energy supply
that an economy applied to grow in a way that method would also ensure
future generations to benefit from that environmental resource.139
Energy scholars presented many reasons for the importance of
environmental sustainability features in the modern form of energy security.
107, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), at 4.
133. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
The United Nations (Dec. 11, 1997), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
134. Eur-Lex, supra note 44.
135. See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 124.
136. See A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Economic, Environmental, Social,
Foreign Policy, Technical and Security Dimension, 6 OGEL no. 3, Nov. 2008, at 2.
137. See e.g., Bert Kruyt et al., Indicators for Energy Security, 37 ENERGY POL’Y
2166, 2167 (2009); see e.g., Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28,
at 27.
138. See e.g., Eur-Lex, supra note 44; see e.g., B.W. Ang et al., Energy Security:
Definitions, Dimensions and Indexes, 42 RENEW. SUSTAINABLE ENERGY REV. 1077,
1082 (2015).
139. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 6..
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Jonathan Elkind, the International Affairs Assistant to the U.S. Secretary of
Energy 2009-present, explained that most energy projects would last a
prolonged period and impact the environment and social life in the long
term.140 Whereas, the assessment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) confined the environmental concerns of the energy industry to
coal, nuclear, and unconventional projects,141 the energy policy of the
European Union includes environmental protection plans for a broad
category of energy infrastructures in the different stages of production,
transportation, and consumption.142 To ensure the economic and
environmental elements of energy security, Alhajji proposed incorporation
between technology and energy sectors in the energy policy as a
requirement to build up a high level of efficiency in modern
accouterments.143
Considering hitherto provided elements of energy security, many
definitions of energy security emerged with the arrival of the 21st century.
Sascha Müller-Kraenner, in Energy Security: re-measuring the world,
summarized modern energy security as “the provision of reasonably priced,
reliable and environmentally friendly energy.”144 The European Union's
stance on the security of energy supply in the 21st century embodied one of
the most comprehensive descriptions of energy security. The 2000 Green
Paper of the European Union stated that “[t]he European Union's long-term
strategy for energy supply security must be geared to ensuring, for the wellbeing of its citizens and the proper functioning of the economy, the
uninterrupted physical availability of energy products on the market, at a
price which is affordable for all consumers (private and industrial), while
respecting environmental concerns and looking towards sustainable
development.”145
III. The Gravity of Energy Crisis
The expression “energy crisis” appeared for the first time as the principal
concern of Western countries in 1973 when Arab oil-producing countries in
the Middle East decided to stop exporting oil to developed countries,

140. Elkind & Pascual, supra note 68, at 129.
141. Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 27.
142. See e.g., Eur-Lex, supra note 44.
143. A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Economic, Environmental, Social, Foreign
Policy, Technical and Security Dimension, 6 OGEL no. 3, Nov. 2008, at 3.
144. Müller-Kraenner, supra note 59, at xii.
145. Eur-Lex, supra note 44.
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particularly the United States. However, long before the 1973 oil crisis,
energy convulsions had troubled Western countries, dating back to the end
of World War II. In 1947, Europe suffered from a post-war energy crisis
and the unavailability of coal terrified all of Europe, especially Britain.146
For decades, coal was the primary energy source — more than seventy-five
percent of usage — in Western Europe.147 Later, in the 1950s,
environmental concerns and economic motivations incited Europeans to
shift their primary energy source from coal to oil.148 As a result of this
energy source conversion, European countries, notably in West Europe,
reveled in their “Golden Age” of economic growth; between 1950 and
1973, real GDP per person increased by more than four percent per year.149
The Northwest quadrant of the world owed their significant economic
development to the cheap and abundant oil input into their economy.
Nonetheless, the consequences of the 1973 oil crisis appalled Western
countries when their economic growth shrank by about fifty percent.150
The concept of oil crisis has projected energy crises since the 1950s due to
the reliance on oil supply for economic growth in developed countries.
However, natural gas started taking part in the global economic growth in
the late Twentieth Century.151 Today, crude oil supplies one-third of the
world’s energy usage.152 A sudden interruption in the accessibility of crude
oil would devastate the global economy. Therefore, developed and
emerging economies consider any crisis in the security of oil supply as a
severe world energy crisis.
A. Energy Crises in History
In this section, the author discusses three oil crises that occurred in the
Twentieth Century. Each crisis has its specific criteria and effects on global
economic development. The 1956 Suez Canal crisis, despite being
indirectly related to the oil market, its consequences directly affected the
146. Yergin, supra note 76, at 525.
147. Id. at 526.
148. Id.
149. See Nicholas Crafts, Fifty Years of Economic Growth in Western Europe, 5 World
Econ. 131, 133 (2004).
150. Id.
151. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Global Natural Gas Consumption
Doubled from 1980 to 2010 (Apr. 12, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?
id=5810 (stating that the global consumption of natural gas increased from 53 trillion cubic
feet (Tcf) to more than 113 Tcf between 1980 to 2010).
152. See British Petroleum, supra note 38, at 41(stating that that crude oil provided
4,211.1 Mtoe share of the total global energy consumption, 12,928.4 Mtoe, in 2014).
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security of oil supply, particularly the security of oil transportation from the
Middle East. Predominantly to the United States, an oil interruption derived
from the 1973-74 oil crisis proved how global economic development
depended on the preservation of geopolitical interests of the OPEC
countries. Both the 1956 Suez Canal crisis and the 1973-74 oil crisis
substantiated a claim that the lack of physical elements of energy security
could lead to devastating energy crises around the globe. In both
circumstances, the Middle East had deprived Western countries of
accessing the oil supply. Finally, the 1979 and 1980 oil crises surprised all
international oil players, proving that politics would not be the only factor
to manipulate the oil industry, but the global market and its economic
feature could concern the oil security of both producing and consuming
countries.
1. The 1956 Suez Canal Crisis
For the first time in the Twentieth Century, the Western world confronted
an oil crisis during the 1956 Suez Canal crisis. However, the 1938
nationalization of the oil industry in Mexico and later, the 1951 oil
nationalization in Iran had previously deprived American and British oil
companies of lucrative concessions.153 At that time, the United States and
British governments did not face any challenging oil crises due to their oil
companies having access to abundant oil supplies within giant oil fields in
other parts of the world.154 However, the 1956 Egyptian nationalization of
the Suez Canal caused a severe oil crisis in Europe which led to a military
confrontation as well. The Suez Canal is an artificial waterway in Egypt
that connects the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea; it was an essential
element of national security for the British Empire to have closer access to
India for decades.155 After World War II, the post-war reconstruction in
Europe demanded a large quantity of crude oil from the Middle East, and
two-thirds of crude oil supplied from Persian/Arabian Gulf was transferred
to Europe through the Suez Canal by 1955.156
Inspired by the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry in 1951, the
Egyptian ruler, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, started challenging Britain

153. Mabro, supra note 74, at 4; see also Yergin, supra note 76, at 437.
154. See Clayton R. Koppes, The Good Neighbor Policy and the Nationalization of
Mexican Oil: A Reinterpretation, 69 J. Am. His. 62 (Oxford University Press 1982). See also
Yergin, supra note 76, at 446.
155. Yergin, supra note 76, at 461.
156. Id. at 462.
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and France on the ownership of the Suez Canal and its revenue.157 Nasser,
who had grabbed the power through a military coup in 1956, initially
claimed a one-half revenue share of the Anglo-French Suez Canal
Company in 1955.158 Following the British and French denial of profitsharing with Egypt, Nasser’s army expropriated the Suez Canal on July 26,
1956.159 When British, French, and Israeli armies attacked Sinai — the
Egyptian Peninsula — in November 1956, Nasser blocked the Suez Canal
with dozens of Egyptian ships, and then closed the Canal.160 At the same
time, sabotage on the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline, which was
transporting oil from Iraq to Israel, interrupted exports of crude oil from the
Middle East to Europe.161 As a result, Europe encountered an oil crisis in
December 1956.162
The Petroleum Emergency Group, under the Organization for European
Economic Cooperation (the predecessor to the OECD), announced an
emergency oil supply program, the “Oil Lift;” it required intensive
cooperation among the United States and European governments and
companies to combat the 1956-1957 oil crisis.163 The Oil Lift ordered a
decrease in oil usage to the pre-Suez level in Europe.164 Most importantly,
Western countries decided to improve their oil tankers which led to the
invention of the VLCC and ULCC supertankers to carry hundreds of
thousands of tons of crude oil around the Cape of Good Hope to Europe.165
The Oil Lift program rescued the European countries from the 1956-1957
oil crisis by supplying almost ninety percent of the interrupted oil during
the Suez Canal crisis.166 At the end of the Suez Canal crisis in April 1957,
Egypt kept the ownership right of the Suez Canal and the European tankers
resumed transporting crude oil through the Suez Canal.167

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 467.
Id. at 464.
Id.
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id. at 475.
Id.
Id.
Mabro, supra note 74, at 4.
Yergin, supra note 76, at 476.
Id. at 477.
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2. The 1973-1974 Oil Crisis
For the first time, the world perceived the dramatic and acute effects of
the “oil weapon”168 on global economic development in the 1973 ArabIsrael War (known as the “Yom Kippur War”). The 1973 Arab oil embargo
against the United States and Holland also disrupted the economy of
Western Europe and Japan, similar to the way that the sudden oil shortage
had stopped the post-World War II pace of their economic development.169
The sudden drop in oil production and exports to developed countries
instigated an oil crisis that slumped Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and
generated economic recession and high unemployment.170
Years before 1973, Arab members of the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) made a common political retort against
Western countries who were sponsoring the State of Israel during the 1967
Arab-Israel War.171 Arab oil-exporting countries withdrew from the 1967
Oil Embargo because Arab countries noticed that the prolonged interruption
of the Arabian Light Oil export was considerably diminishing their
revenue.172 In 1967, the Arabian Light Oil was traded at less than 3.5 USD
per barrel,173 and non-OPEC members — particularly the United States —
were producing the majority oil in the world.174
The 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, on the other hand, generated a severe
global energy crisis. On October 16, 1973, Arab members of the OPEC
agreed to no longer export oil to the United States and the Netherlands due
to their support of the State of Israel during the Yom Kippur War.175
Moreover, the Saudi-led oil embargo contained an oil production cut plan,
“an initial [ten percent] cutbacks, and then an additional five percent each
month.”176 The significant shortage of the Arabian Light Oil virtually

168. Mabro, supra note 74, at 2.
169. Yergin, supra note 76, at 598.
170. Bielecki, supra note 8, at 236.
171. See M.S. Daoudi & M.S. Dajani, The 1967 Oil Embargo Revisited, 13 J. Palestine
Stud. 65, 69 (University of California Press 1984).
172. Yergin, supra note 76, at 525 Yergin, supra note 76, at 596.
173. Colin J. Campbell & Jean H. Laherrère, The End of Cheap Oil, 278 Sci. Am. 78, 81
(1998).
174. Daoudi & Dajani, supra note 171, at 84.
175. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 595 (stating that the 1973-74 Arab oil embargo, later,
included Portugal, South Africa, and Rhodesia).
176. Id.
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quadrupled oil prices in the oil market.177 As a result, Western Europe and
Japan also confronted a critical economic crisis which impaired their
important post-World War II economic development.178 The 1973 Arab oil
embargo traumatized the United States economy, especially in the fuel
section.179
The second Arab oil embargo in 1973-1974 was more successful in
breaking the economy of developed countries than the 1967 Arab oil
embargo. There were many reasons for the success of the 1973 oil embargo.
As the developed nations doubled their oil consumption by 1973,180 Arab
countries increased their oil production and exports considerably.181
Moreover, the developed countries’ oil stock was very small when they
encountered the sudden oil shortage in 1973.182 Destructive socioeconomic
effects of the 1973 oil crisis led the United States government to plot to
seize oil fields in Arab countries.183
3. The 1979-1980 Oil Crisis
A series of interrelated global economic and political affairs in 1979 and
1980 helped trigger two consecutive oil shocks that created a distinctive oil
crisis. The 1979-80 oil crisis not only appalled developed countries but also
jeopardized the economy of oil-exporting countries for the first time.184 The
first oil shock appeared in 1979 as a direct consequence of the revolution
that overthrew the thirty-eight-year reign of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the
Shah of Iran.185 Besides the fact that Iran was the second-largest oil
producer in the OPEC in 1978, the Western bloc valued the Shah of Iran as
177. Yergin, supra note 76, at 597 (stating that on October 16, 1973, the posted oil price
of the OPEC was US $5.40 per barrel which was increased to over US $22 a barrel a few
weeks after the embargo).
178. Id. at 598.
179. Id. at 599.
180. Id. at 573 (stating that the United State had doubled its oil import to 6.2 million
barrels of oil per day (b/d) in the middle of 1973).
181. Id. at 596 (stating that Arab countries were exporting more than twenty million b/d
in 1973).
182. See A.F. Alhajji & James L. Williams, The Coming Energy Crisis? Keep Current on
the Oil and Gas Industry, 1 OGEL, no. 2, Mar. 2003, Fig. 4 (showing that the U.S. oil stock
had covered less than 150 days in 1973 while, ten years later, the U.S increased its oil stock
capacity to more than five hundred days in 1983).
183. See Glenn Frankel, U.S. Mulled Seizing Oil Fields in ’73, Washington Post (Jan. 1,
2004), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2004/01/01/us-mulled-seizing-oilfields-in-73/0661ef3e-027e-4758-9c41-90a40bbcfc4d/?utm_term=.7dcfd215ef1d.
184. Yergin, supra note 76, at 667.
185. Id. at 656.
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an essential ally in the Middle East for decades.186 In the early days of the
1979 Iranian revolution, Iranian oil production had declined to about two
million barrels per day, due to the commotion and labor strikes in the Iranian
oil industry.187 Despite Saudi Arabia increasing its oil exports to fulfill the
two-million-barrel-per-day shortage from Iran, the panic of an oil shortage
completely engulfed the global oil market.188 Subsequently, the oil price
rocketed from thirteen to thirty-four dollars per barrel at the end-1979.189
The post-1974 updated energy policy of the OECD was unable to help
developed countries overcome the extreme consequences of the 1979 oil
shock. A savage race among the OECD members over their economic
development spectacularly augmented the global oil demand.190 At the
same time, the United States, the world’s largest economy and oil
consumer, had lost twenty-seven percent of its proven reserves by 1976.191
As a result of the loss in reserves, the United States imported fifteen percent
more crude oil in 1978 than it did in 1973.192 Learned from the 1973-74 oil
crisis, the OECD members had established the International Energy Agency
(IEA) to prepare for impending oil crises.193 According to advisory reports
of the IEA, the OECD governments had been cooperating closely to control
the 1979 oil shock.194 Nevertheless, the OECD members were unsuccessful
because their oil companies acted impatiently by bidding against each other
for oil supply, causing a price surge; this approach contradicted the energy
policy of their governments and the IEA approvals.195
186. Id. at 27. (stating that due to the close relationships between Iran and the United
States, Shah had disagreed to join Arab members of the OPEC to embargo Western
countries in 1973, and the Soviet Union never accessed the Persian/Arabian Gulf via Iran).
187. Id. at 667.
188. Id. at 666.
189. Id.
190. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 4 (stating that for example, the US
petroleum consumption reached 17.1 million b/d in 1978 which it was eight percent higher
than in 1973).
191. Yergin, supra note 76, at 647.
192. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 4 (stating that “[the United States oil]
imports as a percentage of petroleum supply increased at a more or less steady rate to 42% in
1978 from 35% in 1973 and exceeded 50% for a few months during that time span”).
193. International Energy Agency (IEA), Our Mission (Sep. 10, 2016), http://www.
iea.org/about/ (stating that “the IEA is an autonomous organisation which works to ensure
reliable, affordable and clean energy for its 29 member countries and beyond. The IEA has
four main areas of focus: energy security, economic development, environmental awareness
and engagement worldwide”).
194. Yergin, supra note 76, at 667.
195. Id.
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Besides oil-importing countries, Saudi Arabia was the only oil-exporting
country that was warry of the 1979 spike in oil price.196 Overwhelmed by
the joy of capturing the unexpected oil revenue, other oil-exporting
countries never envisaged that the 1979 oil shock would jeopardize their
energy security and economy.197 Soon, the flame of the 1979 oil shock was
fanned by another oil price shock in September 1980, when the Iraqi Army
invaded the largest oil-producing province in Iran.198 In the early months of
the Iraq-Iran War, the global oil market lost four million barrels per day,
eight percent of the total oil demand in the world; accordingly, the price per
barrel of Arabian Light Oil abruptly soared to forty-two dollars.199
OECD countries, who had suffered from the 1979 oil shock due to the
uncoordinated actions of their oil companies, had become more skilled at
combating the 1980 oil shock through closer collaboration with their oil
companies.200
The 1979 and 1980 oil price shocks had together caused an oil crisis
from which oil-importing countries suffered economically due to the oil
price surge during the crisis, and after the surge, oil-exporting countries —
particularly OPEC members — experienced an unfortunate reality in the oil
market for the first time. Perhaps, the most considerable consequence of the
1979-1980 oil crisis was the end of the OPEC imperium in the global oil
market.201 Only one year after the 1979-1980 oil crisis, the oil “mini-glut”
caused a twenty-seven percent decline in OPEC’s oil exports.202 OPEC’s
position never improved in the 1980s, and even worsened in the oil glut of
1986, when the output of OPEC was halved.203 After the 1979-80 oil crisis,
the global market witnessed an oil glut when production of new oil
discoveries in Mexico, Britain, Norway, Alaska, and other non-OPEC
countries started oversupplying the market.204 Yamani, then-Saudi Arabia’s
196. Id. at 685 (stating that Ahmed Zaki Yamani, Saudi Oil Minister 1962-1986 had
warned OPEC members that oil price shock would generate recession in the global
economy, and that would damage the OPEC countries).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 691.
199. Id. at 693.
200. Id. at 695 (stating that the global oil demand fell, and high inventories convinced oil
companies to follow a guidance issued by their member counties in the IEA to avoid
overbidding the OPEC’s oil supply).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 696.
203. Bielecki, supra note 8, at 236.
204. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 3 (stating that Alaskan production, for
instance, increased from 464,000 b/d in 1978 to 1.6 million b/d in 1980).
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Oil Minister, confessed that the insatiable voracity of OPEC members was
the main reason for the creation of the oil glut in the 1980s.205
All three of these energy crises — the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, the 197374 oil crisis, and the 1979-80 oil crisis — had detrimental impacts on socioeconomic aspects and national security of both developed and emerging
countries. All of those energy crises ended in speculation, recession,
inflation, and higher unemployment in the world.206 They also restrained the
diplomatic maneuver of political superpowers, such as the United States,
against the oil-importing countries whose actions might be considered a
threat to the national security of the United States.207 Thus, delicate studies
and analyses of earlier energy crises likely present beneficial experiences to
impede parallel threats against energy security in the future.
B. Standing Descriptions of Energy Crisis
Since the 1970s energy crisis, energy scholars have provided substantial
literature examining energy supply crises, particularly oil crises. In doing
so, many studies on oil crises concentrated on specific and limited causes
and effects of energy crises that had occurred in specific regions or
countries. For instance, James L. Smith, an energy scholar at Southern
Methodist University, focused on the economic aspect of oil supply and the
impacts of oil price instability on the global oil market, which creates energy
crises.208 Michael L. Ross strove to discover obvious correlations between
natural resources, predominantly oil and gas and civil wars in energyexporting countries.209 Furthermore, Peter Toft investigated whether
intrastate conflicts in oil-exporting countries threatened the oil market and
caused severe energy crises.210 Many energy scholars, however, sought to
dispense a comprehensive definition by covering all critical aspects that
shape an energy crisis.
Among them, Alhajji and Williams defined an energy crisis as “a
situation in which the nation suffers from disruption of energy supplies (in

205. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 695 (stating that Ahmed Zaki Yamani was the longrun Saudi Oil Minister from 1962 to 1986).
206. Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 2.
207. Id. at 3.
208. James L. Smith, World Oil: Market or Mayhem?, 23 J. Economic Perspectives 145,
146 (2009).
209. Michael L. Ross, What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War?, 41 J.
Peace Res. 337 (2004).
210. Peter Toft, Intrastate Conflict in Oil Producing States: A Threat to Global Oil
Supply?, 39 Energy Pol’y 7265 (2011).
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the US case, oil) accompanied by rapidly increasing prices that threaten
economic and national security.”211 Alhajji and Williams jointly expressed
that an energy crisis causes economic and national threats when a country is
unable to access to energy supplies.212 To illustrate, Alhajji and Williams
referred to the 1970’s energy crises when a sudden disruption of oil imports
from the Middle East rocketed energy prices.213 Moreover, they explained
how the 1970’s energy crises, both the 1973-74 oil crisis and the 1979-80
oil market crisis, confined the capability of active international players in
their foreign policy affairs, in addition to the direct impacts on the
economic growth of a country.214
Later, in a separate article, Alhajji expounded that both “a decline in
GDP growth and a threat to national security” was measured as two
elements of an energy crisis.215 Alhajji explained that energy crises most
likely restrict the foreign diplomatic power of the United States; he
introduced this as a real threat to the U.S. national security.216 To analyze
the concept of energy security, Alhajji tried to depict a distinct line between
the terms “energy crisis” and “threat to energy security.”217 For example,
Alhajji elucidated that “energy insecurity,” one form of a threat to energy
security, would enlarge the possibility of an energy crisis; but, it would not
necessarily end in an energy crisis.218
Alhajji and Williams, in their article defining the concept of the energy
crisis, introduced the disruption of energy supply as a leading cause of an
energy crisis or an environment in which an energy crisis could grow.219
However, they did not explain what factors could initiate the disruption of
the energy supply. The section below will examine the pathology of an
energy crisis to analyze and clarify primary sources of supply disruption,
particularly physical casualty.

211. Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 2.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Definitions and Concepts, 6 OGEL, no. 3,
Nov. 2008, at 6.
216. Id. at 3.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 4.
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C. The Pathology of Energy Crises
An energy policy aims to prevent an energy crisis and provide security of
energy supply.220 To that end, energy policy strives to assure that all
elements of energy security are protected.221 The most updated view — on
which the first section of this chapter has expounded — has structured the
concept of energy security using the elements of availability, accessibility,
affordability, and acceptability. However, energy security is naturally
termed: a status in which energy supply is continuously available at a
price that a country can afford.222 Thus, incomplete elements of energy
security could generate a substantial shortage of energy supply. Moreover,
energy scholars have indicated that energy supply interruption, particularly
oil, leads countries to energy crises and economic downturns.223 Developed
countries experienced a sudden shortage of crude oil during the 1970s oil
crisis, and their economies collapsed because of the oil price surge.224
Therefore, an energy crisis appears when the absence of the energy security
elements concludes in the disruption of the energy supply.
Through explaining three central energy crises from the previous
century — the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, the 1973-74 oil crisis, and the 197980 oil crisis — the author discovered that the energy security of the
economically-suffered countries missed more than one of the elements
before the crises started. Nonetheless, more energy crises occurred in the
aftermath due to the paucity of elements of energy security. Along these
lines, this study illustrates how the absence of each element of energy
security has produced energy crises in the world.
Starting with the most modern element of energy security, the
acceptability of energy security requires countries to apply environmental
protection standards to their energy policy.225 Environmental sustainability
strives to ensure that current consumers and future generations will
uninterruptedly benefit from natural energy resources with no harm to the
environment.226 Due to the combustion of fossil fuels, the increasingly220. See, e.g., Bielecki, supra note 8, at 235.
221. Kruyt, supra note 19, at 2166.
222. International Energy Agency, supra note 44.
223. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 2.
224. See Bielecki, supra note 8, at 236; see also Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 2
(stating that in both oil crises of the 1973 and the 1979, Western countries suffered from
economic recessions, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) drop, and high unemployment).
225. See A. F. Alhajji, What is Energy Security? Economic, Environmental, Social,
Foreign Policy, Technical and Security Dimension, 6 OGEL no. 3, Nov. 2008, at 2.
226. See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 6.
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populated world has been suffering from palpable climate change, derived
from temperature increases and the atmosphere’s “greenhouse gases
accumulation,” in addition to regional air pollution.227 Many statistics prove
that the unprecedented heatwave and natural disasters — including floods,
drought, and storms — have negatively affected human health and
contributed to environmental degradation.228 A large segment of the
damaging effects of natural disasters stemmed from the destruction of
underlying energy infrastructure in the past decade.
For example, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which made landfall in the
Gulf of Mexico and surrounding states in August and September of 2005,
significantly disrupted oil and natural gas production, as well as refinery
capacity in the United States.229 Another dreadful event in March 2011, a
powerful earthquake and tsunami, hit the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power
plant in Northern Japan; as a result, tens of thousands of Japanese citizens
were forced to evacuate the radioactive-contaminated areas.230 Furthermore,
the environment has endured many human-made catastrophes due to oil
spills, notably the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the 1991 Persian/Arabian
Gulf oil spill, and the 2011 Macondo oil spill.231
From the economic element of energy security, some energy scholars
claim that the flexibility and productivity of the global energy market
contribute to the security of energy supply, in addition to political
interactions between energy-related countries.232 This statement noticeably
evolved after the 1986 collapse of oil price.233 Since then, price fluctuations

227. A. Haines et al., Climate Change and Human Health: Impacts, Vulnerability and
Public Health, 120 Public Health 585, 594 (2006).
228. Id.
229. Yergin, supra note 17, at 74. (stating that both Hurricanes Katrina and Rita shot
down up to 27 percent of oil production and 21 percent of refinery capacity in the US).
230. See Mark Holt et al., Fukushima Nuclear Disaster Specialist in Energy Policy,
Cong. Res. Serv., Jan. 18, 2012, at 2 (stating that the tsunami destroyed the backup power
system of Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, and Japanese government forced more
than 100,000 residents to evacuate their houses, up to 25 miles far from the nuclear power
plant).
231. See Daniel Yergin, The Quest: Energy, Security, And the Remaking Of The Modern
World, 249 (Penguin Putnam 2011); See also U.S. Energy Information Administration,
supra note 124.
232. See e.g., Yergin et al., supra note 64, at 87.
233. See Bielecki, supra note 8, at 238; see also Aleh Cherp & Jessica Jewell, The Three
Perspectives on Energy Security: Intellectual History, Disciplinary Roots and the Potential
for Integration, 3 Curr. Opin. Envtl. Sustainability 202, 205 (2011).
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resulting from considerable gaps between supply and demand have
fabricated shocking crises in the world.234
Global oil consumption in the 1980s was about six million barrels per
day less than the 1979 level, and at the same time, non-OPEC producers
were delivering an extra four million barrels of oil per day to the market.235
The United States’ dependency on oil imports, for example, declined to its
lowest level from 1983-86 (figure 1). Thus, the price of OPEC crude oil
dropped from $23.29 in December 1985 to $9.85 in July 1986.236 The 1986
oil glut resulted in a shocking energy crisis, the third oil shock, for both
OPEC and non-OPEC oil producers. Some of the OPEC countries, Iran and
Libya, lost up to forty-two percent of their oil revenue due to the 1986 oil
price collapse.237 Many strip oil wells in the United States, the most
significant non-OPEC producer, were shut down; subsequently, the national
oil production suffered the loss of one million barrels per day, and the
United States’ oil import dependency doubled in 1987.238

Figure 1: US Petroleum Import Dependency239
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 35.
Yergin, supra note 76, at 700.
See U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 124.
Yergin, supra note 76, at 741.
See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 4.
Id. at fig. 2.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

658

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

One decade later, in 2008, another oil shock appalled the global energy
market. The early years of the Twenty-First Century coincided with a
substantial reduction in global oil production, particularly in the United
States, Mexico, and the North Sea.240 At the same time, the significant
economic growth of China and India, containing one-third of the global
population, rocketed oil demand in the world.241 Overall, the real global
GDP increased an extra 10.1% in 2006 and 2007.242 As a result, oil prices
noticeably rose from 2001 to 2007, and then the global oil market was
shocked by a dramatic oil price surge in 2008. Oil prices increased from $25
per barrel in 2001 to $70 per barrel in July 2007 and then rapidly jumped to
the high of $145 per barrel in July 2008.243 The 2008 oil price shock
diminished purchasing power in the United States and cut the profit of the
United States automobile industry significantly.244 The 2014 oil price shock
was another financial consequence of an oil oversupply in the global
market.245
Finally, the geological and geopolitical concerns over the adequacy of
energy supply have been categorized as the physical aspect of energy
security, which is represented by two elements: availability and
accessibility.246 A lack of these two factors limits the capability of a country
to benefit from energy supply, leading to the country falling into a severe
energy crisis. The following research explains the nexus between energy
crises; and the unavailability and inaccessibility of energy supply.
1. Unavailability and Energy Crises
The availability of energy supply has traditionally covered the geological
concerns over energy supply.247 Both the 1956 King Hubbert’s Peak Oil
Theory and the 1972 Club of Rome publication, “The Limits to Growth,”
240. See James D. Hamilton, Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08
(Working Paper No. 15002, Nat’l Bureau of Eco. Res., May 2009) 57.
241. See Klare, supra note 99 (stating that China oil consumption increased over 200
percent, from 2.3 million b/d to 7.4 million b/d, between 1990 and 2006).
242. Hamilton, supra note 240, at 11.
243. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC Annual Report
2008 (2009) at 21.
244. Hamilton, supra note 240, at 36.
245. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC Annual Report
2015 (2016) at 21 (stating that in 2015, more than two million barrels of oil per day has been
oversupplied in the market).
246. Kruyt, supra note 19, at 2167.
247. See e.g., Sovacool, supra note 7, at 151.
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anticipated that the depletion of oil reservoirs would demolish the modern
lifestyle of humankind.248 These two anticipations, along with a few others,
were incorrect about the exact time the world would run out of oil.249 Oil
production has even grown in many parts of the world since the beginning of
the Twenty-First Century due to the discovery and development of
unconventional oil reservoirs.250 The Theory of Peak Oil and its endorsing
viewpoints accurately apply to the depletion of the conventional oil
reservoirs in the world.251 Conventional oil reservoirs, unlike
unconventional reservoirs, require less capital and controversial
technology.252
In the United States, oil production from conventional reservoirs
decreased to its lowest rate at the beginning of the Twenty-First Century
(figure 2), while oil consumption was at its highest level.253 In other words,
United States oil imports averaged ten to eleven million barrels a day in the
2000s, the highest rate of oil imports globally.254 That status was of great
concern to the United States Administration on national security in the
2000s.255 The increasing import trend would have continued if the United

248. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 237; see also Mabro, supra note 74, at 4.
249. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 231 (stating that the concept of oil reservoirs’
depletion has been mentioned five times totally).
250. See U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), U.S. Field Production of Crude Oil
(Sep.
30,2016),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCR
FPUS2&f=A (stating that oil production rate of the US has almost doubled since 2008 when
the U.S. was only producing five million b/d).
251. See Colin J. Campbell & Jean H. Laherrère, The End of Cheap Oil, 278 SCI. AM.
78, 78 (1998).
252. Nick A. Owen et al., The Status of Conventional World Oil Reserves—Hype or
Cause for Concern?, 38 Energy Pol’y 4743, 4745 (Elsevier BV 2010).
253. See U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), U.S. Crude Oil Production in
2015 Was the Highest Since 1972, But Has Since Declined (Nov. 7, 2016), http://www.eia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=28672 (stating that the US oil production was reduced to
less than five million b/d in 2008 when the US was consuming more than twenty million
b/d).
254. See U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), U.S. Net Imports of Crude Oil and
Petroleum Products (Sep. 30, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.
ashx?n=pet&s=mttntus2&f=a.
255. See e.g., President Bush’s State of the Union Address, Washington Post (Feb. 1,
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/31/AR20060131014
68.html (stating that George W Bush, the 43d President of the United States, in his 2006
State of the Union Address declared that the United States had faced “a serious problem”
due to its oil addiction imported from “unstable” countries).
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States had not developed its unconventional oil reservoirs, particularly tight
oil, in the late 2000s (figure 3).

Figure 2: The United States Oil Production256

Figure 3: U.S. Tight Oil Production257

256. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at Fig. 1.
257. U.S. Energy Information Agency (EIA), Shale in the Unites States (Aug. 15, 2016),
Tbl. 3, https://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/shale_in_the_united_states.cfm.
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As conventional oil reservoirs depleted, increasing global oil
consumption led the world to depend on challenging unconventional oil
discoveries, namely oil shales and oil sands, which ultimately relied on
enhanced technology and astronomical capital investment.258 Additionally,
uncertainty regarding the safety aspects of unconventional infrastructure has
continually frightened the world concerning environmental catastrophes.
Perhaps, this fear permeated the world in 2011 when an explosion on the
BP Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico created the most
massive offshore oil spill in the world.259
The availability element of energy security also involves non-geological
aspects of the energy industry because of the growing global demand for
unconventional oil production. Adequate capital investment, advanced
technology, appropriate regulations, and refining capacity are considered
crucial factors to fulfill the availability element of energy security.260
Shortage of these factors has even generated dire predicaments in oil-rich
countries. Venezuela, which owns the world’s largest proven oil reserves,
has been importing oil due to its highly restrictive governmental regulations
and a deficiency in foreign investment in its national oil industry that
prominently contains unconventional oil reservoirs.261 Nigeria, due to its
low refining capacity, can only supply twenty percent of its gasoline
demand, despite the nation producing over 2.5 million barrels of oil per
day.262
The unavailability of non-geological factors threatens the development
progress of unconventional oil and gas reservoirs and causes the

258. Yergin, supra note 76, at 243.
259. Id.
260. Elkind & Pascual, supra note 68, at 123.
261. See Patrick Gillespie, Oil-Rich Venezuela is Now Importing U.S. Oil, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/02/03/news/economy/venezuela-importsamerican-oil/ (stating that Venezuela imported half million barrels of oil from the US in late
January 2016); see also Matt Egan, Why Venezuela’s Oil Production Plunged to a 13-Year
Low, CNN MONEY (Jul. 12, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/07/12/investing/venezuelacrisis-oil-production-plunges/ (stating that the proven oil reserves in Venezuela are estimated
298 billion barrels, and its oil production was decreased from 3.5 million b/d in 2003 to 2.1
million b/d in 2016).
262. See Julia Payne, Nigeria Aims to Supply 20 pct of Gasoline Demand Itself, Reuters
(Jul. 10, 2015), http://www.reuters.com/article/nigeria-oil-refineries-idUSL8N0ZQ37O
20150710 (stating that the refining capacity of Nigeria has been decreasing to under forty
percent, lack of maintenance and security as well as corruption issues were identified as
main reason); See also Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Nigeria
Facts and Figures (May 3, 2016), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm.
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productivity of conventional reservoirs to dwindle. A proper example of this
statement is Iran, home of the world’s largest proven reserves of natural
gas263 and OPEC’s third-largest proven oil reserves.264 Because the Iranian
“buy-back” model for oil and gas contracts has not attracted foreign
investors, Iran is currently struggling to develop its oil and natural gas fields
because of the lack of capital investment and advanced technology.265 A
similar situation is threatening an Iranian neighbor — Iraq. Southern Iraqi
super-giant oil fields, Rumaila and West Qurna, desperately need an
adequate water supply for injection operations to protect reservoir pressure
and guarantee the required development plan.266 Due to the scarcity of
freshwater in its southern area, Iraq had to build a high-cost seawater
treatment plant, the Common Seawater Supply Facility (CSSF).267 The
2012 ExxonMobil withdrawal from the CSSF project has led to Iraqi
concerns regarding the unavailability of water for the development of its oil
fields, which linger on until today.268
Many non-geological factors covered by the availability element of
energy security are closely related to the accessibility element of energy
security. Therefore, the availability and accessibility elements make up the
physical aspect of energy security.
2. Inaccessibility and Energy Crises
Energy crises are also engendered by human activities involving the
acquisition, administration, and utilization of energy supply. Human-made
energy crises are easily distinguishable distinguished from natural or
geological oil and gas crises because of the depletion of oil and gas
reservoirs. The preceding section explained that the discovery of
unconventional oil and gas resources reduced the global concern over the
availability of energy supply. However, this section will revise the human-

263. British Petroleum (BP), BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, Jun.
2016, 20, https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/energy-economics/statistical-review2016/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2016-full-report.pdf. (ranking Iran on the top of
largest proved natural gas reserves in the world).
264. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC Share of World
Crude Oil Reserves (Mar. 5, 2016), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm.
265. Paul Stevens, Prospects for Iran’s Oil and Gas Sector, Chatham House: Royal Inst.
of Int’l Affairs, Research Paper, pg. 8 (Mar. 2015).
266. See International Energy Agency (IEA), World Energy Outlook Special Report
2012 – Iraq Energy Outlook (2012), at 66.
267. Id. at 62, 102.
268. Id. at 68.
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made or non-natural factors, predominantly geopolitical features, which
create energy crises.
The ability of a country to secure continuous access to available energy
supply for its economy constituted the second physical element of energy
security:
accessibility.269
Energy-consuming
countries
pursue
“diversification” to provide different sources of oil supply to reduce the
substantial consequences of oil interruptions on their economy.270 The high
dependency of energy-consuming countries, e.g., the United States, on
imported energy from unstable oil regions, makes the national security of
Western nations vulnerable.271 By galvanizing the accessibility element of
their energy security, energy-consuming states aim to reduce their supply
reliance on producing countries. The accessibility element has traditionally
covered the geopolitical concerns of consuming countries over energy
supply in producing regions.272
On the other hand, an absence of accessibility or inaccessibility may
push energy-consuming countries toward severe energy crises. In the 197374 oil crisis, for example, the United States was highly dependent on oil
imports from Arab countries.273 At the same time, regional political tension
in the Middle East spiraled into a regional war between Arab countries and
the State of Israel, and the Arab members of the OPEC stopped exporting
oil to the United States and other countries who supported Israel in the
war.274 That is to say, the high oil import dependency of consuming
countries, along with supply interruptions due to political turmoil in oilproducing countries, constrained the consuming world from having access
to oil supply and subsequently led them to an energy crisis.
More than two-thirds of the global oil supply is produced in the Middle
East, Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and post-Soviet states.275
Additionally, many of the oil-producing regions are struggling with
substantial political instability, internal turmoil, terrorism, a feeble rule of

269. See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 6.
270. Yergin, supra note 17, at 76.
271. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 5.
272. See e.g., Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 19.
273. See Alhajji & Williams, supra note 182, at 4.
274. Yergin, supra note 76, at 595.
275. British Petroleum, supra note 263, at 8 (stating that the mentioned regions produced
more than sixty million barrels of oil per day out of 91.67 million barrels of oil per day, the
total global oil production, in 2015).
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law, and pervasive official corruption.276 The instability of oil-producing
regions may, at any moment, cause supply interruption, which could halt
global economic development. Thus, the oil-consuming countries are
concerned about the geopolitical sources of supply interruptions. The
following research discerns three primary sources of geopolitical concerns
over energy security.
a) Intrastate and Interstate Conflicts
The main geopolitical concern of the consuming world noticeably arises
from intrastate and interstate conflicts in producing countries. Starting with
intrastate conflicts, many scholars, such as Collier and Hoefler, believe
substantial that oil rents, along with other natural resources, motivate the
belligerents to start clashes to oust the government.277 Identifying this
financial incentive of rebellions as a direct cause of intrastate armed
confrontations, Peter Toft asserted that a weak governing body to provide
security represented an indirect cause for oil production reduction.278 Using
the post-2011 Libyan internal conflict as an example, Toft also stated that
the Libyan oil interruption threatened the energy security of energyimporting countries.279 In sub-Saharan Africa, rebellions in the Niger Delta
caused a significant supply disruption by attacking on-shore Nigerian oil
infrastructure in 2008.280 Based on the 2010 dataset from the Correlates of
War (“COW”) Project, 133 intrastate wars occurred globally between 1965
and 2007, with 42 of 133 civil wars occurring in oil-exporting countries.281
The 1980-88 Iraq-Iran war and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990
epitomized the robust link between interstate conflicts and oil
interruptions.282
276. See The World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators (Apr. 21, 2016),
http://Info.Worldbank.Org/Governance/Wgi/Index.Aspx#Reports (stating that these regions
ranked among countries with the lowest political and governance stability in the world in
2015).
277. Paul Collier & Anke Hoeffler, Greed and Grievance in Civil War, 56 Oxford Econ.
Papers 563, 588 (Oxford University Press 2004).
278. See Toft, supra note 210, at 7266.
279. Id.
280. See Carlos Pascual & Evie Zambetakis, The Geopolitics of Energy From Security to
Survival, in Energy Security: Economics, Politics, Strategies, and Implications, 9, 13-14
(2010).
281. The Correlates of War Project (COW), Cow War Data, 1816 - 2007 (V4.0) - Cow
War List - Appendix A Chronological List of All Wars (2010), http://www.correlatesofwar.
org/data-sets/COW-war/cow-war-list.
282. Yergin, supra note 76, at 755.
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b) Authoritarian Governments
Another geopolitical concern of OECD members concerning energy
security is the growth of authoritarianism in three countries that are the
world’s major oil and gas producers. Iran, Venezuela, and Russia,
altogether, possess more than one-third of the world’s total proven oil and
natural gas reserves and produce about one-fifth of the total oil supply on
the global market.283 Contending for regional authority and influence, Iran,
Venezuela, and Russia have employed oil and gas weapons against
neighboring countries and consumers to confound the OECD countries,
particularly the United States.284 Despite the imposition of many U.S.-led
international sanctions and UN Security Council resolutions to prevent or
suspend the Iranian nuclear weapon program in the last decade, Iran has
insisted on developing its nuclear weapons, sponsored by its oil export
revenue.285 By expanding its military operations in the Persian/Arabian
Gulf, Iran has often threatened to shut the Strait of Hurmuz, through which
about forty percent of total oil exports pass.286
To disperse his revolutionary ideology in Latin America, former
President of Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, utilized a policy that restricted
Western countries and their energy companies from investing in the oil
industry of Venezuela and other Latin American countries.287 In Europe, the
dependency of the OECD members on Russian natural gas has led Russia to
use its abundant natural gas as a weapon against the European members
who refuse to accept Putin’s authoritarianism.288
c) Terrorism and Cyber-Attack
Lastly, terrorism and cyber-attacks on the global energy industry have
threatened the energy security of energy-producing and energy-consuming
countries. Identified as an “economic jihad,” Al Qaeda targeted oil and gas
283. British Petroleum, supra note 263, at 20 (stating that Iran, Venezuela, and Russia
own more than 560 billion barrels of proven oil reserves out of the world’s total 1.67 trillion
barrels. These countries possess 2,538 trillion cubic feet (tcf) natural gas proven reserves
when the total natural gas proven reserves in the world is 6,600 tcf. Total oil production of
these countries is 17.5 million b/d out of the total global oil production: 91.6 million b/d).
284. See Pascual & Zambetakis, supra note 280, at 7.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 14-15.
287. Id. at 19.
288. Id. at 20-21 (stating that on the pretext that Ukraine disagreed to pay for its gas,
Russia shut down all gas supply on Ukraine and other European countries in winters of 2006
and 2008).
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infrastructure in the Middle East to make a “powerful revenge” against their
enemies according to the religious fatwa “Judgment on Targeting
Petroleum Interests” issued in 2006 by an Al Qaeda scholar, Shaikh
Abdullah bin Nasser Al-Rashid.289 In two failed attacks in 2006 and 2015,
Al Qaeda fighters attempted to destroy one of the essential Saudi Arabian
oil export terminals in Abqaiq city, in which forty-six pipelines transport
more than seven million barrels of Saudi crude per day to the
Arabian/Persian Gulf.290 Terrorist groups also targeted the oil pipelines in
other countries and foreign oil supertankers.291 After controlling outsized
oil-rich territories in Syria and Iraq in mid-2014, the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria (ISIS), an Islamic jihadist group, earned billions of dollars from
trading produced oil to subsidize their unrecognized state and terrorist
operations.292
Cyber-attacks are another threat to the energy security of both
international oil and gas producers and consumers. The 2012 cyber-attack
on Saudi Aramco, the world’s largest oil-producing company, damaged the
computer network of Aramco for two weeks and concerned Saudi’s oil
consumers, particularly the United States.293
IV. The Global Structure for Energy Security
As principal owners of energy resources, states had unliterary undertaken
the task of protecting their energy security and relied on their national law to

289. Nicole Stracke, Economic Jihad: A Security Challenge for Global Energy Supply,
Security & Terrorism Res. Bull., 27 (Aug. 2007).
290. Alessandria Masi, Saudi Arabia Thwarts “Terrorist” Attack in Abqaiq, World’s
Largest Oil Processing Facility, International Business Times (Sept. 4, 2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/saudi-arabia-thwarts-terrorist-attack-abqaiq-worlds-largest-oilprocessing-facility-2083386.
291. See e.g., Frank Umbach, Global Energy Security and the Implications for the EU,
38 Energy Pol’y 1229, 1233 (2010) (Al-Qaeda has attacked oil infrastructures of Iraq since
2004. Terrorist groups committed a suicide attack against a French oil supertanker, Limburg,
in October 2002).
292. Howard Koplowitz, ISIS Oil Revenue: Islamic State Makes Money by Selling Gas to
Bashar Assad, New BBC2 Documentary Claims, International Business Times (Apr. 22,
2015),
http://www.ibtimes.com/isis-oil-revenue-islamic-state-makes-money-selling-gasbashar-assad-new-bbc2-1892370.
293. Christopher Bronk & Eneken Tikk-Ringas, The Cyber Attack on Saudi Aramco, 55
Survival, no. 2, pg. 82 (May 01, 2013) (stating that regarding the 2012 cyber-attack on
Aramco, Leon Panetta, then US Secretary of Defense expressed that the incident made a
“tremendous concern” for the oil consuming world. From his statement, many speculated
that Iran was behind the attack).
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confront energy crises for many decades.294 However, states’ unilateral
measures to secure their energy demand generated conflicts and wars
among them in the Twentieth Century. Post-World War II globalization and
development compelled governments to prepare a legal framework to settle
common challenges over investment and supply.295 In pursuit of this
objective, states applied two legal procedures to promote active
collaboration and resolve disputes amidst them. Governments signed
treaties to regulate their commercial interactions and established
organizations to implement the rules outlined in the signed agreements. At
the outset, the intergovernmental approach aimed to create organizations
and target broad subjects, such as trade in goods, within a region, or
globally. The global and regional communities have been unable to ease
energy challenges, despite the efforts of these intergovernmental
organizations and agreements covering the energy sector.
As an overarching intergovernmental organization, the United Nations
has played a pivotal role in implementing international law within many
different areas since its establishment, and its members have signed several
treaties — e.g., the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT)/World
Trade Organization (WTO) — to legalize their interactions in the wideranging field of commerce.296 As the principal organization regulating
intergovernmental connections, the United Nations has not been supported
with sufficient technical, financial, and administrative resources to cope
with challenges in specific commercial sectors, such as the energy
market.297 Furthermore, some scholars argue that the United Nations’
multilateral trading system was unable to handle global energy challenges
because the WTO/GATT did not use a distinctive marketing feature to
distinguish energy supplies and regulated energy products according to the
same trade rules as general goods.298 That is probably why many top oil and
gas exporting countries — including Iran, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya — have

294. See A. Konoplianik, Energy Security: The Role of Business, Governments,
International Organisations and International Legal Framework, 6 OGEL, no. 3, Nov.
2008, at 10 (stating that foreign investment on the energy sector was an example that states
had managed through their national law until the second World War).
295. Id. at 9.
296. Melaku G. Desta et al., The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, the
World Trade Organization, and Regional Trade Agreements, 37 J. World Trade 523 (2003).
297. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 5.
298. Desta et al., supra note 296, at 529.
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not joined the WTO so far.299 The United Nations played a pivotal role —
through its active agencies, the UN Economic Commission for Europe
(UNECE), the UN Industrialized Development Organization (UNIDO), the
World Bank, the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the UN
Environment Program (UNEP) — in directing the global energy industry
to operate less aggressively towards the global environment and develop
sustainability and efficiency measures within the energy usage stage.300
The United Nations is not the only intergovernmental organization
involved in global governance. Leaders of the super-economic powers in
the world formed two other global governance organizations — the Group
of Eight (G8) and its expanded version, the Group of Twenty (G20) — in
the third quarter of the Twentieth Century to enhance global economic
coordination. The Heads of Governments in seven countries — the United
States, the United Kingdom, Japan, France, Germany, Italy, and Canada —
established the Group of Seven in the mid-1970s to present and deploy a
joint economic policy against the global challenge of energy disruption at
that time.301 When Russia, as a significant oil producer, joined the
organization in 1997, the Group of Eight was fully established.302 At the
outset of the Twenty-First Century, the G8 started to become more actively
involved in the energy sector. In the aftermath of the 1997 Kyoto protocol
on climate change, the G8 gathered at the 2000 Summit and the 2005
Summit to augment renewable energy usage in developing countries.303 In
2004’s G8 Summit, the members concentrated on the physical security of
energy supply in the Middle East and oil price increases. 304 Although
energy was the impetus of the G8’s establishment, this organization has not
made any strenuous efforts to involve itself in the global energy challenges;
instead, the G8 handed over responsibilities to other world agencies such as

299. The World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: The Organization Members and Observers (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/
whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
300. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 16-19 (stating that the United Nations cooperates with
independent and intergovernmental agencies, e.g., the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
and the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA)).
301. Ann Florini & Benjamin K. Sovacool, Who Governs Energy? The Challenges
Facing Global Energy Governance, 37 Energy Policy 5239, 5239 (2009).
302. Id.
303. See id (stating that in the 2000 G8 Summit, Japan posited a renewable energy task
force to augment the renewable energy usage in developing countries, but the initiative never
grew due the United States’ lack of interest).
304. Id.
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the IEA and the World Bank.305 One explanation for the G8’s passive
stance on global energy security is the lack of an administrative mechanism
in the organization; for instance, there is no permanent secretary or
headquarters for the G8.306 The G8 Records Act shows that the organization
is predominantly engaged in political matters. In March 2014, seven
members of the G8, along with the presidents of the European Council and
European Commission, suspended Russia’s membership in the G8 due to
their military action in Ukraine, in violation of Ukrainian sovereignty.307
In Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”), was
founded in 1967 as a multi-purpose organization to enhance
intergovernmental cooperation among its ten members — Brunei
Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar,
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam — and hasten economic
development in Southeast Asia.308 ASEAN has also shown a keen interest
in the security of energy supply, leading its members to sign the ASEAN
Petroleum Security Agreement (“APSA”) in 1986.309 One of the main
achievements of the APSA was creating an emergency mechanism, the
ASEAN Emergency Petroleum Sharing Scheme, which jointly combats oil
disruption among members.310 ASEAN energy demand will be growing
considerably in the two upcoming decades, and its members rely on the
energy imports for their economic development.311 Unsurprisingly, ASEAN
is incapable of unilaterally influencing global energy supply security trends.
Today, no single governance organization facilitates international energy
conflicts. The current experiment ensues from a dearth of global consensus
on the security of energy supply. Every international organization targeting
a broad range of objectives has subsequently constructed some effective
mechanisms for ensuring energy supply globally. Nonetheless, the matter of
energy security urges the discrete attention of all energy players through an
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Zachary Laub, The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations, Council on Foreign
Relations (Oct. 16, 2017).
308. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, About ASEAN: Overview (Jan. 10,
2017), https://asean.org/about-us/.
309. See Bielecki, supra note 8, at 241.
310. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN Petroleum Security Agreement
Manila, 24 June 1986 (Jan 10, 2017), http://asean.org/?static_post=asean-petroleumsecurity-agreement-manila-24-june-1986.
311. International Energy Agency (IEA), Southeast Asia Energy Outlook (2015), 30
(stating that the IEA anticipated that energy demand of the ASEAN would increase 80% by
2040).
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energy-centered organization that covers the most important, if not all,
aspects of energy security.
A. Intergovernmental Energy Organizations
All governments value their energy sector “as crucial to national security
and national power” because energy resources are predominantly owned by
governments, and energy services play a decisive role in their economic
development.312 Additionally, most energy challenges ensue from conflicts
of interest among states over energy supply. Yet, no substantial progress
appears in the energy business absent direct government involvement. This
reality persuaded governments to be the leading participants in the energy
industry. Many scholars and institutes, through some independent energyrelated foundations, have been acting vigorously for many decades to
proffer practical energy guidance. For example, since 1923, the World
Energy Council (“WEC”) has diligently directed the gathering of thousands
of individual and institutional energy leaders to enhance “an affordable,
stable and environmentally sensitive energy system for the greatest benefit
of all.”313 The WEC is only “the UN-accredited global energy body,” and it
is not a governance agency in which governments need to display their
leading characters in energy tasks.314 Demand for international rules to
manage energy missions convinced governments to become collectively
involved in the decision-making process through an intergovernmental
organization.
On the other hand, the divisive approach of empowering overarching
intergovernmental organizations, such as the United Nations, to settle
global energy challenges disappointed leading energy players in the second
half of the Twentieth Century. In the energy sector, both oil-exporting and
oil-importing states understood that the traditional energy system was
incapable of ensuring the requisite energy security needed to facilitate their
ideal economic development, most notably when post-WWII
Reconstruction generated an oil demand shock in Europe. It became
apparent that only a close collaboration among members of each energy
group could ensure their common energy interests. That objective is only
reachable using an exclusive energy organization among each energy
group.

312. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5239.
313. World Energy Council, About the World Energy Council (Jan. 11, 2017),
https://www.worldenergy.org/about-wec/.
314. Id.
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The structure of energy-centered organizations has gradually advanced
with the evolution of the energy security concept since the beginning of the
Twentieth Century. A good case in point is the debate among some energy
scholars about whether “global energy governance has remained largely
elusive.”315 In the first section of this chapter, Bert Kruyt described the
nature of energy security as “elusive” and “highly context dependent.”316 In
the same way, as most energy scholars and institutes who intentionally
highlight one or two aspects of energy security in their definitions, nearly
all energy organizations have calibrated their institutional mandate to
ensure only one or two aspects of energy security. Intergovernmental
organizations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (“NATO”) and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) take a
leading part in the physical aspect of energy security.317 As mentioned
previously in this research, other global governance organizations — for
instance, the UNDP and the UNEP — had energetically engaged in the
environmental facet of energy security under the auspices of the United
Nations.318 While both collections of agencies are categorized as the allencompassing range of global governance organizations, there are
distinguished intergovernmental energy bodies — the Energy Charter
Conference (“ECC”), the IEA, OPEC, and the International Energy Forum
(IEF) — who genuinely pursue the economic and commercial outlook of
energy security.319 The following section will examine the historical and
modern position and functions of three main energy organizations, OPEC,
the IEA, and the IEF in the global energy industry. ECC’s role is discussed
later in the section that discusses the importance of energy treaties in the
global security of supply. The reasoning for this characterization is that the
ECC is commonly identified as a vehicle used to implement the leading
energy treaty, the Energy Charter Treaty, which will be exclusively
highlighted in the section on energy treaties.
1. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
In the 1950s, rampant socialism and anti-imperialism fever in thirdworld countries, especially in the Middle East, overthrew many pro-

315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

Wheeler, supra note 26, at 5.
Kruyt, supra note 19.
Wheeler, supra note 26, at 4.
Id. at 16-19.
Id. at 4.
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Western rulers through violent coups.320 The pro-Arab nationalistic rulers
already viewed international oil companies as arms of imperialism in their
region.321 The international oil companies, the “Seven Sisters,” who
possessed long-term oil concessions in the Middle East included British
Petroleum (“BP”), Gulf Oil (later Chevron), Standard of California (later
Chevron), Standard of Jersey (later Exxon), Standard of New York (later
Mobil), Texaco (subsequently merged into Chevron), and Royal Dutch
Shell.322 Soon, the greed of the Seven Sisters sparked outrage in the Middle
East and South America. The 18-cent-per-barrel cut off “posted” oil price
by British Petroleum in 1959 raised the ire of leaders of oil-exporting Arab
countries and Venezuela.323 In September 1960, Venezuela, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran gathered in Baghdad to establish an
intergovernmental organization, the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (“OPEC”), “to coordinate and unify petroleum policies
among Member Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for
petroleum producers.”324
OPEC, with its thirteen member countries, currently holds more than
seventy percent of the world’s proven crude oil reserves.325 Both the 2016
OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin and the 2016 BP Statistical Review of
World Energy confirmed that OPEC produced more than forty-two percent
of the total oil supply in the world in 2015.326 Because the oil demand of
OPEC members is less than twelve percent of total world oil demand,

320. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 490 (stating that inspired by a successful coup of the
Army against the King of Egypt in 1952, pro-Arab military officers of Iraq slaughtered
strung up the body of the King of Iraq and slaughtered the pro-Western Prime Minister of
Iraq in 1958).
321. Id. at 485.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 497.
324. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), Brief History (Jan. 10,
2017), http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about us/24.htm.
325. See BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016 6 (2017) (stating that
OPEC members owned 1.211 trillion barrels of the total crude oil proved reserves (about 1.7
trillion barrels) in the world. OPEC, on the other hand, claimed the total global proven
reserves was 200 billion barrels less than the BP report which it increased the percentage of
total OPEC proven reserves to more than 80 percent); see Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016 (2016) at 22.
326. See Organization of The Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), OPEC Annual
Statistical Bulletin 2016, supra note 325, at 28; see also BP, BP Statistical Review of World
Energy June 2016 8 (2017).
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OPEC members export most of their production.327 Also, OPEC has
produced a considerable amount of oil as spare capacity and delivers it to
the market in the event of a sudden shortage of oil supply.328 So long as
crude oil remains the primary source of global energy demand, OPEC will
continue to play a crucial role in global economic development.329
Furthermore, its members believe that OPEC can control oil prices and the
market as long as it possesses the majority of oil production.330
The objectives and strategies of OPEC evolved throughout different
energy crises since its establishment in 1960. OPEC unilaterally regulated
oil prices for more than a decade and never negotiated with other oil market
players, such as oil companies or consuming countries.331 In 1973, OPEC
utilized its oil asset against Western countries to bolster its political power
in the world.332 During the 1980’s-oil glut, OPEC members adopted a new
strategy to manage the quantity of oil supply in the global oil market to
alleviate the effects of an oil price drop.333 Today, OPEC members
recognize the increased role of non-OPEC producers in the market, and
they prefer to collaborate with those non-OPEC producers, principally
Russia, who have “a direct governmental administrative control over its oil
production,” to ensure the oil price stabilization in the world.334 The late
2016 oil deal between OPEC members to cut oil output ended in the 2017
oil price stabilization because Russia had already agreed to cut 300,000 of
its oil output.335 Notwithstanding the recent cooperation with other
producers, OPEC rejects the concept of free trade recommended by the
WTO for all international players of petroleum market, including
international oil companies and significant consuming countries; and,
327. See OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016, supra note 325, at 42 (stating that
OPEC members consume less than 11 million barrels p/d out of the total global oil demand
(93 million barrels p/d) in 2015).
328. Bielecki, supra note 8, at 242.
329. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 8.
330. Catherine Redgwell, International Energy Security in Energy Security: Managing
Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment, 17, 34 (2004).
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Desta et al., supra note 296, at 526.
334. Dr. Kent Moors, OPEC Needs This One Country to Boost Oil Prices – and They’re
About to Cave In, Oil And Energy Investors (Sep. 6, 2016), https://oilandenergyinvestor.
com/2016/09/opec-needs-this-one-country-to-boost-oil-prices-and-theyre-about-to-cave-in/.
335. Vladimir Soldatkin et al., OPEC, Non-OPEC Agree First Global Oil Pact Since
2001, Reuters (Dec. 10, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-opec-meeting-idUSK
BN13Z0J8.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

674

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

OPEC insists on an exclusive control of oil exporting countries to stabilize
the global market.336
2. The International Energy Agency
In response to the Arab oil embargo, the oil-consuming countries in the
western hemisphere recognized that programmed cooperation among their
states was the only way to alleviate the deleterious consequences of the
1973-74 oil crisis on their economic development.337 The developed
countries — formerly seventeen members — who were members of the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“OECD”)
gathered in Paris, France, in November 1974 to sign the “Agreement on an
International Energy Program.”338 The Agreement created the International
Energy Agency, one of the most active intergovernmental energy
organizations in the world, and established a legal framework for the
decision-making process among its members.339 Today, twenty-nine
member countries of the International Energy Agency (“IEA”) work
together on “security of supply, long-term policy, information
‘transparency,’ energy and the environment, research and development and
international energy relations.”340
Perhaps, “an emergency oil-sharing system” was one of the IEA’s most
valuable devices in the early years of its existence that allowed its members
to more effectively benefit from their “oil stockpiling” through the use of an
energy information-sharing program.341 The IEA members nevertheless
presented a feeble response to the 1979 oil shock because they disagreed
with the advisory recommendation of the IEA Secretariat regarding how
best to operate their oil stock.342 Conversely, during the 1980 oil shock and
later energy crises, the OECD members of the IEA successfully coordinated
with one another to implement the IEA’s advice.343 The key to this
achievement stemmed from the IEA members controlling their fear of oil
disruption and avoiding unnecessary and detrimental competition to

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.

Desta et al., supra note 296, at 525.
Yergin, supra note 76, at 612.
International Energy Agency, supra note 43.
Id.
Id.
Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5242.
Id.
Id.
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purchase supply.344 Furthermore, the four-million-barrel capacity of the
“strategic petroleum reserves” among the IEA members became a
substantial aid to OECD oil consumers to ensure that they experienced
reduced damage during the 1990 Gulf War when the global oil market
suddenly lost the supply of Kuwait and Iraq, two of the world’s major oil
producers.345 Today, the IEA members are committed to hoarding crude oil,
to the extent of at least ninety days of their oil demand, to maintain their oil
security.346
The IEA also obliges its members to confine their oil demand, from
seven to more than ten percent, given specific conditions of each member
county.347 The IEA has recommended three measures for implementing
such principle: “persuasion and public information, administrative and
compulsory measures, and allocation and rationing.”348 Mixing the demand
restraint principle with oil stockpiling to combat oil disruption is termed
CERM, or the Coordinated Emergency Response Measure, which the IEA
members deployed during the 1991 Gulf War.349
Besides setting principles for governments to collaborate to reduce the
consequences of oil disruption, the IEA has been active in enlightening
energy companies, institutes, and scholars by publishing statistics and
analyses of the energy sector of the world and its members.350 The IEA
issues ninety publications each year; the World Energy Outlook and Key
World Energy Statistic are considered the most informative periodicals on
the global energy supply and demand that the IEA distributes annually.351
The limited membership of the IEA has raised doubts about its
competence to handle future energy crises, particularly oil shocks.352 The
IEA only consisted of the OECD countries in the 1970s and 1980s that
were significant oil consumers.353 Today, new oil-consuming members of
344. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 695 (stating that the global oil demand fell, and high
inventories convinced oil companies to follow a guidance issued by their member counties
in the IEA to avoid overbidding the OPEC’s oil supply).
345. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5242.
346. Redgwell, supra note 330, at 30.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 31.
350. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5243.
351. International Energy Agency (IEA), Publications (Sep. 10, 2016), http://www.iea.
org/publications/.
352. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5243.
353. See Membership, International Energy Agency (IEA), https://www.iea.org/about/
faqs/membership/#d.en.20933 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
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the OECD — including Chile, Israel, Mexico, and Iceland — are yet to join
the IEA.354 The rationale for establishing the IEA in 1974 was because the
OECD countries constituted a large proportion of the world’s major oil
consumers at that time. Since the beginning of the Twenty-First Century,
the oil-consuming non-OECD countries have weighed heavily on the global
energy market. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa — which
created an intergovernmental organization (“BRICS”) to enhance their
economic development — consume about one-fourth of the world’s crude
oil and are not IEA members.355 Many believe that the active participation
of BRICS in IEA strategies is essential “to increase energy policy
coordination and to reduce the environmental impact of global oil
demand.”356
Another reason for the limited future capacity of the IEA is its refusal to
allow certain oil-producing countries to attend the meetings of its governing
board. Global energy security and environmental protection necessitate
close collaboration between oil-consuming countries and major oilproducing countries. Yergin states that “well-functioning markets” will be
supported by “high-quality information.”357 Such information about the rate
of energy demand and supply will not be attained without the close
coordination of both oil-consuming and oil-producing countries.
3. The International Energy Forum
After the Gulf War I, oil-producing and consuming countries gathered in
Paris, France in July 1991 to institute a new inter-governance energy
organization, the International Energy Forum (“IEF”), that included all
national energy players to exchange their views on global energy challenges
and to promote productive understanding of their collective energy
interests.358 At present, the IEF is considered to be the most inclusive intergovernmental energy organization, with seventy-two member countries
that make up more than ninety percent of global oil and gas demand and
supply.359 This distinguishing feature has helped the IEF to create

354. Id.
355. See BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2016, 9 (2017) (stating that the
BRICS consumed about 23 million barrels p/d out of the total global oil demand (95 million
barrels p/d) in 2015).
356. Florini & Sovacool, supra note 301, at 5243. See also, Yergin, supra note 17, at 78.
357. Yergin, supra note 17, at 76.
358. International Energy Forum (IEF), Twenty Years Of Producer-Consumer Dialogue
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.ief.org/about-ief/history.aspx.
359. Id.
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constructive trust and interchange of ideas among the IEA countries and
OPEC countries, as well as other energy-consuming and transit countries,
including Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Oman, Russia, and South
Africa.360
The IEF founders identified two large fissures in the structure of other
energy organizations that precluded global energy actors from devising a
common world energy policy. First, there was a small amount of accurate
energy data for governments to construct their energy policy, so major
energy decisions were made based on estimations from before the 1990s.361
That was because every other energy organization, predominantly the IEA and
OPEC, represented distinct factions of the energy industry, either energyconsuming or energy-producing, and there was no legal connection between
them to share information. Access to accurate data on energy demand and
supply is a required factor for energy-consuming and producing players to
efficiently resolve modern energy challenges. For that purpose, only an
inter-governmental energy organization, which embraces both energyconsuming and producing countries, could encourage both factions to jointly
prepare energy data. Today, the IEF organizers exult over the establishment
of the Joint Oil Data Initiative (“JODI”), which was created from a fruitful
dialog between both oil-producing and consuming countries to provide
timely and reliable information among energy players.362
Second, major global energy governance agencies declined to embrace
new energy players, such as China, India, Russia, and Brazil.363 These new
energy players, with large populations, were rapidly taking decisive roles in
the global energy industry due to their active economic development in the
early 1990s. For instance, the crude oil consumption in China and India
doubled between 1973-1990, which meant these two non-OECD countries
held a substantial role in the global energy market.364 By the early 1990s,
the IEA no longer represented all energy-consuming countries, and its share

360. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 9.
361. Enno Harks et al., The International Energy Forum and the Mitigation of Oil
Market Risks, Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of The Game, 247, 249 (Andreas
Goldthau & Jan Martin Witte eds. 2010).
362. See International Energy Forum, supra note 358.
363. Harks et al., supra note 361, at 249.
364. International Energy Agency (IEA), IEA Energy Atlas (Feb. 10, 2017),
http://energyatlas.iea.org/#!/tellmap/-1920537974/0 (stating that China oil consumption rose
from about 52 Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe) in 1973 to about 115 Mtoe in 1990.
China became the top second oil consumer in the world (504 Mtoe) in 2014. Also, India’s oil
consumption increased from 23 Mtoe in 1973 to 58 Mtoe in 1990).
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of global oil demand was considerably reduced due to the appearance of
new giant energy consumers, China and India.365 On the production side,
Brazil quadrupled its crude oil production rate between 1973-1990, and
Brazil, along with Russia, diminished the superior position of OPEC in the
oil market.366 By involving all global energy players, the IEF strives to
narrow “the differences among energy producing, consuming and transit
Member States on global energy issues.”367
Despite the broad membership of the IEF, which includes many major
energy players from six continents, the IEF weight has never reached a
level that could properly resolve energy issues.368 In 2011, the IEF Charter
authorized, in Section VII, its Secretariat to administrate affairs of the
Forum.369 The IEF Secretariat, with its small staff, is likely unable to
accomplish and manage the numerous delegated activities.370 More
importantly, the IEF meetings are informal, and decisions are merely
advisory. The IEF Charter, in Section I, points out that [t]he Forum is an
intergovernmental arrangement that serves as a neutral facilitator of
informal, open, informed, and continuing global energy dialogue among its
membership of energy-producing and energy-consuming States, including
transit States.”371 In the same section, the IEF Charter clarifies that “[t]he
Charter does not create any legally binding rights or obligations between or
among its members.”372 IEF’s legal limitation stems from the fact that the
IEF is not bound by a treaty, unlike other energy-related organizations;
thus, the IEF has never granted a binding decision.373
B. Energy Treaties
The inability of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) to address
global energy security concerns compelled significant energy-involved
365. Harks et al., supra note 361, at 249 (stating that the IEA members, who were
consuming 75 percent of global oil demand in 1970s, their demand share declined to 57
percent by 2008).
366. International Energy Agency, supra note 364 (stating that Brazil crude oil
production increased from 8.6 Mtoe in 1973 to 33.39 Mtoe in 1990. In 2014, Brazil oil
production rate reached 122.76 Mtoe).
367. International Energy Forum (IEF), International Energy Forum Charter (Feb. 22,
2011) at 5.
368. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 9.
369. International Energy Forum, supra note 364, at 13.
370. Wheeler, supra note 26, at 9.
371. International Energy Forum, supra note 364, at 4.
372. Id.
373. Harks et al., supra note 361, at 257.
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countries to create specific regional energy agreements, both multilateral
and bilateral treaties, to provide more efficient legal structures for energy
commodities.374 The 1995 WTO and its original 1947 agreement version,
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (“GATT”), provided the
disciplines and rules of the trade that included all merchandised goods at
large “to ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably, and freely as
possible.”375 The WTO also covers other fields of business, such as
services, intellectual property, transfer of technology, finance, investment,
and the environment.376 While energy supplies, namely petroleum, have
been the largest traded commodity in the world, many major oil-producing
countries — Iran, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya — have not joined the WTO.377
One possible reason is that the oil-producing countries believed that
competition among oil producers, inspired by the free trade theory of the
WTO, would damage the oil industry and, subsequently, the energy security
of both oil-producing and oil-consuming states.378 Furthermore, the WTO
trading system focuses on market access, which does not cover the central
aspect of energy security which was the guaranteed supply access.379 That
gap over energy security in the WTO pushed energy-concerned countries to
create regional organizations and treaties that more directly engaged in the
energy sector, such as OPEC, the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and the European Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). Regulations
and objectives of these energy organizations and treaties allowed member
countries to disobey the WTO principles, for example, the prohibition of
quantitative restrictions by the trade parties.380 In contrast to the WTO
principles, oil-producing countries, particularly OPEC, aimed to control the
energy market through a supply restriction device.381 The 1973-74 oil
crises, engendered by the supply restrictions device deployed by the Arab
members of OPEC, proved to industrialized countries that the WTO trading
system would be unable to provide a desirable trade environment for
374. Wen-Chen Shih, Energy Security, GATT/WTO and Regional Agreements, 49 Nat.
Resource J. 433, 466 (2009).
375. World Trade Organization (WTO), The WTO in Brief (Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/inbrief_e/inbr00_e.htm.
376. Desta et al., supra note 296, at 525.
377. See World Trade Organization (WTO), Members and Observers (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.
378. Desta et al., supra note 296, at 525.
379. Id. at 532.
380. Id. at 534 (stating that both OPEC members and non-OPEC members, Mexico and
Norway, deployed the oil supply restrictions device in the 1980s and 1990s).
381. Id. at 533.
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energy-consuming countries in the same manner that the security of other
tradable goods is guaranteed.382
Due to the complete reliance on energy production for capital-intensive
operations, the security of energy supply could only be obtained through the
“right investment decisions.”383 In other words, only uninterrupted energy
investment could assure international energy security in the long term. 384
For that reason, the protection and promotion of foreign investments in the
energy sector were probably the principal motives for both energyproducing and energy-consuming countries to establish specific energy
agreements. Additionally, energy-related treaties protect an open and
competitive energy market that ensures short term energy supply.385
The need to establish legally binding regional agreements to provide
better cooperation than the WTO in the energy sector could potentially
terminate several multilateral and bilateral treaties. Among these treaties,
the Energy Charter Treaty was formulated to focus on the energy sector
specifically.386 The role and objectives of the Charter are discussed in the
next section. There are other regional treaties, such as the OECD, NAFTA,
and MERCOSUR (signed among some of the South American countries)
that are considered to be general trade agreements because they govern all
tradable goods, including energy supply.387 NAFTA, for example, includes
a disciplined energy division, Chapter XI, that has generated distinctive
cooperation among its three member countries in the energy field.388
Chapter XI of NAFTA is discussed in the second section of this subchapter.
Finally, this research will examine the role of bilateral treaties in global
energy security.
1. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT)
The 1990 European initiative to establish an effective energy treaty
among energy-producing countries, energy-transit countries and energyconsuming countries in Eurasia benefited from a unique situation during the
end of the Cold War.389 Most states of the former Soviet Union (“FSU”),

382. See Shih, supra note 374, at 434.
383. Andrei Konoplyanik & Thomas Walde, Energy Charter Treaty and Its Role in
International Energy, 24 J. Energy & Nat. Resources L. 523, 529 (2006).
384. Id. at 530.
385. Id. at 531.
386. Id. at 526.
387. Id.
388. See Shih, supra note 374, at 468.
389. Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 383, at 525.
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including Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan, possessed
abundant oil and gas resources but lacked the capital and advanced
technology to develop these energy resources. At the same time, the energy
security of West Europe was in jeopardy due to its dependence on the
Middle East.390 The collapse of the Soviet Union provided an opportunity
for both the energy-producing states of FSU and energy-consuming
countries in Western Europe to enter a mutual arrangement over the energy
sector to ensure their economic development. Additionally, the role of
transit countries, like Ukraine, was essential to guarantee the energy
security of Eurasia. Given these circumstances, the Energy Charter Treaty
(“ECT”) was created in December 1994 and entered into legal force in
1998, accompanied by the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy Efficiency
and Related Environmental Aspects (“PEEREA”).391 The Energy Charter
Treaty, with a total number of fifty-four signatories, including fifty-two
states and the European Union and Euratom, is recognized as the top energy
treaty covering the largest geographical framework.392
The Energy Charter Treaty is the only “legally binding multilateral”
agreement that has deliberately set up rules and an intergovernmental
institution to ensure active cooperation in the energy sector.393 The Energy
Charter Treaty carefully handles three essential fields — investment,
transit, and trade — and provides an efficient dispute settlement mechanism
among all different energy players.394 The Energy Charter Treaty also
concentrates on developing “energy efficiency” to diminish the damaging
environmental impacts of energy operations.395 Andrei Konoplyanik and
Thomas Walde, two energy scholars, described the Energy Charter Treaty
as “a multilateral framework for energy cooperation that is unique under
international law, and the strategic value of these rules is likely to increase in
the context of efforts to build a legal foundation for global energy security,
based on the principles of open, competitive markets and sustainable
development.”396 The principles of improving open and competitive
390. Id.
391. Id. at 524-525.
392. International Energy Charter, The Energy Charter Treaty 1994 (Feb 18, 2017),
http://www.energycharter.org/process/energy-charter-treaty-1994/energy-charter-treaty/.
393. Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 383, at 526.
394. Andreas Goldthau & Jan Martin Witte, The Role of Rules and Institutions in Global
Energy: An Introduction to Global Energy Governance: The New Rules of The Game, 1, 9
(Andreas Goldthau & Jan Martin Witte eds. 2010).
395. Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 383, at 529.
396. Id. at 527.
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markets and sustainable development ensure an available, accessible,
affordable, and acceptable energy supply and subsequently protect global
energy security.397
In contradistinction to the central objective of other energy-related
organizations, the Energy Charter Treaty was not designed to dominate the
global energy market and supply.398 Instead, the Energy Charter Treaty
promises to prepare a robust and stable business ground for energy
investors, in addition to promoting transparency in energy operations while
respecting the sovereignty of member states.399 The energy security of
European consumers depends on the an assurance of adequate and reliable
energy supply; this assurance will only be, in the long term, obtained through
persistent global investment and a legally-secured trade process in the
energy sectors.400 Reducing risks related to energy investments and trade
through an applicable legal outline and substantive participation of
member countries is the main objective of the Energy Charter Treaty.401
For this purpose, the Energy Charter Treaty achieves its primary objectives
via its peculiar institution, the Energy Charter Conference, which was
instituted by the Energy Charter Treaty in 1994.402 As a global governance
energy-related agency, the Energy Charter Conference manages the Energy
Charter process, implements the Energy Charter rules, as well as makes
decisions on potential modifications to the Energy Charter Treaty and the
membership applications in annual meetings of all participating
countries.403
The Energy Charter Treaty features an accommodating structure that
allows qualified non-member states, who accept the obligations of the
Energy Charter Treaty, to attend the Charter after the Energy Charter
Conference approves their membership application.404 At the same time,
each member has the right, based on Article 47 of the Energy Charter
Treaty, to leave the Charter “after five years from the date on which the

397. Id. at 531.
398. Id. at 554.
399. Id. at 554.
400. Id. at 529-530.
401. Id. at 528.
402. International Energy Charter, The Energy Charter Conference (Feb. 18, 2017)
http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/energy-charter-conference/.
403. Konoplyanik & Walde, supra note 383, at 548.
404. Id. at 550.
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ECT has entered into force for this Contracting Party.”405 Besides
membership status, the Energy Charter Treaty provides two more forms of
participation, “Observership” and “Association Agreements” in the Charter
process.406 To date, nineteen observer countries — including China, South
Korea, Iran, and Iraq — have signed the Charter, giving them the right to
attend international forums to exchange their opinions and concerns and
reach a potential common understanding regarding the global energy
challenges.407 However, the observer countries are not bound by the
Charter’s rules and annual budget subscription.408 Twelve international
organizations — for instance, IEA, WTO, The World Bank, and the
OECD — are observers in the Charter.409
2. The North American Free Trade Agreement (“NAFTA”)
The substantial commercial dependence between the United States,
Canada, and Mexico, led these countries to negotiate and create an
agreement providing an effective legal framework to facilitate free trade
and promote foreign investment among themselves.410 The United States,
Canada, and Mexico formally signed NAFTA, composed of twenty-two
Chapters and ten Annexes, in 1992, which entered into force in 1994.411
NAFTA is recognized as a general trade treaty that regulates all tradeable
items and has considerably increased the volume of trade among the North
American partners.412 However, oil and natural gas specifically have played
a significant role in shaping the provisions of NAFTA. Canada and Mexico
have been the primary sources of oil and natural gas demand for the United

405. International Energy Charter, The International Energy Charter Treaty Consolidated
Energy Charter Treaty with Related Documents, Energy Charter Secretariat (Jan. 15, 2016),
at 103.
406. See Energy Charter, The Energy Charter Treaty - a Reader's Guide, 2 OGEL, no. 5,
Dec. 2004, at 66-8.
407. See International Energy Charter, Constituency Of The Energy Charter Conference
(Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.energycharter.org/who-we-are/members-observers/. See also,
Energy Charter, supra note 406, at 67.
408. Energy Charter, supra note 406, at 67.
409. International Energy Charter, supra note 407.
410. Shih, supra note 374, at 467.
411. See Nafta Secretariat, North American Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/Home/Legal-Texts/North-American-Free-TradeAgreement.
412. Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S.-Canada Trade Facts (Feb 10,
2017), https://ustr.gov/countries-regions/americas/canada (stating that in 2015, the United
States exports to Canada was up to 179% up from 1993 (pre-NAFTA)).
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States. In 2015, the United States imported 48% of its petroleum demand
from Canada and Mexico, and more than 96% of the U.S. imported natural
gas was from Canada.413
Provisions of NAFTA removed “many of the lingering energy trade
barriers that had existed between Canada, Mexico, and the United
States.”414 Chapter XI of NAFTA includes nine Articles and five Annexes,
dealing with “Energy and Basic Petrochemicals” trade in North America.415
Article 602.2 of NAFTA distinguished its scope from the GATT/WTO by
defining energy goods and labeling energy products under their
Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (“HS”) codes.416
Nevertheless, Article 603 of NAFTA adopted the principle of the
prohibition on “Export and Import Restrictions,” originally introduced by
the 1994 GATT/WTO treaty.417 Other provisions of NAFTA present
explanatory measures to the parties on regulating cross-border energy trade.
Article 604 of NAFTA obligates member countries to impose a tax on the
export of an energy product only if there was a domestic tax on that energy
supply.418 Annex 602.3 grants Mexico an exception to one of the main
principles of the agreement, which was the deregulation of energy trade by
partners. For instance, Annex 602.3(1) recognized the right and authority of
Mexico to regulate up to fifty percent of its total oil export due to a
requirement by the Mexican Constitution to exercise its sovereign power
over national natural resources.419
NAFTA has faced multi-faceted criticism since its inception. Some
scholars believe that NAFTA restricts the liberalization to regulate the
energy trade, similar to the GATT/WTO principle on the prohibition of
energy export control.420 Some Canadians view NAFTA as an inherently
exploitative agreement that increased the cost of Canadian fuel and depleted
national fossil fuel resources.421 They argue that NAFTA should grant
413. The U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA), How Much Petroleum Does the
United States Import and Export? (Feb. 10, 2017), http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.
cfm?id=727&t=6; see also The U.S Energy Information Administration, U.S. Natural Gas
Import by Country (Feb 10, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_impc_s1_a.htm.
414. John Fohr, How NAFTA Can Increase Global Energy Security, 22 Wis. Int'l L.J.
741, 756 (2004).
415. Shih, supra note 374, at 468.
416. Id. at 468-469.
417. Id. at 469.
418. Id.
419. Fohr, supra note 414, at 759.
420. Shih, supra note 374, at 471.
421. Fohr, supra note 414, at 758.
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Canada a similar exception that Mexico received to conserve its natural
resources.422 The NAFTA authorization for Mexico to reserve some of its
strategic energy operations, on the other hand, discouraged foreign
investors from offering the required capital in the energy development of
Mexico.423 Some scholars recommend that NAFTA should include “greater
deregulation approaches” to increase private shares in the state-owned oil
company of Mexico (“PEMEX”) for that purpose.424
3. Bilateral Investment Treaties
The development of different stages in the petroleum industry, especially
upstream, and the stability of the oil and gas market requires intensive
capital investment, which could be guaranteed through the participation of
major petroleum companies.425 Since the 1950s, many host countries have
presented discriminatory policies and regulations, along with asset
expropriation and devaluation of the foreign direct investment (“FDI”).426
To protect the FDI, major petroleum companies and their original countries
demanded a legal structure for the section of international investment under
international economic law.427 The emerging countries that require FDI also
recognize that bilateral investment treaties are a key element to promote
their economic development.428 Mere modification of domestic regulations
in the emerging countries has not been sufficient to attract foreign investors
because the national laws are unstable, and only treaties are thought to be
sufficient to ensure the protection of the FDI.429 The failure of
intergovernmental organizations to conclude a multilateral agreement on
investment has also compelled countries to sign bilateral and regional
agreements.430 Developed, developing, and emerging economies benefited
422. Id.
423. Shih, supra note 374, at 471.
424. Fohr, supra note 414, at 761-762.
425. See Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre (APERC), supra note 28, at 35.
426. See Emily A. Witten, Arbitration of Venezuela Oil Contracts: A losing Strategy? 4
Texas J. Oil, Gas, And Energy L. 55, 57-8 (2008) (stating that the last notorious case
occurred in Venezuela in the end twentieth century and the early 21st century when Chavez
regime imposed prejudicial regulations on ExxonMobil, by doubling its tax revenue and
devaluating of its assets in Venezuela).
427. Efraim Chalamish, The Future of Bilateral Treaties: A De Facto Multilateral
Agreement?, 34 Brook J. Int’l L. 303, 307 (2009).
428. Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy, And
Interpretation, 2 (Oxford University Press 2010).
429. Id. at 4.
430. See Chalamish, supra note 427, at 304-305.
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from the end of the Cold War in 1989, in terms of promotion and protection
of foreign investment, which is identified as “the principal engine of
sustainable growth and development” in the global economy.431 Today, over
2,900 bilateral investment treaties have been signed.432
Bilateral investment treaties (BITs), unlike general trade agreements, are
considered to be legal instruments covering “specific circumstances” in
business transactions between the state from which the investment
originates (the home state) and the state in which the investment is devoted
(the host state).433 BITs are characterized by six main clauses: “access,
reasonableness, security, nondiscrimination, transparency, and due
process.”434 The strong disposition of the host states to honor its contractual
liabilities shapes the first clause of BITs, “access.”435 The reasonability
clause of BITs prohibits the host state from issuing arbitrary directives that
are not “reasonably related to a legitimate host-state regulatory
objective.”436 The security clause of BITs protects the FDI against infamous
treatments of the host states, such as “exchange control or wrongful
expropriations.”437 The non-discriminatory provision discourages the host
state from influencing FDI through political intervention; instead, the clause
allows the market to extent of investment flow.438 By diminishing
corruption, the transparency clause of BITs aims to improve the role of
governance in the development of investment projects.439 Finally, disputes
that arise between the host state and foreign investors are resolved by
agreed-upon legal tools, such as arbitration, under the due process provision
of BITs.440
C. Unitization Agreements
Every state possesses the exclusive authority over its natural resources
“in the soil and subsoil of their land territory and territorial sea to an

431. See Chalamish, supra note 427, at 308.
432. Investment Policy Hub: United Nations UNCTAD, International Investment
Agreements (Mar. 15, 2017), http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA.
433. Vandevelde, supra note 428, at 1.
434. Id. at 2.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 189.
437. Id. at 233.
438. Id. at 337.
439. Id. at 397.
440. Id. at 430.
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unlimited depth.”441 This exclusive right or “territorial sovereignty” of the
state also includes untouched oil and gas deposits within its territories and
borders.442 Hydrocarbon deposits have an elusive quality; as a result, they
“do not conform to property lines, licensing demarcations, or political
boundaries.”443 The management and development of transboundary oil and
gas reservoirs, without the consent and cooperation of all sovereign owners,
likely distress global energy security. Unilateral operations of sovereign
owners decrease the maximum recovery of hydrocarbons and causes energy
waste.444 Subsequently, a serious energy conflict among neighboring states
will lead to a breach of physical security in the world. The 1990 invasion of
Kuwait by the Iraqi regime became an unforgettable example that disturbed
global security as a result of an energy conflict between two sovereign
states.445 Similar energy conflicts, for instance, the disagreement over the
ownership of natural resources in the South China Sea, could potentially
disturb the physical security of the most populated region.446
Providentially, geological and engineering advancements provided the
oil industry with the technique of “unitization” to resolve the conflict of
operatorship over transboundary oil and gas reservoirs.447 Unitization is
“the joint, coordinated operation of a petroleum reservoir by all the owners
of rights in the separate tracts overlying the reservoir.”448 Unitization of a
joint oil and gas reservoir, shared by numerous individuals or more than
one government with different jurisdictions, involves complex issues, such

441. Rainer Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 Am. J. Int’l. L.
215, 216 (1979).
442. Id.
443. Albert E. Utton & Paul D. McHugh, On an Institutional Arrangement for
Developing Oil and Gas in the Gulf of Mexico, 26 Nat. Resources J. 717, 722 (1986).
444. Raymond M. Myers, The Law of Pooling and Unitization: Voluntary – Compulsory,
7-8 (Banks and Company 1957).
445. R.W. Apple Jr., The Iraqi Invasion; Invading Iraqis Seize Kuwait and Its Oil; U.S.
Condemns Attack, Urges United Action, N.Y. Times (Aug. 3, 1990), https://www.nytimes.
com/1990/08/03/world/iraqi-invasion-invading-iraqis-seize-kuwait-its-oil-us-condemnsattack-urges.html.
446. See Bielecki, supra note 8, at 243; see also Renato De Castro, The Philippines
Confronts China in the South China Sea: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism, 39 Asian
Perspective 71, 95 (2015).
447. Baxter D. Honeycutt, Petroleum Engineering, Encyclopedia Britannica (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.britannica.com/technology/petroleum-engineering.
448. Jacqueline L. Weaver & David F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the
World: A Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts, 28 Hous. J. Int'l L.
3 (2006).
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as determining the participation formula.449 After unitization is agreed
upon, the involved parties draft and sign unitization and unit operation
agreements to cover all technical, fiscal, and legal aspects of unitization.
Unitization agreements are legal instruments protecting property rights
through determining liabilities of the mineral and working rights of owners
of the reservoir.450 Internationally, unitization agreements successfully
delivered a peaceful resolution to the conflict between South Korea and
Japan over the exploitation of natural resources in the disputed area of the
Korean Strait in 1974.451
The succeeding chapters will expand on the technical concept, modes,
and drafting procedures of unitization agreements.

449. Id. at 81.
450. Myers, supra note 444, at 100.
451. Lagoni, supra note 441, at 224.
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CHAPTER TWO: UNITIZATION OF PETROLEUM RESERVES
I. Introduction
The primary objective of both mineral interest owners and working
interest owners is to recover the maximum rate of oil and gas deposits from
a petroleum reservoir. Since the early Twentieth Century, most experts in
the fields of petroleum engineering and economics have averred that only
unitization of the entire petroleum reservoir — field-wide unitization —
could guarantee the maximum ultimate production of hydrocarbons from
the reservoir. Unitization, in addition to a technical work program, requires
a legal instrument (such as a Unitization Agreement) to regulate the entire
operation and determine the property rights and operational obligations of
each participant. The construction of a legal framework for unitization
requires an advanced understanding of the technical and economic
backgrounds of unitization. For instance, the lawyers who draft unitization
agreements need to recognize many technical terms and operational
responsibilities of all parties.
To cover these prerequisites, this chapter starts with the technical
background of unitization, which contains geological features of petroleum
reservoirs, dynamics of oil and gas reservoirs, different stages of
hydrocarbon recovery, and finally, technical necessities of unitization. This
section will illustrate that the primary technical objective of unitization is to
control and utilize the energy drives of the petroleum reservoir to obtain the
maximum efficient rate (“MER”) of oil production. Moreover, the technical
nature of petroleum reservoirs strongly encourages the owners of mineral
and working interests to unitize the entire petroleum reservoir and
cooperate in the primary stage of oil and gas recovery.
In the second section of this chapter, the author discusses the economic
benefits of unitization which play a crucial role in preventing and resolving
energy crises around the world. For this purpose, the second part of this
chapter primarily focuses on two economic advantages of unitization:
preventing waste of hydrocarbons and promoting the rate of petroleum
production.
Finally, the last section discusses the legal aspects of unitization in both
privately-owned and state-owned mineral regimes. This section examines
the common legal frameworks of unitization and explains why unitization
agreements are the best legal instrument for regulating complex and multifaceted unit operations by protecting property rights and establishing the
operational obligations of the participants. Furthermore, this section
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addresses how different legal theories impact the unit title and the legal
nature of property interests after the unitization agreement is signed. Lastly,
the researcher challenges the legal classification of unitization agreements
using geopolitical measures, such as borders and countries. Instead, the
research proposes the use of jurisdiction as a legal measure to divide
unitization agreements into single-jurisdiction unitization agreements and
trans-jurisdiction unitization agreements.
II. Technical Setting of Unitization
Petroleum geology and petroleum engineering are two crucial modern
sciences that expound upon “the physical nature of oil and gas reservoirs
and the engineering requirements for efficient production,” because without
an understanding of these two fields, legal comprehension of unitization
would be unfeasible.452 This section covers relevant aspects of the technical
background to the unitization of oil and gas reservoirs. The details include a
technical definition of oil and gas reservoirs, characteristics of petroleum
reservoirs, dynamics of petroleum reservoirs and their energy drives in
different stages of hydrocarbon recovery, as well as the oil and gas recovery
stages and technical advantages of unitization.
A. Characteristics of Petroleum Reservoirs
A geological trap is “an impermeable rock layer such as shale or salt”
that is recognized by a geologic feature such as a dome, fold, or fault.453
Operators trace rich deposits of oil and gas within a reservoir encased by
geologic traps. An oil and gas reservoir is described as “a subsurface body
of rock with sufficient void space (‘porosity’) to store hydrocarbons and
connectivity between those void spaces (‘permeability’) to allow
hydrocarbons to flow.”454 This definition highlights critical geologic
characteristics of a petroleum reservoir: porosity and permeability.
The porosity level of the reservoir rock is “the ratio of the pore volume
to the total rock volume;” reservoir rocks are geologically attractive if they
have a porosity level of at least thirty percent.455 The permeability of a
reservoir rock, which is the level of interconnectedness of pore spaces

452. Jacqueline L. Weaver, Unitization of Oil and Gas Fields in Texas, pg. 9 (Resources
for The Future 1986).
453. John S. Lowe et al., Cases and Materials on Oil and Gas Law, 7 (West Academic
Publishing, 6th ed. 2012).
454. Id. at 8.
455. Id.
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within the rock, is calculated in millidarcy (“md”) units, and a reservoir
rock with higher levels of millidarcy units allows hydrocarbons to flow
among pore spaces of the rock freely.456
Another physical feature of a petroleum reservoir is the “viscosity” of
contained hydrocarbons. Viscosity is the consistency grade of fluids in the
reservoir rock. A low viscosity level in hydrocarbons, such as in “light oil,”
causes the fluids to have a higher gravity level, allowing them to flow easily
through the pores of the rock.457 On the other hand, “heavy crude,” with
higher viscosity levels, resists flowing through pore spaces of the rock;
therefore, heavy crude requires the reservoir rock to have a high
permeability level.458
Scientific developments in petroleum engineering and geology
convinced the petroleum industry that reservoirs are not homogenous.
Instead, a reservoir may contain different volumes and types of
hydrocarbons, in addition to having variable levels of porosity,
permeability, and viscosity.459 The hydrocarbon deposits in a reservoir
could be crude oil, natural gas, or both. Due to its complex composition, oil
is denser than natural gas; as a result, oil is found under natural gas
deposits.460 In comparison, the density of water is higher than oil and
natural gas; hence, water deposits are found beneath oil and gas deposits.461
The extraction of oil and natural gas is feasible either together or
separately.462 Natural gas deposits, due to the substance’s low density, can
be extracted much easier than crude oil from a reservoir. The natural gas
dissolved in crude oil is identified as “associated gas,” whereas gas that
contains little or no crude oil is called “non-associated gas.”463
Alternatively, “[t]he efficient recovery of crude oil is technically rather
complicated.”464 Crude oil, due to its minimal compressibility, is unable to
drive itself out of the reservoirs up to the surface.465 Understanding the
456. Id. at 7.
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act: Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. Land Resources &
Envtl. L. 277, 281 (2004).
460. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 24-26.
461. Id. at 7.
462. Id. at 25.
463. See Saeid Mokhatab & William A. Poe, Handbook of Natural Gas: Transmission
and Processing (Gulf Professional Publishing, 2nd ed. 2012).
464. Weaver, supra note 452.
465. Id. at 10.
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dynamics of the reservoir is a vital task before starting petroleum
operations.
B. Dynamics of Petroleum Reservoirs
Production of crude oil occurs when an area of low pressure, created by a
penetrated well, expands the compressed natural gas and water within the
reservoir and, as a result, crude oil is expelled towards the surface.466 The
expansion of natural gas and water act as energy drives or associated
displacement mechanisms for producing oil.467 There are three types of oil
energy drives that, “either alone or in combination,” can lead a reservoir to
produce oil: (1) the gas-cap drive, (2) the dissolved gas drive, and (3) the
water drive.468
Gas-cap drives are divided into two parts, consisting of natural gas in the
upper part and crude oil at the bottom of the reservoir (see figure 3-1).469
The pressure of the reservoir falls if a well penetrates the reservoir, and the
natural gas will push towards the crude oil if the well is drilled into the
lower part of the reservoir.470 As a result, crude oil will be expelled through
the wellbore towards the surface until the compressed gas fills the entire
reservoir.471 In the end, a considerable rise in the gas-oil ratio of the
produced substances indicates a loss in the natural pressure that was driving
the crude from the depths of the reservoir and may lead to complications in
recovering the residual oil.472 A gas-cap drive could be an effective
displacement mechanism if the operator drills his well into the “down-dip,”
the lowest part of the oil reservoir.473 This may enable the operator to
recover up to fifty percent of the crude oil from the reservoir.474

466. Id.
467. Research Associates Incorporated, The Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 27
(1957).
468. Weaver, supra note 452, at 10.
469. Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 12.
472. Id.
473. Id.
474. Id. at 12 (stating that the operator should, however, take advantage of the natural
energy of gravity drainage in the reservoir to obtain such oil recovery rate).
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Figure 3.1: The Gas-Cap Drive475
The most common reservoir type is the dissolved gas drive, in which the
oil is in solution with the dissolved natural gas in the reservoir (see figure 32).476 When the well is drilled into the reservoir, the reservoir reduces the
pressure, and the dissolved gas within the crude oil escapes from the
solution; as a result, the oil viscosity is reduced, and the oil flows easily.477
However, the natural gas will be “exhausted before all the oil can be
produced, and the oil cannot expel itself.”478 Only one-fourth of the oil can
be produced if the reservoir contains the dissolved gas drive; consequently,
petroleum engineers consider the dissolved gas mechanism to be the least
productive reservoir drive.479

475. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 22.
476. Weaver, supra note 452, at 10.
477. Myers, supra note 444, at 24.
478. Weaver, supra note 452, at 10.
479. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 22 (stating that the American Petroleum Institute has
estimated that solution-gas drive reservoirs yield maximum recovery rates between ten and
twenty-five percent (10-25%) of the oil originally found in the reservoir, increasing to
twenty-five to fifty percent (25-50%) when augmented by a gas cap).
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Figure 3.2: The Dissolved-Gas Drive480
The final oil displacement mechanism is the water drive, which is the
most effective reservoir type because water directly provides an oil
reservoir with the best-pushing energy.481 In this type of reservoir, the oil is
found atop a water deposit (see figure 3-3). When the operator drills a well
into this type of reservoir, the compressed water, having more weight and
being more viscous than oil, moves upwards towards the oil and expels the
crude oil up through the wellbore.482 An operator will abandon this type of
reservoir if the water-oil ratio is high because the cost of production will
likely outweigh the benefits of oil production.483 A down-dip well will not
increase oil recovery in water drive reservoirs, in contrast with gas drive
reservoirs.484 The operator should drill in the upper part of a water drive
reservoir.485

480. Id.
481. Id. at 23 (stating that the water drive could recover more than fifty percent of oil
from the reservoir).
482. Weaver, supra note 4452, at 13.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id.
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Figure 3.3: The Water Drive486
All three types of reservoirs use the natural energy of gas and water to
displace and push crude oil toward the surface. However, to take advantage
of the natural energy drives, the unit operator must control two key factors:
(1) the rate of production and (2) the location of wells.487 The operator can
control the rate of oil recovery through the maintenance of pressure in the
pool.488 One pressure preservation method is to inject the reservoir with
natural gas or water in the early stage of operations before the natural
pressure diminishes.489 Additionally, petroleum engineers study and
estimate a reservoir’s maximum efficient rate (MER) of oil production by
identifying the most effective types of energy drives in the reservoir to
assist the operator in controlling the rate of production.490 Next, the unit
operator needs to control the location of wells. In a gas-cap drive reservoir,
the operator should avoid drilling wells into the upper part of the field to

486.
487.
488.
489.
490.

Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 23.
Weaver, supra note 452, at 13.
Id. at 13-14.
Myers, supra note 444, at 25.
Weaver, supra note 452, at 14.
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maintain the reservoir pressure.491 On the other hand, the operator should
not penetrate the lower part of an oil pool in a water drive reservoir to
ensure there is a low water-oil ratio in pursuit of the maximum rate of crude
oil production.492
C. Oil and Gas Recovery Levels
1. Primary Recovery
The process of production using “the pressure caused by the overlying
strata” and the natural energy drives of the reservoir is known as Primary
Recovery.493 At the end of the primary recovery period, a considerable
amount of crude oil remains in the reservoir due to the diminishing
effectiveness of the reservoir’s natural energy drives.494 To produce the
residual oil from the pool, the unit operator may utilize artificial means to
increase reservoir pressure at the end of the primary recovery period.495
These operations are known as Secondary Recovery.
2. Secondary Recovery
In secondary recovery operations, the unit operator could reinject recycled
natural gas or water into the reservoir after the completion of the primary
recovery to maintain or enhance the reservoir pressure.496 For example, the
unit operator could, at the surface, remove liquid hydrocarbons from
produced wet gas through the “cycling” process and then reinject the residual
dry gas into the reservoir.497 Alternatively, the unit operator can utilize
external sources of gas or water for the secondary recovery process.498
While secondary recovery serves the same purpose as the pressure
maintenance operations in primary recovery;499 the timing of the operations
differentiates the two recovery operations.500 Primary pressure maintenance
491. Id (stating that the operator should drill no well that is going to produce gas from the
gas cap, since this would dissipate the reservoir's pressure source).
492. Id.
493. Id. at 15.
494. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 22 (stating that Up to fifty percent of oil in the water
drive, up to seventy five percent of oil in the gas-cap drive, and up to ninety percent of oil in
the dissolved-gas drive could be unrecovered).
495. Weaver, supra note 452, at 14; Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 25.
496. Weaver, supra note 452, at 14.
497. Bruce M. Kramer & Patrick H. Martin, The Law Of Pooling And Unitization, §2.03
(LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2016).
498. Weaver, supra note 452, at 14.
499. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 2.03.
500. Id.
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occurs in the early stages of operation, whereas the secondary recovery
operations, involving the reinjection of water or gas, happen when the
natural pressure is exhausted at the end of the primary recovery period.501
To increase oil production during secondary recovery, the unit operator must
consider many engineering factors, such as the optimal amount and
placement of injection wells.502 One such consideration of the unit operator
should be to drill the injection wells based on a systematic pattern; for
example, a five-spot pattern, in which four water input wells are placed at
the corners of a square, effectively pushes oil towards the production well
in the center.503
3. Enhanced Oil Recovery
Enhanced Oil Recovery (“EOR”) is an advanced form of oil recovery
that takes place after secondary recovery, which introduces essential
substances other than water or gas into the reservoir to increase the volume
of oil production.504 EOR includes “[the] thermal process, carbon dioxide
miscible flooding; and chemical flooding.”505 During thermal operations,
the unit operator injects heat and steam into the reservoir to vaporize the oil
and reduce its viscosity, thereby increasing production.506 Carbon dioxide
miscible flooding injects carbon dioxide to fill the reservoir’s pore spaces
which pushes oil to the surface by increasing reservoir pressure and by
dissolving carbon dioxide into the oil, the oil becomes less viscous and can
flow to the surface.507 Unit operators can also inject chemical supplements,
such as surfactants, polymers, or alkaline, and utilize water flooding “to
scrub the reservoir rock more thoroughly,” and push the oil toward the
surface.508
D. Technical Necessities of Unitization
This examination of the physical nature and dynamics of reservoirs
proves that reservoirs should be treated as a single operational pool to
maintain their pressure and conserve the required geological features of the
reservoir. To prevent oil and gas waste, the unit operator must apply a
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

Id.
Weaver, supra note 452, at 16.
Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 2.03.
Id.
Weaver, supra note 452, at 17.
Id. at 16
Id.
Id.
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single engineering plan to the entire reservoir. The executive of that plan
must be able to control the rate of water, gas, and oil production and select
the optimal surface locations for drilling input wells without restrictions
based on the property lines.509 Alternatively, unilateral oil and gas
operations, based on fragmented ownership or operatorship, will diminish
the maximum production of energy resources from the entire reservoir.510
III. Economic Advantages of Unitization
The unitization of oil and gas reservoirs has, taking a broad view,
resolved energy crises that generate from the imbalance between energy
supply and demand in the oil and gas market.511 Additionally, the
unitization of oil and gas reservoirs, taking a narrow view, economically
benefits the owners of royalty interests and working interests. Although the
transactional cost of unitization seems high, the parties of an oil and gas
agreement consider two main economic reasons to pursue a unitization
plan. The first reason is to prevent waste of energy, capital, and surface
area; the second reason is to increase the production rate.
A. Prevent Waste
Raymond M. Myers, in his distinguished book on The Law of Pooling
and Unitization in the United States, described the term “waste” generally,
using eleven geological and economic waste factors.512 The eleven factors
included in this description of waste are:
1) Allowing the escape of oil or gas from one stratum to another;
2) Operating an oil well with an inefficient gas-oil-ratio;
3) The drawing with water of any startup capable of producing
oil or gas in paying quantities;
4) Surface waste or loss, however, caused;
5) Underground waste, including the operation of wells in excess
of their maximum efficient recovery (MER);
6) Creating of fire hazards;

509. Myers, supra note 444, at 39.
510. Research Associates Incorporated, supra note 467, at 36.
511. Paula C. Murray & Frank B. Cross, The Case for a Texas Compulsory Unitization
Statute, 23 St. Mary's L. J. 1099, 1101 (1991).
512. Myers, supra note 444, at 7-8.
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7) Permitting any gas well to burn wastefully;
8) Physical waste incident to drilling, equipping or operating
wells;
9) Escape of casing head gas from an oil well;
10) Production of oil or gas in excess of transportation or market
facilities or reasonable market demand; and
11) The use of gas for a wasteful purpose such as in the
manufacture of carbon black.513
The waste of natural gas is considered to be a type of economic loss
because the natural gas has economic value.
University of Texas Professor Stephen L. McDonald further explained
that oil and gas recovery requires “unnecessary investment in wells with
correspondingly higher production costs” in the absence of unitization.514
Professor McDonald also states that secondary recovery would only be
“economically feasible” if unit operators start unitization in the early stages
of recovery.515 Additionally, the waste of capital during petroleum
operations will discourage investors from exploring new oil discoveries.516
On the other hand, unitization usually offers friendlier economic terms,
which encourage further exploration.517
Unitization can also prevent surface waste. Competition between
multiple operators to produce hydrocarbons from a common reservoir
causes unnecessary surface usage and land conflicts due to the drilling of
superfluous wells.518 Instead, unitization enables the unit operator to easily
employ “a variety of modern technologies, including 3-D seismic surveying
and hydraulic fracturing, with less risk of trespass claims.”519 This
minimizes the risk of conflicts between third parties and the unit operator
because all surface owners are parties to the field-wide unitization.520
513. Id.
514. Stephen L. McDonald, Unit Operation of Oil Reservoirs as an Instrument of
Conservation, 49 Notre Dame L. 305, 307 (1973).
515. Id. at 305-07 (stating that the early unitization prevents the natural pressure of
reservoir being fully exhausted; otherwise, it would be economically infeasible to produce
the residual unrecovered hydrocarbons through the enhanced recovery).
516. Id.
517. Murray & Cross, supra note 511, at 1101.
518. Anderson & Smith, supra note 459, at 284.
519. Id.
520. Id.
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Lastly, petroleum operations cause reduced environmental damage when
conducted under a unitization agreement than in the absence of
unitization.521 Unitization protects the environment by decreasing the
likelihood of unnecessary drilling and minimizing the need to install
additional machinery, pipes, and tanks on the surface.522 Unitization may
also promote development sustainability “through the prevention of waste
and the conservation of oil and gas for use by future generations.”523
B. Promote Production
Through studies of the physical nature and dynamics of petroleum
reservoirs, it is evident that unrecovered oil in reservoirs at the end of
primary operations can be as much as ninety percent of the initial
reserves.524 The operator may not even be able to recover the investors’
Capital Expenditures (“CapEx”) from primary recovery operations unless
certain techniques utilized raise the production to a much higher rate.
Secondary recovery and enhanced recovery techniques can dramatically
increase the recovery rate, sometimes by over one hundred percent.525 This
increase in production can stabilize the investors’ income stream.526
However, operators will be unable to achieve this ideal recovery rate in the
absence of unitization during the early stages of recovery operations.
IV. Legal Aspects of Unitization
Unit operators and interested parties cannot utilize the recommended
techniques for pressure maintenance and enhanced recovery to increase the
maximum rate of production in a reservoir without unitization.527 In addition
to technical encumbrances, the operator will assume severe legal
burdens — including the liability to the regulatory authority, lessors, and
third parties — by unilaterally implementing pressure maintenance and
enhanced recovery techniques without unitization.528

521. McDonald, supra note 514, at 307.
522. Murray & Cross, supra note 511, at 1102.
523. Strudwick M. Rogers, Fieldwide Unitization, 68 Ark. L. Rev. 425, 432 (2015).
524. Id.
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. Myers, supra note 444, at pg. 43 (stating that the pressure maintenance and
enhanced recovery will likely cause some drainage of hydrocarbons across property lines,
which their owner rights could only be secured through unitization of the reservoir).
528. Id. at 29-37.
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Unitization is defined as “the joint, coordinated operation of a petroleum
reservoir by all the owners of rights in the separate tracts overlying the
reservoir.”529 Although unitization is a type of joint or cooperative
operation to develop an oil and gas reservoir, the contractual features of
unitization agreements differ from typical joint or cooperative development
agreements.530 Usually, cooperative development agreements lack the
contractual characteristics of unitization agreements, such as the sharing of
property interests, production, and costs.531
Unitization requires a legal instrument to protect property interests and
allocate the liabilities of the mineral and working rights owners.532 The
legal instrument, drafted by lawyers, predicts and resolves legal issues
arising in the unit area.533 Understanding the legal nature and framework of
unitization requires familiarization with the definitions of the following
terms.
The term “Unitization”534 refers to “the joint, coordinated operation of an
oil or gas reservoir by all the owners of rights in the separate tracts
overlying the reservoir or reservoirs.”535 Moreover, Professor Kramer and
Professor Martin describe unitization, or unit operations, as “the
consolidation of mineral or leasehold interests covering all or part of a
common source of supply . . . to maximize production by efficiently
draining the reservoir, utilizing the best engineering techniques that are
economically feasible.”536
The “unit” or “unit area” is the total land that has been unitized for
production operations to develop the reservoirs. The 2015 Manual of Oil
and Gas Terms defines a “unit area” as "an area of land, deposit, or deposits
of minerals, stratum or strata, or pool or pools, or a part or parts thereof, as
to which parties with interests therein are bound to share minerals produced
on a specified basis and as to which those having the right to conduct

529. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 6.
530. This research will discuss the legal difference between unitization agreements and
cooperative development agreements in the section 3.4.2.
531. Robert E. Sullivan, Handbook of Oil and Gas Law (Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1955).
532. Myers, supra note 444, at pg. 100.
533. Id.
534. The European spelling of this term is “unitisation.”
535. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 11.
536. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at §1.02.
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drilling or mining operations therein are bound to share investment and
operating costs on a specified basis.”537
A “field” is “a geographic area situated over several separate oil and
gas reservoirs which are vertically or horizontally separated from each
other, or which are overlapping, contiguous, or superimposed on each
other.”538 When there is only one hydrocarbon reservoir, the terms “field”
and “pool” will have the same meaning; however, a field can contain many
pools.539 The “Unitized substances” are hydrocarbon products found within
the reservoir and required materials — such as water, carbon dioxide, and
diluent — that are used in the enhanced recovery operation.540 In a more
detailed definition, the American Petroleum Institute’s model Unitization
Agreement named these substances as “all oil, gas, gaseous substances,
sulphur contained in gas, condensate, distillate, and all associated and
constituent substances other than Outside Substances within or produced
from the unitized formation.”541
The “Unitization Agreement” is the legal vehicle that effectuates the
technical recommendations of engineers by utilizing pressure maintenance
and enhanced recovery techniques through unitization.542 In a
comprehensive description, Professor Kramer and Professor Martin define a
unitization agreement as “[a]n agreement or plan of development and
operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as a single
consolidated unit without regard to separate ownership and for the allocation
of costs and benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan.”543 The
signatory parties to this agreement are all owners of the mineral and royalty
interests in the unit area.544
The “Unitization Operating Agreement (UOA)” is the agreement that
regulates the rights and obligations of the working-interest owners or

537. Patrick H. Martin & Bruce M. Kramer, Williams & Meyers Manual of Oil and Gas
Terms 1111 (LexisNexis, 16th ed. 2015) (stating that the definition of unit area provided in
Article 213 of the Louisiana Mineral Code R.S. 31:213 (1975)).
538. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
539. Robert E. Hardwicke, Antitrust Laws, Et Al. V. Unit Operation of Oil or Gas Pools
(Society of Petroleum Engineers of AIME, Revised ed. 1961).
540. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 76-78.
541. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.032, FN. 18.
542. Myers, supra note 444, at pg. 43.
543. Martin & Kramer, supra note 537.
544. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17 (stating that the parties of the unitization
agreement could be individual owners in the United States due to its private ownership
system of minerals).
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licensees in “the actual operation of the unit.”545 The use of a UOA, which
contains daily details of the unit operation, is widespread — along with
unitization agreements — in both the United States and Canada.546 However,
internationally, a unitization agreement will often contain the contents of an
American or Canadian agreement.547 This is likely because a UOA is very
similar to a Joint Operating Agreement, which is an essential document in
the international oil and gas practice.548
The author will continue to delineate relevant terminologies throughout
this section and the rest of this dissertation. In the forthcoming sections, the
paper will discuss the legal nature and framework of unitization and the two
main types of unitization.
A. Legal Framework of Unitization
The legal instrument that effectuates unitization grants the lessor and
lessee the authority to consolidate their leased land with adjacent tracts to
efficiently develop and produce oil and gas from the reservoir or reservoirs.
This legal arrangement is either included in specific provisions of the oil
and gas lease or as a stand-alone unitization agreement.549
In both the public and private ownership regime, it is common for parties
to include provisions in their oil and gas contracts that allow their tracts to
be unitized if the underground oil and gas reservoirs are naturally shared
among contiguous tracts.550 These unitization provisions within oil and gas
contracts provide the lessee with advance authority to create a unit operation
that will benefit both the lessor and lessee as well as the overarching oil
industry.551 For example, a typical U.S. unitization provision found within the
oil and gas lease could be drafted as follows:
Lessee shall have the right to unitize, pool, or combine all or any
part of the above-described lands with other lands in the same
general area by entering into a cooperative or unit plan of
development or operation approved by any governmental
authority . . . and, from time to time, with like approval, to
modify, change or terminate any such plan or agreement and, in

545.
546.
547.
548.
549.
550.
551.

Id. at 17-22.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 17.
Sullivan, supra note 531, at 369-370.
Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 27.
Sullivan, supra note 531, at 373-374.
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such event, the terms, conditions, and provisions of this lease
shall be deemed modified to conform to the terms, conditions,
and provisions of such approved cooperative or unit plan of
development or operation and, particularly, all drilling and
development requirements of this lease, express or implied, shall
be satisfied by compliance with the drilling and development
requirements of such plan or agreement, and this lease shall not
terminate or expire during the life of such plan or agreement.552
Outside of the United States and Canada, many countries have embraced
unitization provisions in their model forms of oil and gas contracts. In their
comprehensive study on unitization outside of the United States, Jacqueline
Lang Weaver and David F. Asmus selected twelve countries that are active
in the petroleum industry and thoroughly analyzed unitization provisions in
their model petroleum contracts and national laws.553 Because this
dissertation will focus on unitization in Iraq, the researcher includes Article
34.1 of the 2007 Kurdistan model Production Sharing Contract (below) to
discuss how the Kurdistan Regional Government handles potential
unitization situations.
In the event, a Reservoir extends beyond the Contract Area into
an adjacent area which is the subject of another Petroleum
Contract . . . the GOVERNMENT shall require the
CONTRACTOR and the contractor of the Adjacent Contract
Area to agree upon a schedule for reaching an agreement of the
terms of the unitisation of the Reservoir.554
Unitization provisions in oil and gas leases usually state only basic and
broad instructions of the unitization process. In other words, oil and gas
leases, including unitization provisions, are unable to fairly and fully
encompass every essential aspect of the unitization process due to the
complexity of unitization, particularly field-wide unitization.555 To more
fully govern other aspects of unitization, the parties draft and sign a
“Unitization Agreement.” In the United States, this agreement is also
recognized as a "Royalty Owners Unitization Agreement" because the

552. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Peterson, 218 F.2d 926, 928 (10th Cir. 1954) (resolving a
dispute over the unitization of an oil and gas lease in the United States). a
553. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 27.
554. Model Production Sharing Contract, Art. 34.1, (2007) (The Kurdistan Region of
Iraq).
555. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 373.
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royalty-interest owners or lessors are the first party who signs this
agreement with the working-interest owners.556 The American and Canadian
private ownership systems allow for both individual parties and federal or
state governments to become signatory parties of unitization agreements as
owners of royalty interests or as the lessor.557
The unit parties obtain another legal instrument to “primarily govern the
rights between those who will bear the cost of the operation of the unit.”558
This legal instrument, known as the "Unit Operating Agreement" or simply
"Operating Agreement" in the United States, only covers the operational
features of unitization.559 The unit operating agreement is signed only by
lessees and operators who possess the working interests within the unit
area.560 The American Petroleum Institute and Rocky Mountain Mineral
Law Foundation provided the oil industry with two different model forms
for unit agreements and unit operating agreements in the United States.561
However, “the unit agreement and unit operating agreement are typically
combined into a single document which may be referred to as a ‘unitization
and unit operating agreement’ or simply as a ‘unitization agreement.’”562
In most countries, other than the United States and Canada, the host
government is the sole lessor, meaning it “holds title to all valuable oil, gas,
and mineral deposits, including deposit locates beneath what may otherwise
be privately-owned land”.563 Outside of the United States and Canada, only
Ecuador owns a specific model form Unitization Agreement.564 To
“incorporate maximum flexibility, given the myriad of situations in which
unit agreements are used” in international practice, the Association of
International Petroleum Negotiations (“AIPN”) presented a model form

556. Wendell J. Doggett, Practical Legal Problems Encountered in the Formation,
Operation and Dissolution of Fieldwide Oil and Gas Units, 16 Okla. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1963).
557. See Cynthia Nickerson et al., Major Uses of Land in the United States, 2007, 89
Eco. Res. Ser. (2011) https://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/pub-details/?pubid=
44630 (stating that about 60 percent of the land in the United States is privately owned. The
Federal Government owns 29 percent of the land base, mostly in the West. State and local
governments own nearly nine percent, and Indian trust land accounts for about 2 percent).
558. Doggett, supra note 556.
559. Id.
560. Id.
561. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 29.1-7.
562. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 70.
563. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 54.
564. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 25.
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international unitization and unit operation agreement (unitization
agreement) in 2006.565
The unitization provisions in both the oil and gas lease and the
unitization agreement are required to adhere to “special field rules and
regulations which are promulgated by the conservation agency and which
are adopted pursuant to the purposes of the unit agreement and the unusual
drilling and operating practices necessitated thereby.”566 In America, most
states have state unitization statutes.567 In 2004, the Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission (“IOGCC”) — a multi-state government agency
representing thirty oil and gas producing states568 — provided its members
with several regulations regarding unitization through a model Oil and Gas
Conservation Act.569 These regulations apply to unit operations on private
lands because all unitization agreements require the approval of
conservation agencies to force uncooperative lessors or lessees into unit
operation and comply with anti-trust law.570 In the international context,
some countries — including Azerbaijan, Brazil, and Ecuador — have
substantive laws that govern unit operations through regulations.571 The
Kurdistan region similarly regulates unit operations through Articles 48 and
49 of the aforementioned 2007 Oil and Gas Law.572
When oil and gas deposits straddle the borders of two or more sovereign
countries, the unit operations may be regulated using international legal
instruments, like treaties, conventions, and international customs.573
However, international law instruments, such as unitization treaties,

565. Association of International Petroleum Negotiations (AIPN), Guidance Note to the
AIPN 2006 Model Form International Unitization and Unit Operation,
https://www.aipn.org/forms/store/ProductFormPublic/unitization-and-unit-operatingagreement-2006.
566. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 369.
567. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 6 (stating that Texas has not enacted a
compulsory unitization statute yet).
568. Member States, The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC),
http://iogcc.ok.gov/member-states (last visited on September 15, 2017).
569. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 755-58 (stating that Sections 13-19 cover regulations
concerning compulsory unitization).
570. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
571. Id. at 25.
572. Oil and Gas Law of the Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq) Art. 48 & 49.
573. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 9.
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“generally follow the same practice used in domestic unitization
agreements.”574
B. Legal Effects of Unitization
This section discusses the legal nature of the unit title and how unitization
may affect the property rights of parties over mineral or working interests in
various tracts in the unit. Do the parties of unitization merely intend to
coordinate through “an economic and efficient operation,” or do they agree to
assign their interests?575 Two separate property-law legal theories have
materialized these options, particularly in private ownership regimes
followed in the United States and Canada.
Two theories — “the cross-assignment (cross-conveyance)” and “the
contract” — are used to define the parties’ property rights over the unitized
title.576 The adoption of a theory generates critical and different outcomes,
clarifying potential disputes, such as who is a legitimate party in litigation,
the rights, and obligations of assignees, and income tax disagreements.577
States may have different views on the legal effect of unitization agreements
and may adopt either the cross-assignment theory or the contract theory to
define unit titles.
1. Cross-Assignment Theory
The parties to unitization, under the cross-assignment theory, agree to
exchange their property interests, including production and cost, when they
enter into the unitization agreement.578 The lessee or the lessor of one tract
will be granted a property interest, either a royalty interest or working
interest, in other tracts “in proportion to his contribution to the unit measured
on a surface acreage basis or any other participation basis the agreement
employs.”579 Under the “cross-conveyance theory, the lessors would each
own an undivided interest in the others’ interest, and each would thereby
have conveyed to the others a similar interest in the premises originally
owned.”580 In the U.S., some states — including California, Illinois,
574. Ana E. Bastida et al., Cross-Border Unitization and Joint Development Agreements:
An International Law Perspective, 29 Hous. J. Int'l L. 355, 391 (2006).
575. Doggett, supra note 556, at 7.
576. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 19.01.
577. Doggett, supra note 556, at 8; Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 19.01.
578. Doggett, supra note 556, at 8.
579. Leo Hoffman, Some Problems in Pooling and Unitization, 7 Proc. Ann. Inst. On Oil
& Gas L. & Tax'n 219, 246 (1956).
580. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 19.02.
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Mississippi, and Texas — interpret the unitization agreement to create a
property-based combination, wherein the participants share the unit title and
property interests in proportion to their contributions to the surface area and
other property interests in the unit.581
Outside of the United States and Canada, the cross-assignment theory
describes the legal nature of the unitization title and regulates the
participants’ interests because no private owners are claiming any interest or
making any legal issues from merging the tracts. In international practice,
“[o]nce a unit is formed, each separately owned tract that participates in the
unit will be entitled to an undivided percentage [tract interest] of unitized
production obtained in any unit operation, regardless of the tract from which
it is produced, and will be liable for that same undivided percentage of costs
and liabilities incurred in any unit operation, regardless of the tract to which
they relate.”582
In his well-known handbook, the Handbook of Oil and Gas Law, Professor
Robert E. Sullivan highlighted that the feature of cross-assignment of
property interests among unit parties could only distinguish the unitization
agreement from other types of joint development agreements.583
2. Contract Theory
The owner of a royalty interest or a working interest in a tract will not
acquire a property interest in other tracts when he enters into the unitization
agreement based on contract theory. In other words, this theory refuses to
accept that the unit parties intend to share their property interests merely by
creating a unit. Instead, the jurisdictions that follow this theory — such as
Kansas, Oklahoma, Utah, and West Virginia — explain that the unit parties
intend to enter into “a mere operating arrangement.”584 These jurisdictions
describe the unitization agreement as a legal instrument to simply engage in
“a joint operation and that no conveyance of interests has been affected.”585
Nevertheless, the parties are entitled to a share of production from the whole
unit area, calculated based on their contributions to the unit in surface acreage
or other property interests.586

581. Id.
582. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 78.
583. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 358.
584. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 19.02.
585. Doggett, supra note 556, at 9; Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 19.02.
586. Leo Hoffman, Voluntary Pooling and Unitization: Oil and Gas (Matthew Bender &
Company 1954).
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This contract theory likens the unitization agreement to other types of
voluntary agreements that are signed to develop oil and gas reservoirs
productively. For example, a cooperative development agreement regulates
the operations “in which individual producers retain management of their
leases but a joint committee has authority to regulate the rate and character of
development and production from the entire pool.”587 The cooperative
development operation is described as “a type of joint venture wherein the
individual owners retain title to their tracts and develop them by a
preconceived and pre-agreed plan which has been adopted by all operators in
the pool.”588 Moreover, the only characteristic that differentiates it from the
contract theory of unitization is that “the separate ownership units are
independently operated without allocation of production” in the co-operative
development agreement.589
In the famous article Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the World,
Jacqueline L. Weaver and David F. Asmus argue that a cooperative
development operation, wherein the unit parties “independently operat[e]
without allocation of production between them, . . . [may] prevent physical
and economic waste, but it is not as effective as unitization in securing these
goals.”590 However, Weaver and Asmus go on to describe unitization
agreements in the international context, except those involving the United
States and Canada, as a "Super Joint Operating Agreement" because a large
surface area of the reservoir is combined to help all interest owners proceed
“cooperative development” operations.591 The article offered no further
explanation of how the two concepts of unitization and cooperative
development operations differ between the U.S. and Canada and the
international practice. This dissertation acknowledges that unitization
agreements, with their two critical contractual features of the crossassignment property interests and a share allocation of production and costs
among the unit parties, should be distinguished from cooperative
development agreements. Unit operations are considered one type of
cooperative method to develop the oil and gas reservoir. Thus, this
dissertation assumes that Professor Weaver and David Asmus also intended
to describe the unit operations as cooperative development operations.
Particularly, Weaver and Asmus refer to the six features that James G. Ross,
Senior Group Advisor, Gaffney, Cline & Associates (London), named to
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.

Sullivan, supra note 531, at 361.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 417.
Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at n. 34.
Id. at 22.
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distinguish between the cross-border unitization agreements and cooperative
development agreements.592 Among these features, the share of production
and costs, as well as the lack of borderline dispute, are marked qualities of
cross-border unitization agreements.593
Most unitization scholarship explicitly confirms that the property interests
of the whole unit area are shared among the participants in the unit, except
those in a few American states that adopted the contract theory. Nevertheless,
unitization scholars have not written much, if any, regarding the legal effect
of unitization agreements between two or more sovereign nations on the unit
title. Will a country assign the title of its territories to the neighboring state?
How does the internationally recognized principle of sovereignty of a country
over its territories and natural resources impact the legal effects of crossborder unitization agreements? Moreover, which theory of mineral property
rights, cross-assignment or contract, best fits the different types of unitization
agreements based on the location of the unit? The author will discuss
potential solutions to these questions in the coming two chapters.
V. Conclusion
Petroleum technicians and economists provided extensive evidence to
verify that consolidation of the entire oil and gas reservoir, through field-wide
unitization in the early stages of production operations, is a necessity to
prevent waste of hydrocarbons and to increase the rate of oil and gas recovery
in petroleum reservoirs. To effectively regulate complex unit operations,
minimal unitization provisions in the oil and gas lease will not suffice.
Lawyers consider unitization agreements as the best legal instruments to
govern different parts of unitization, protect the property interests of the
participants, and define operational liabilities of the unit parties.
Unitization agreements in private and public ownership regimes result in
specific legal effects on the participants’ property rights, which differ from
other voluntary or statuary joint operations to develop reservoirs, such as
cooperative development agreements. All states distinguish unitization
agreements through a contractual feature that provides a share of the unit
production among participants in proportion to their contributions to the
surface area or other property interests. The next chapter discusses the modes
of unitization agreements and presents evidence to apply a legal concept
while disregarding geopolitical concepts of border and sovereignty to classify
a unitization agreement.
592. Id. at 14-15.
593. Id.
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CHAPTER THREE: MODES OF UNITIZATION AGREEMENTS
I. Introduction
Unitization agreements can be categorized on two separate bases. The
first basis is whether the implementing method of the unitization agreement
is voluntary or compulsory. Second, unitization agreements can be
differentiated based on the location of the unit area. This research concludes
that the concept of jurisdiction is more accurate in differentiating
unitization agreements based on unit location than geopolitical alternatives.
As a result, this dissertation introduces two types of unitization agreements:
sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements and cross-jurisdiction unitization
agreements. To justify this categorization, the researcher compares the legal
term jurisdiction to geopolitical concepts, such as borders, sovereignty, and
country. Finally, this thesis interprets potential dimensions of jurisdictional
authority over hydrocarbon deposits in both terrestrial and marine
ecosystems.
II. The Categorization of Unitization Agreements
This research will study modes of unitization agreements based on
implementing methods of drafting unitization agreements and location of
units. The unit operation may be formed through the unanimous consent of
all unit parties; otherwise, the host government may force recalcitrant
parties to enter into a unitization agreement with original unitization
applicants. The author will examine these two methods in more details
below. In addition to characterizing the geological and geophysical
structures, the location of the unit area determines the legal configurations
and challenges that confront lawyers while drafting unitization agreements.
The oil and gas reservoirs may straddle across the borderline and as a result,
two or more different jurisdictions might transpire to control and regulate
the unit area. Consequently, this research prefers to apply the jurisdictional
legal measurement to classify unitization agreements based on the location
of units. This chapter introduces sole-jurisdiction and cross-jurisdiction
unitization agreements, which will be detailed in separate chapters.
A. Categorizing Unitization Agreements Based on Implementing Methods
Unitization agreements are divided into categories based on the methods
through which the unit parties accomplish the agreements.594 If the unit
594. Doggett, supra note 556, at 6; Sullivan, supra note 531, at 360.
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operation is necessary, the unitization agreement will be achieved through
either voluntary or compulsory means.595
Initially, in most cases, mineral interest owners will attempt to
voluntarily agree upon the formation of a unit and approve legal and
technical details of future unit operations.596 Voluntary unitization
agreements have become commonplace in the international oil industry. On
the other hand, legal regimes with private ownership of property rights,
such as in the United States, have applied the compulsory unitization. In the
case of the United States, numerous individuals may own minerals rights in
a field, and the likelihood of disputes arising among them in the context of
voluntary unitization is high. Compulsory unitization is “the consequence
of a failure to agree to unitize voluntarily” in most cases.597 To carry out
compulsory unitization, the requisite governmental entity, through specific
statutes, obliges the related parties to create a unitization agreement to
combine their mineral rights and subsequently regulates the unit
operation.598
1. Voluntary Unitization Agreements
After related parties recognize a need for creating a unit operation,
unitization can be accomplished through an agreement signed by the
participants voluntarily.599 In voluntary unitization agreements, “the owners
of interests in a pool agree that all, or a large part thereof, will be operated
as a single producing unit, irrespective of leased property lines, in
accordance with the terms of the agreement.”600 What makes a voluntary
unitization “a difficult and prolonged matter” is that all owners of mineral
rights in the field must unanimously concur with the formation of unit and
unit operation.601 In the United States, the unanimous agreement must be
reached among all working-interest holders and owners of non-working
interests.602 There are many justifications behind the intricacies within
595. Id. see also Sullivan, supra note 531, at 360.
596. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.01.
597. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 19.
598. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 361; Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 18.01.
599. Doggett, supra note 556, at 23.
600. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 361.
601. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.01; Sullivan, supra note 531, at 361;
Owen L. Anderson, Mutiny: The Revolt Against Unsuccessful Unit Operations, 30 Rocky
Mt. Min. L. Inst. 13 (1984).
602. Anderson, supra note 601, at 13-14; Sullivan, supra note 531, at 368-69 (all
“diverse surface owners, lessees, and royalty owners” need to consolidate their mineral
rights to form a voluntary unitization agreement in the United States).
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voluntary unitization agreements among the respective unit parties.603 The
essential excuse is that many parties — numerous mineral owners in the
case of the United States — are usually involved in a vast area of the
unit.604 The process of guaranteeing a “final agreement on all of the vital
terms of the unitization agreement and the unit operating agreement” is a
complex goal to achieve.605 That is in addition to “substantial amounts of
geological, geophysical, economic, financial, and other data must be
collected and digested to see if the unitization project is feasible.”606
During the negotiation process among parties, a time-consuming dispute
arises over “the participation formula” that determines the precise share of
each party involved in the unit after unitization is operated.607 The unit
parties may present various interpretations regarding a fair and equitable
allocation of production in the unit.608 The main factor used to calculate the
participation formula is the exact proportion of each tract’s contribution to
the unit.609 Additionally, in the United States, “fear of prosecution under the
anti-trust laws” may diminish the likelihood that interested parties of
unitization would voluntarily agree on consolidating their mineral
interests.610
In the international practice, the same pattern as the United States is
implemented to create unitization agreements voluntarily. Almost all
countries have designed a legal plan to encourage the working-interest
owners to prepare a draft of the voluntary agreement and submit it for
approval.611 The most conspicuous international example is found in
603. Anderson supra note 601, at 13-14.
604. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.01; Anderson supra note 601, at 13-14.
605. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.01.
606. Id.
607. Id. at §17.02 (stating that “the formula determines the portion of the unitized
substances each participant is to receive, and it is usually arrived at after long and laborious
negotiation”).
608. Anderson supra note 601, at 13-14 (stating that “[m]any interest owners, especially
those with highly productive wells in the heart of a field, may believe that their interests are
best served by refusing to share any production with outlying properties. Some interest
owners are simply suspicious of unitization plans and characterize them as a ploy by lessees
to hold on to leased acreage without having to fully develop the fields”).
609. Myers, supra note 444, at pg. 77; Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448 (stating that
“[t]he most common bases for determining tract interests in unitizations outside of the
United States and Canada seem to be (i) relative quantities of oil or gas in place under each
tract, and (ii) relative quantities of recoverable reserves attributable to each tract”).
610. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 360; Anderson supra note 601, at 13-14 n. 11.
611. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 25 (stating that out of twelve countries that
Weaver and Asmus studied their unitization provisions, eight countries — including Angola,
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Azerbaijan that exclusively allows for voluntary unitization agreement.612
Despite involving fewer engaging parties in the international practice, it is
technically difficult to determine reasonable shares of participants in
voluntary unitization agreements.613 The reason for such difficulty is that
unitization in the international practice “usually involve larger prospects,
bigger sums of money, and unitization at an early stage of a field's
development.”614 Furthermore, most host governments require the unit
parties to enter into a unit agreement within a limited time voluntarily.615
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq, for instance, requires the contractors of
adjacent blocks to operate unitization after signing a unitization of a
common oil and gas reservoir agreement “within a reasonable period.”616
A comprehensive assessment of the voluntary method reveals that this
type of unitization agreement may be inaccurate because most provisions of
the agreements, in the U.S. or the international practice, confirm that a
voluntary unitization agreement will not be effective unless a governmental
entity approves the prepared draft.617 Additionally, the involved parties of
the voluntary unitization agreements must follow the required terms, such
as limited time and specified procedure, to prepare the draft of the
unitization agreement.618
Finally, almost all oil and gas producing states mandate compulsory
unitization if unit parties fail to reach the voluntary unitization agreement
with the specified time.619
Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Nigeria, and United Kingdom — require that the
unit parties first attempt to secure unitization by voluntary agreement. Among other
countries, Russia and Yemen did not have unitization provisions at the time that research
was published. Azerbaijan only recognizes voluntary unitization agreements. Russia and
Yemen did not have unitization provisions in their laws).
612. Id. at 35 (citing Appendix I, The Oil and Gas Law of the Azerbaijan Republic:
Parliament Commission Draft, art. 13 (2000) (Barrows Supp. No. 43, Russia & NIS)).
613. Id. at 34.
614. Id. at 23.
615. Id. at 51-52 (stating that the Egyptian Decree 758 of 1972, under Article 45, requires
parties to reach agreement within six months of being notified by the Egyptian General
Petroleum Corporation, otherwise the Corporation will issue binding rules for the
unitization).
616. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region – Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq) art. 47.
617. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 360.
618. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 51-52.
619. Id. at 34 (stating that in the international practice, Azerbaijan is the sole country and
in the United States, Texas, is the only state that only recognize voluntary unitization
agreement).
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2. Compulsory Unitization Agreements
The compulsory method of unitization is performed entirely “under
statutory authority.”620 Based on a specific law, a relevant governmental
entity will direct the parties of a particular field to combine their mineral
rights in order to form a unit to produce hydrocarbons through a unified
operations.621 Most oil and gas producing countries wait to invoke the
compulsory method until the working-interest and royalty owners fail to
voluntarily agree upon terms for a necessary unit operation within a
specified time limit.622 The language of compulsory unitization legislation
can differ between states or countries. For instance, the Kurdistan 2007 Oil
and Gas Law No. 22, Article 47.2, authorizes the Kurdistan’s Ministry of
Natural Resources to operate a compulsory unitization via the following
language: “[I]f no joint agreement has been reached within a reasonable
period of time from receipt of written notice . . . the Minister shall decide
on the unitization.”623
In the United States, the compulsory method developed as a practical
approach to prevent waste and to increase production after a significant
amount of oil and gas producing states recognized that achieving
unanimous approval for unitization among various unit parties would often
be unfeasible.624 Oklahoma became the first state to adopt legislation
allowing for compulsory unitization in 1945.625 Texas, the largest petroleum
producing state in the United States, and Pennsylvania are surprisingly the
only states without compulsory unitization laws.626
The compulsory method of unitization does not mean that unit parties are
without authority regarding the drafting of the agreement. In the United
States, compulsory unitization combines the voluntary and statutory
methods.627 For example, the governing state oil and gas agencies will
allow working-interest owners and royalty owners to voluntarily, with a
620. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 360.
621. Id. at 361.
622. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 34.
623. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region – Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq) art. 47.
624. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 34.
625. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 362; Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 18.01
(stating that “Louisiana had the first compulsory unitization statute, but it was limited to
recycling of gas. Oklahoma was the first state to have a generally applicable compulsory
unitization law, which was enacted in 1945 and was substantially amended in 1951”).
626. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 18.01.
627. Doggett, supra note 556, at 6.
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certain (non-unanimous) percentage of consent vote, approve the
unitization proposal.628 However, a formal request of working-interest
owners usually triggers the involvement of a conservation agency to compel
mineral-right holders of the field to combine their interests and form a
unitization.629 The rational explanation of this involvement is to prevent
“recalcitrant lessees and royalty owners” from obstructing the productive
partnership plan of the majority of unit parties for increasing production
and avoiding waste.630
The United States’ model of compulsory unitization is not, however, an
absolute version of the government’s police power. The governmental
agencies, under statutory provisions, can compel unwilling parties to
participate in a unit operation only if the recalcitrant parties hold a minority
percentage of interests in the unit.631 In other words, the compulsory acts of
most states require the unit parties, who apply for unitization, to
successfully collect a specified percentage of both the working and
nonworking-interests owners which varies from 63% to 85%.632
In the event of a failure to unitize through both voluntary and
compulsory means in the United States, either each party will operate the
block based on the rule of capture, in which it would be subject to well
spacing rules, or the government will restrict the production volume of each
block by implementing a "no waste" rule.633
In the international practice, like the United States, most oil and gas
producing countries invoke the compulsory method after their contractors
failed to reach a voluntary unitization agreement over a certain time
period.634 Unlike in the United States, the jurisdictional authority of most
countries may disregard any minimum percentage of voluntary approval of
the unitization plan by the contractors.635
Finally, the compulsory method of unitization does not apply on
common petroleum reservoirs that are jointly owned by more than one

628. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 754-755.(stating that “[a]mong the major oil and gas
producing states, the required percentage specified in the acts varies from 63% to 85% of
each of the working and nonworking-interests”).
629. Id. at 752-53; see also Doggett, supra note 556, at 6.
630. Sullivan, supra note 531, at 401.
631. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 19.
632. Lowe et al., supra note 453, at 755.
633. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 50.
634. Id. at 25 (stating that Azerbaijan is the sole country operating only per voluntary
form of unitization).
635. Id.
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country.636 No rule of international customary law has been established to
compel sovereign countries to form unitization agreements over joint oil
and gas reservoirs.637 In fact, a sovereign country can reject any rule of
international law that requires compulsory unitization.638
B. The Categorization of Jurisdiction Based on Location of Unit Area
The location of the unit, either in one or in more than one country, forms
another category of unitization. Based on the location factor, scholarship
distinguishes between “sole-country” and “cross-border” unitization
agreements.639
Unitization scholars define the “sole-country unitization agreement” as
an agreement unitizing the relevant oil and gas reservoir that entirely
underlies beneath two or more blocks and different leases in one country
whose laws and regulations govern the entire unitization operations.640
Alternatively, “cross-border unitization” is the unit operation of
transboundary hydrocarbon deposits.641 In other words, cross-border
unitization occurs when there is “a reservoir underlying two or more
countries that have a delimited border between them.”642
The author, however, believes that these two labels inadequately
represent the modes of unitization agreements. This research doubts that
political measures, such as borders or sovereign countries, are capable of
classifying unitization agreements based on the location of the unit. This
dissertation, instead, prefers to consider the legal measure of governing
jurisdiction to categorize unitization agreements. For that reason, this
dissertation has modified the respective types of unitization agreements and
alternatively marks them as “sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements” and
“cross-jurisdiction unitization agreements.”643

636. Ernest E. Smith et al., Materials on International Petroleum Transactions 167
(Denver: Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 3d ed. 2010).
637. Bastida et al., supra note 574, at 380.
638. Id.
639. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 34; see also Smith et al., supra note 636, at
167.
640. Id. at 13.
641. Smith et al., supra note 636, at 167.
642. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 14.
643. This dissertation will explicate these two types of unitization, sole-jurisdiction
unitization and cross-jurisdiction unitization, in separate chapters.
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1. Sole-Jurisdiction Unitization Agreements
When unitization becomes a necessary operation within a reservoir that
is entirely located beneath a region governed by only one jurisdiction, the
parties will draft a sole-jurisdiction unitization agreement.644 A solejurisdiction unitization agreement may “extend underneath the boundaries
of different license areas,” but does not straddle the boundary of another
jurisdiction authority.645 The sole-jurisdiction unitization agreement is
regulated by the laws and regulations of a sovereign state or an
administrative division that has authority over the territory in which the
respective hydrocarbon reservoir is found.646
A governmental entity may need to approve drafts of unitization
agreements and will enact statutes to grant this power. For instance, the
Directorate General of Oil and Gas in the Indonesian government regulates
unitization agreements under Decree No. 402 of l967.647 Similarly, the
conservation agencies of each state in the U.S. regulate the unit operations
that take place exclusively within its borders.648 The majority of other
countries apply a similar approach. The Kurdistan regional government,
under the provisions of the 2005 Iraqi constitution, is authorized to regulate
and control unit operations and agreements that take place entirely within
Kurdistani territories, which is almost completely different than the federal
government of Iraq.649
A unique example of sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements may occur
in transboundary petroleum reservoirs when two or more sovereign states
agree upon cooperatively managing petroleum operations within their joint
development zone; they enact “a single set of petroleum regulations and
fiscal terms” to regulate the unit operation within the zone.650 This
dissertation will explicate sole-jurisdiction agreement in chapter four.

644. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 13.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Id. at 33; July Usman, Unitization Practices in Indonesia, in the Fifteenth Annual
Convention of Indonesian Petroleum Association, vol.2, pp. 335-349 (Oct. 1986).
648. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 10.
649. CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ (2005) Arts. 112, 114, 115, 117, and 121 (recognizing
the administrative authority of the Kurdistan region along with jurisdictional authority of the
region over its natural resources); Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region – Iraq No. 22
of 2007 (The Kurdistan Region – Iraq) Art. 47 (stating that The Ministry of Natural
Resources is the approval and regulatory authority over unitization in the Kurdistan region).
650. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at n. 18.
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2. Cross-Jurisdiction Unitization Agreements
One definition of cross-border unitization describes it to exist when one
or more working-interest owners possess a license to operate on each side
of the border.651 Inspired by this definition, this dissertation states that a
cross-jurisdiction unitization agreement appears when an oil and gas
reservoir that needs to be unitized, exists within an area with two or more
separate jurisdictional authorities. A cross-jurisdiction unitization
agreement usually includes “two or more different licensees.”652 Moreover,
a cross-jurisdiction unitization agreement may involve international treaties
and various national laws and regulations.653 Each implicated jurisdiction
may have different tax laws, environmental protection regulations, and
safety instructions than other jurisdictions.654 Jurisdictions may also apply
different granting instruments or fiscal regimes, such as concession
agreements, production sharing contracts, service contracts, and joint
ventures.655 National or international borders may also differentiate
jurisdictional authority from each other. That means the jurisdictional
authorities could be under different sovereign states or administrative
divisions. As a result, a unitization agreement may involve two or more
host governments in addition to many petroleum companies.
If the unit extends across an international borderline dividing two or
more sovereign states, the cross-jurisdiction unitization agreement will
typically require the unit parties to draft two types of agreements. Initially,
the implicated host governments will sign a unitization agreement among
each other and then the engaged licensees or petroleum companies will
enter into a unit operating agreement.656 The impacted host governments
will also enter into a treaty agreement to enhance cooperation.657 For
example, the United Kingdom and Norway signed a unitization treaty in
1976 to develop their joint Frigg gas field in the North Sea.658
651. Id. at 14.
652. Id.
653. Id.
654. George Burn et al., Legal Issues in Cross-Border Resource Development, 8 J. World
Energy L. & Bus. 154, 159 (2015).
655. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 9.
656. Bastida et al., supra note 574, at 380, 370; Smith et al., supra note 636, at 167.
657. Smith et al., supra note 636, at 168; Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 14 (Email from James G. Ross, Senior Group Advisor, Gaffney, Cline & Associates (London), to
Jacqueline Lang Weaver, A.A. White Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center
(on file with Author)).
658. Bastida et al., supra note 574, at 370; Smith et al., supra note 636, at 169.
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This dissertation will expound cross-jurisdiction agreement in chapter
five.
III. The Superiority of Jurisdiction in Classifying Unitization Agreements
The classification of unitization agreements based on the location of the
unit area establishes the fundamental substance of what lawyers need to
consider during the preparation of the unitization agreement. Among that
substance, the lawyers concern is more about the legal measures to draft a
unitization agreement. Any contract needs to comply with the legal
authority of the relevant territory. On the other hand, mere geopolitical
measures — such as country, sovereignty, and borderlines — bear no legal
impact on contracts. The legal language that dictates how to control and
regulate unitization agreements is not embedded within the geopolitical
measurements. In addition to the fact that “political and social identities”
are products of “territorial jurisdiction,”659 jurisdictions regulate the legal
relationships of contractual parties in agreements.
Another integral argument in support of the thesis that classifying
unitization agreements based on jurisdiction is best, is that more than one
jurisdiction may exist within a distinct political system, such as federalism.
Consequently, the drafters, in some cases, may need to invest the same
amount of time, energy, and capital to confront the authoritative differences
within a single country. These challenges are similar to the challenges of
drafting a unitization agreement between two sovereign countries.
Therefore, the dominance of the concept of jurisdiction would be more
palpable than the geopolitical dimensions of border and sovereignty among
the drafters to classify unitization agreement based on the location of the
unit.
A. Comparison Between Jurisdiction and Border
A border or a boundary is a geographic phenomenon determining the
territory line of a geopolitical entity, such as a country. The terms “border”
and “boundary” interchangeably refer to “a cartographically identifiable
line marking the territorial limits of states.”660 Anderson and O’Dowd
define borders as “political divides or social constructions that are a product

659. Richard T. Ford, Law's Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 Mich. L Rev. 843,
844 (1999).
660. Sabri Ates, The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making A Boundary 1843-1914, 8
(Cambridge University Press 2013).
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of modern state-building and the global state system.”661 Moreover,
borders, as political lines, show “the territorial consolidation of state” and
“the actual power that states wielded over their own societies.”662 From the
perspective of international law, Black’s Law Dictionary defines a
boundary as “[a] line marking the limit of the territorial jurisdiction of a
state or other entity having an international status.”663 Buad and Van
Schendel posit that boundary is a term that is mostly applied among
diplomatic milieu to refer to “the precise location of borders” as well as
“the dividing line between different peoples or cultures.”664 Therefore,
borders and boundaries are recognized as geopolitical markers to divide
states and their authorities, and not to classify contracts.
The classification of unitization agreements based on borders is an
inaccurate measure because the geopolitical concept of border is unable to
regulate unitization agreements. Even international petroleum companies do
not limit their business activities based on “defined boundaries and
precisely measurable territory” because “[t]here is . . . no rule that the land
frontiers of a state must be fully delimited and defined.”665
When a hydrocarbon reservoir extends across the boundary line of a
contract area and partially underlies a non-contract area, the unitization
agreement determines interests and liabilities of all parties involved in the
contract area and the non-contract area.666 The unit parties could utilize the
same legal instrument when the oil and gas reservoir straddles across the
borderlines of two or more countries.667 Perhaps, the boundary or
borderlines are the main reason that involved parties need to draft
unitization agreements. Borderlines are also used to measure the property
rights of all legitimate parties on each side in unitization agreements.668
However, these lines take no roles in regulating the unitization agreements.
Therefore, the border and boundary lines will be inaccurate measures to

661. James Anderson & Liam O’Dowd, Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality:
Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance, 33.7 Reg. Studies 593, 603 (1999).
662. Michiel Baud & Willem Van Schendel, Toward a Comparative History of
Borderlands, 8 J. World History 211, 214-5 (1997).
663. Boundary, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
664. Baud & Van Schendel, supra note 662, at 213.
665. Smith et al., supra note 636, at 74 (stating that some jurisdictions have applied an
extraterritorial authority to cover activities beyond their boundaries).
666. Martin & Kramer, supra note 537.
667. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 14.
668. Boundary, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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classify unitization agreements, and the category of cross-border unitization
agreements may not be appropriately named.
Just as the mere concept of border is unable to govern unitization
agreements when the oil and gas reserves extend across the border, the
concept of the country cannot regulate unitization agreements when the
reservoirs are fully recoverable inside of one country. The logic behind that
statement is that “the regulatory and taxing authority” in some federal
countries are shared among the federal governments and provincial or
regional governments.669 More than one jurisdiction would be subject to
regulating natural resources within those countries. As a result, this research
believes that the category of sole-country unitization is also unable to
accurately represent unitization agreements within one country.
Unitization agreements are only governed by the jurisdictions, laws, and
regulations of countries that own royalties or working interests as well as
the police power to regulate the petroleum operations within their
territories.670 The concept of jurisdiction is the proper measure for dividing
unitization agreements because jurisdictions regulate all oil and gas
contracts and operations that take place entirely within the territorial
authority. Therefore, the modes of sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements
and cross-jurisdiction unitization agreements are more accurate.
The sole-jurisdiction unitization is an agreement that is only subject to
one jurisdiction because the entire unit area and unit operations take place
within a territory, either an administrative division or a country that is run
by one jurisdiction. On the other hand, cross-jurisdiction unitization
agreements transpire when the oil and gas reservoirs extend across the
borderlines of two or more neighboring countries that have different
jurisdictions than each other. This category would also embrace the
unitization agreement that might be subject to two or more jurisdictions
within a country with a non-central governing system, for example, a
country such as the United States or Iraq, whose states and regions have
their own, deferent jurisdictions. The Kurdistan region of Iraq, for instance,
owns a different jurisdiction than another part of Iraq.

669. FORUM OF FEDERATIONS: THE GLOBAL NETWORK ON FEDERALISM
AND DEVOLVED GOVERNANCE, FEDERAL COUNTRIES, http://www.forumfed.
org/countries/ (last visited September 15, 2018) (stating that “[t]here are 25 federal countries
in the world today, which together represent 40 per cent of the world's population”); Smith
et al., supra note 633, at 191 (stating that the exact authority of provinces might be even
ambiguous in some federal regimes).
670. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 36.
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B. Comparison Between Jurisdiction and Sovereignty
The notions of jurisdiction and sovereignty represent similarly essential
aspects of a government’s authority over its territories. However, this
research trusts that the concept of jurisdiction prevails over the concept of
sovereignty to cover the full and exclusive power of authority regarding the
oil and gas development in a territory. To clarify the reasons supporting
such preference, the researcher highlights the distinction between the
concepts of sovereignty and jurisdiction in more details below.
Many types of literature use the term “sovereignty” in reference to the
legal authority of states over their territories and territorial seas. Such an
inference arises from an inaccurate description of the term because
sovereignty is “the supreme political authority of an independent state,”671
and it will not directly influence substances of its territory. However,
modern literature introduced a more appropriate term, “territoriality,” to
describe the exclusive legal authority of a state over its territory.672 The
principle of territoriality could be tangible and operative through the state’s
power arm, which is “jurisdiction.” Black’s Law Dictionary dissects the
connection of this term with territoriality and sovereignty through two
definitions of jurisdiction. In one definition, jurisdiction is described as “[a]
government's general power to exercise authority over all persons and
things within its territory.”673 Alternatively, Black’s Law Dictionary also
describes jurisdiction as “[a] geographic area within which political or
judicial authority may be exercised.”674 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Professor at
Indiana University Maurer School of Law-Bloomington, affirms that
“[j]urisdiction is an aspect of sovereignty, it is coextensive with and,
indeed, incidental to, but also limited by, the State’s sovereignty.”675
Public international law acknowledges “sovereignty” as a fundamental
notion that, along with territory and boundary, describe “essential attributes
of a state, the primary subject of international law.”676 In other words,
671. Sovereignty, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
672. Saskia Sassen, When Territory Deborders Territoriality, 1 Territory, Politics,
Governance 21, 24 (2013) (stating that “territoriality as a legal construct that marks the
state’s exclusive authority over its territory has become the dominant mode of understanding
territory”).
673. Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
674. Id.
675. Hannah L. Buxbaum, Territory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional
Conflict, 57 Am. J. Comp. L., no. 3, 2009, at 631, 632 (citing Frederick A. Mann, The
Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 30 (1964)).
676. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 362.
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sovereignty epitomizes "the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations, which governs a community consisting primarily of states having a
uniform legal personality.''677 Sovereignty, in the international system, is the
most recognized concept representing the full or exclusive authority of a
government over its territories.678 Nevertheless, some international law
scholars, including Saskia Sassen, Professor of Sociology at Columbia
University, favor the notion of “territoriality” to introduce the authority of
the government over its territories.679 The international system recognizes
the concept of sovereignty to grant states or countries “jurisdiction, prima
facie exclusive, over a territory and the permanent population living
there.”680 This description of public international law highlights four main
components of sovereignty: (1) a state, (2) a uniform legal system, (3) a
territory, and (4) a permanent population. Similarly, public international
law considers a state to include the following four fundamental elements: “a
defined territory, a permanent population, a government, a capacity to
conduct international relations.”681 Because of these similar elements
between the concepts of sovereignty and state, Black’s Law Dictionary
described the expression of “sovereign” as “a state vested with independent
and supreme authority.”682 The authority of a sovereign includes “legal
dominion over its geographical area, including its natural resources.”683
However, the concept of sovereignty includes the element of a uniform
legal system or jurisdiction that the international law did not mention
among the elements of a state. Meanwhile, a state is comprised of a
government that the international system does not recognize as a critical
element of sovereignty.
Based on the definition above, public international law grants a
sovereign state the authority over its territories, including natural resources.
However, this description is not accurate because many essential instances
attest to the fact that the authority of petroleum deposits does not
exclusively belong to the sovereign states. In federal systems and English
common law regimes, constitutions or national laws grant the governorates
677. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 287 (4th ed. 1990).
678. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 362.
679. Sassen, supra note 669, at 24 (stating that that territoriality, as “a powerful
innovation, and it has worked well to legitimate and cement the power of the modern state
over a territory”).
680. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 362.
681. Smith et al., supra note 633, at 74.
682. Sovereignty, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
683. Smith et al., supra note 633, at 30.
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of states, regions, or provinces with the independent authority to exercise
their rights to operate natural resources within their territories.684 For
instance, in the United States, seventeen states were not originally formed
out of federal territories, wherein these states or their residents, not the
federal government, own their territories and natural resources.685 Also, the
U.S. federal government awarded the rest of states, particularly those on the
West Coast, federal lands through a series of laws which were passed by
Congress to earn enough revenue for the states to run their governorates in
the 19th Century.686
Per ad coelom doctrine, the Common Law perspective over property
interests in the United States grants the states the right to own the natural
resources under their territories or lands.687 Even offshore areas may be
divided between the central and provincial governments. For example, the
provincial government may have sovereignty over the territorial sea in
some federal systems, while the federal government may keep the
ownership and control of sovereignty over the exclusive economic zone or
continental shelf seaward of the territorial sea.688 Besides the federal
regimes, countries with unitary systems may still bestow the right to have
local jurisdiction over their territories, including natural resources, upon
their administrative divisions.689 Moreover, the private ownership regimes
in some countries, including the United States and Canada, have granted
individuals — who are not sovereigns or subjects to the international law —
with the right to own and operate natural resources located beneath their
property.690 Governments, as the executive authority, don’t represent mere
legal control over territories; instead, jurisdiction is an accurate
measurement to rule territory in general and to categorize the petroleum
contracts in particular.
Alternatively, one of the descriptions that the Black’s Law Dictionary
includes for the concept of jurisdiction is “[a] government's general power
684. Id. at 74.
685. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 1285 (stating that these states include the original 13
colonies, plus Maine, Texas, West Virginia, and parts of Tennessee).
686. Id. at 1285, n. 442 (stating that the United States Congress issued many Acts, such
as, 9 Stat. 352 (1824), 10 Stat. 634 (1855), 11 Stat. 3, 12 Stat. 3 (1860), and 13 Stat. 3
(1860), allowed states to own swamp lands. The 1894 Carey Act allowed states to own
desert lands, and the 1862 Morrill Act granted stated with land to build agricultural
colleges).
687. Id. at 54.
688. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 363.
689. Smith et al., supra note 633, at 75.
690. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 54.
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to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory.”691
Furthermore, the concept of government is defined as “[t]he structure of
principles and rules determining how a state or organization is
regulated.”692 These two definitions of jurisdiction and government share a
strong connection between them. A government regulates objects and
populations residing within its territories through its jurisdiction. In other
words, jurisdiction is a necessary device to sustain a government’s
competence.
IV. The Determination of Jurisdictional Authority
Over Hydrocarbon Deposits
Oil and gas deposits, like other “mineral resources in the soil and subsoil
of land territory and territorial see to an unlimited depth,” belong to a
sovereign state or an administrative division with jurisdictional authority
over its territory.693 However, this statement is not entirely accurate because
individuals have owned petroleum deposits since the petroleum industry
has started in the United States and Canada based on the principle of private
ownership of property.694 Despite different ownership regimes over oil and
gas, the jurisdiction of the territory regulates legal rights and obligations of
all parties — governments, individuals, and public or private companies —
involved in daily petroleum operations.695 This section tries to answer the
question of how the authority of jurisdiction over petroleum deposits is
legally determined in a territory.
Oil and gas investors usually look to both national and international law
to find language that determines the authority of jurisdiction over petroleum
deposits in a sovereign state of an administrative division.696 On a national
level, foreign investors will examine articles of the constitution and
legislation to find such language. Petroleum companies may detect the
framework in administrative orders awarding provinces, regions, or other
administration divisions a right to regulate petroleum operations within

691. Jurisdiction, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). (defining also that jurisdiction
is “[a] geographic area within which political or judicial authority may be exercised”).
692. Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
693. Lagoni, supra note 438, at 216.
694. Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas, § 2.1 (Matthew Bender, Rev.
Ed.).
695. Id. at §65.1.
696. Smith et al., supra note 633, at 72.
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their territories.697 Furthermore, intergovernmental entities and resolutions
are additional important references that international oil and gas companies
will closely follow to verify the authority of jurisdiction over petroleum
deposits, particularly in disputed territories that multiple ownership claims
raised by different countries or regions are considered as a significant
political risk for investors. Among intergovernmental institutions, the
United Nations and other cooperative regional councils have presented
many resolutions and multilateral treaties determining the jurisdictional
authority over disputed territories and the rights of members over petroleum
deposits.698 Additionally, bilateral treaties among sovereigns may establish
jurisdictional authority over common or disputed mineral rights.699
The jurisdictional territory of a sovereign state or an administrative
division contains both terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Petroleum
investors prefer to conduct their onshore operations on lands that are
entirely or exclusively controlled by an identified jurisdiction. However, oil
and gas investors are aware that “a ‘defined territory’ does not require
precisely defined boundaries and precisely measurable territory.”700 The
same jurisdiction would regulate oil and gas operations in internal waters,
such as rivers and bays, within the territory. Offshore petroleum operations
also extend over the outer continental shelf, which includes territorial seas
and exclusive economic zones.701 Oil investors will verify the jurisdictional
authority of alleging states or administrative divisions before commencing
their costly operations within the outer continental shelf.
A. Jurisdictions and Terrestrial Hydrocarbon Deposits
1. Hydrocarbon Deposits Within Lands
An international principle, issued by the United Nations in 1962,
recognizes the rights of sovereign states and their people to benefit from
their natural resources.702 Jurisdiction, as “an aspect of sovereignty,”

697. Id. at 191 (stating that foreign investors may encounter ambiguous provisions
regarding the jurisdiction authority of provinces).
698. Id. at 36 (stating the United Nations Resolutions on Permanent Sovereignty over
Natural Resources, U.N.G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963)).
699. Id. at 223.
700. Id. at 74.
701. Owen L. Anderson, Federalism: Onshore and Offshore Public Lands in the United
States, 4 OGEL, no. 4, Nov. 2006, at 12.
702. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1962) (declaring that “[t]he right of peoples
and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be
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regulates operations of natural resources, such as oil and natural gas, within
a territory.703 In addition to the United Nations General Assembly
Resolution No. 1803 of 1962, most sovereign states affirm their
jurisdictional authority over natural resources within their territories
through domestic laws and constitutions. For example, the Constitution of
Brazil sets forth that the federal government controls and regulates
petroleum resources, both onshore and offshore.704 Furthermore, the
Petroleum Act of the United Kingdom states that The UK Board of Trade is
the jurisdictional authority regulating onshore petroleum activities within its
territories.705
Many countries around the world, particularly centralized administration
regimes, recognize sole-jurisdiction authority over their hydrocarbon
deposits. However, decentralized regimes, especially federal governments,
subdivide sovereignty and jurisdiction, between the central and regional
governments.”706 For instance, the United States allows its states to regulate
their titled lands.707 Similarly, the Constitution of Iraq has granted
petroleum producing governorates and the Kurdistan regional government
with the authority to manage and regulate petroleum fields that have been
developed after 2006.708 As a result, the jurisdiction of the Kurdistan

exercised the interest of their national development and of the wellbeing of the people of tile
State concerned”).
703. Buxbaum, supra note 672, at 632 (citing Frederick A. Mann, The Doctrine of
Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 30 (1964)).
704. CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 20(V) & (IX) (Braz.).
705. Petroleum (Production) Act 1934, 24 & 25 GEO. Ch. 36, § 2 (UK).
706. Smith et al., supra note 633, at 76.
707. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 1285-1286 (stating that in addition to the original 13
colonies, Maine, Texas, and West Virginia that were allowed to hold the title of their lands,
the United States federal government “granted lands at statehood [to other states] to use as a
source of income to defray the costs of establishing and funding public schools, colleges,
universities, and institutions, and for the costs of constructing various internal
improvements.” As a result, states kept their rights to regulate oil and gas substances within
their lands).
708. CONSTITUTION OF IRAQ 2005, art. 112 (Iraq). James Crawford, Legal Opinion:
The Authority of the Kurdistan Regional Government over Oil and Gas under the
Constitution of Iraq (Jan. 29, 2008) at 7, available at http://mnr.krg.org/images/pdfs/James_
R_Crawford_Kurdistan_Oil_Legal_Opinion_English2008.pdf (accessed November 10,
2017) (stating that Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution granted the Kurdistan Regional
Government with an exclusive right to explore and manage its petroleum fields that would
be operated after 2006 without the involvement of the Iraqi federal government).
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Region of Iraq, under the Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region – Iraq
No. 22 of 2007, regulates the petroleum operations within its territories.709
2. Hydrocarbon Deposits Within Internal Waters
In addition to the land, sovereign states own their internal waters.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines internal water as “[a]ny natural or artificial
body or stream of water within the territorial limits of a country, such as a
bay, gulf, river mouth, creek, harbor, port, lake, or canal.”710 The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 similarly describes internal
waters as “waters on the landward side of the baseline of the territorial sea
form part of the internal waters of the State.”711 Internal waters, such as
lakes, that are completely located within territories of a sovereign country
are subject to the jurisdiction of that sovereign state. For example, a federal
law of the Russian Federation protects and regulates Lake Baikal, the
world’s largest freshwater lake and the world’s deepest lake which is fully
located within Russian territories in southern Siberia.712 In a federal regime,
such as the United States, the federal government allows states to “hold
sovereign title to the beds of internal navigable waters” within their
respective boundaries.713 However, some internal saltwater and freshwater
waters, such as the Kiel Canal, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal, are
subject to the international river regime, and are exclusively regulated
under general customary law because of their navigational importance for
international transportation.714
B. Jurisdictions and Marine Hydrocarbon Deposits
1. Hydrocarbon Deposits Within Territorial Seas
Sovereign countries, in addition to owning natural resources “in the soil
and subsoil of their land territory,” own and possess the right to regulate
709. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq).
710. Internal Waters, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (stating that “inland
waters” is another term to introduce internal waters).
711. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 8, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
712. Darima B. Dabaeva et al, Peculiarities of Lake Baikal Water Level Regime, 48 IOP
Conf. Ser.: Earth Environ. Sci., no. 1, 1 (2016); The Federal Law of The Russian Federation
on Protection of Lake Baikal No. 94-FZ of 1999 (Russ.) art. 1.
713. Anderson, supra note 698, at 16-17.
714. Kaare Bangert, Internal Waters, Oxford Public International Law ¶ 1 (Feb. 2018),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1968.
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hydrocarbon deposits within their “territorial seas to an unlimited depth.”715
Other states have no right to benefit from these oil and gas deposits unless
the sovereign territorial permits.716 Otherwise, the intruding state violates
the public international law principle of territorial integrity which is “[a]
necessary corollary to the principle of territorial sovereignty.”717
For centuries, coastal states have argued over the sovereignty limit of
their coastal waters. In 1703, the Dutch established a legal doctrine, which
became internationally-recognized as “the cannon-shot rule” to resolve
sovereignty disputes over territorial lands and territorial seas.718 In the 18th
Century, French jurists added a concrete interpretation to the cannon-shot
rule by clarifying that “the effective range of a cannon-shot was
approximately three nautical miles.”719 Although the three-nautical-mile
rule was recognized and adopted by many naval powers until the early
Twentieth Century, many states and legal scholars argued that the cannonshot rule had to be expanded from three to twelve nautical miles due to the
advancement of artillery fire range.720 The twelve-mile language first
appeared in the 1930 Hauge Convention, and later became a principle of
customary international law due to the pressure of sovereign members of
the United Nations in the 1940s and 1950s.721
Today, “the territorial sea of a sovereign state,” under the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS), is “up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines.”722 The UNCLOS
delineates that “normal baseline . . . is the low-water line along the coast as

715. Lagoni, supra note 438, at 216 (citing 2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW 462 (8th ed. R Lauterpacht, 1955); I, 2 P. FAUCHILLE, TRAITE DE DRROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 99 (8th ed. H. Bonfils, 1925)).
716. Id.
717. Id. at 217.
718. William L. Schachte Jr., The History of the Territorial Sea from a National Security
Perspective, 1 Terr. Sea J. 143, 148-9 (1990) (stating that in 1610 the Dutch introduced the
implication of naval power, shooting cannons, to resolve their maritime disputes over
sovereignty of coastal water with Britain. In 1703, the Dutch judge Bynkershoek created the
legal doctrine of “the cannon shot” based on his argument that "the dominion of the land
ends where the power of arms terminates").
719. Id.
720. Id. at 155 (citing D. O’CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA
125 (1982).
721. Schachte Jr., supra note 715, at 155; Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 364; Henry M.
Arruda, The Extension of the United States Territorial Sea: Reasons and Effects, 4 Conn. J.
Int'l L. 697, 702 (1989).
722. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 708, at art. 3.
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marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal State.”723
The majority of parties to the UNCLOS, more than one hundred states,
accepted the twelve-nautical-mile rule after the Reagan administration
announced that the U.S. would respect the Convention’s principle regarding
the extension limit of territorial seas to protect its national security
interests.724
Because some federal governments shared a part of land sovereignty and
revenue from mineral interests with their provincial governments, the
respective provinces in the federal regimes also granted the ownership of
territorial seas in a limited extension. For instance, the 1953 Submerged
Lands Act (SLA) of the United States recognized the right of its coastal
states to hold title over the territorial sea, with a limit distance from their
baseline.725 In the United States, Texas and Florida own up to nine nautical
miles of the territorial water from their baseline in the Gulf of Mexico, and
other coastline states hold title to up to three nautical miles of the territorial
seas from their coastline in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.726
2. Hydrocarbon Deposits Within the Continental Shelf
A seaside country, after the twelve-nautical-mile limit of the territorial
sea, may own another extent of seabed that is known as the continental
shelf. The UNCLOS, in Article 76.1, defines the continental shelf as below:
The continental shelf of a coastal State comprises the seabed and
subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial
sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.727
The decision of most seaside countries to claim sovereignty rights over
the continental shelf began after World War II, when the United States,
under the Truman Administration, declared that the jurisdiction of the
United States would control the natural resources beneath the continental
723. Id. at art. 5.
724. Schachte Jr., supra note 715, at 164; Arruda, supra note 718, at 718.
725. Robert Jay Wilder, The Three-Mile Territorial Sea: Its Origins and Implications for
Contemporary Offshore Federalism, 32 VA. J. INT'L L. 681, 682 (1992).
726. Anderson, supra note 698, at 17; Arruda, supra note 718, at 710; Wilder, supra note
722, at 738 n.61.
727. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 708, at art. 76.1.
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shelf adjacent to the United States’ coastlines.728 The 1945 Truman
Proclamation later became an essential principle of international law to
demarcate maritime boundaries.729 Later, the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the Continental Shelf stated that coastal states would be entitled to
exclusive sovereignty rights over mineral deposits in the continental
shelf.730 Additionally, the International Court of Justice used the Truman
Proclamation as a fundamental principle to resolve disputed maritime
boundaries in the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases in 1969.731 Finally, the
1982 UNCLOS, as the dominant intergovernmental law of the sea, clearly
determined the boundary of the continental shelf and the exclusive
jurisdictional authority of coastal states over the exploration of natural
resources in the continental shelf.732
The continental shelf of a coastal state may contain an area known as the
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The EEZ, under the 1982 UNCLOS, is
“an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea,” but it “shall not extend
beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.”733 Like the territorial sea, the continental shelfEEZ is subject to the jurisdictional authority of the coastal state for the
purpose of “the economic exploitation and exploration” activities.734
Nevertheless, this exclusive right of the coastal states in the continental
shelf, particularly the EEZ, does not include the pipeline sector as the 1982
UNCLOS states that all countries, including land-locked countries, may
exercise their “freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines” in the
continental shelf.735

728. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 364 (citing Press Release, White House,
Proclamation [No. 2667] by the President with Respect to the Natural Resources of the
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (Sept. 28, 1945) reprinted in Official
Documents, 40 AM. J. INT'L L. SUPP. 45, 46 (1946)).
729. Lagoni, supra note 438, at 234 & n. 89 (stating that for instance, Saudi Arabia and
Kuwait in 1949 as well as Iran in 1955 proclaimed their sovereignty over oil resources in
their continental shelf).
730. United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf, art. 2, Apr. 29, 1958, 449
U.N.T.C 311.
731. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G. v. Den.; F.R.G. v. Neth.), Judgment,
1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 47, 86, 97, 100 (Feb. 20).
732. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 708, at art. 79-85.
733. Id. at art. 55 & 57.
734. Id. at art. 56.
735. Id. at art. 79 & 87 (stating that the freedom of all states in the continental shelf also
includes navigation, overflight, fishing, etc.).
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The exclusive right of coastal states to explore and exploit natural
resources beneath the continental shelf does not, however, delimit within
the EEZ. The 1982 UNCLOS allows the coastal states to claim an
additional area beyond the EEZ, which is known as “the outer limit of the
continental shelf.”736 The outer limit of the continental shelf, under the 1982
UNCLOS, may “not exceed 350 nautical miles from the baselines from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured or shall not exceed 100
nautical miles from the 2,500-metre isobath.”737
After the International Court of Justice used the 1982 UNCLOS to
determine the disputed boundary of the continental shelf in a case between
Malta and Libya in 1985, the 200-nautical mile limit of the continental shelf
became well-respected in the international community.738 The respective
rule of the International Court of Justice includes the right of the United
States, a non-signatory party to the 1982 UNCLOS, to the continental shelf
of the Gulf of Mexico.739 It is noteworthy that the United States federal
government, besides the 1945 Truman Proclamation and the 1953 Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, reserves its exclusive rights over its
continental shelf for exploitation of natural resources under the 1983
Presidential Proclamation No. 5030.740

736. Id. at art. 76.5.
737. Id.
738. Bastida et al., supra note 571, at 367 (citing Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta),
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶ 55-56 (June 3)).
739. Alberto Szekely, The International Law of Submarine Transboundary Hydrocarbon
Resources: Legal Limits to Behavior and Experiences for the Gulf of Mexico, 26 Nat.
Resources J. 733, 768 (1986).
740. Anderson, supra note 698, at 13 n. 38.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOLE-JURISDICTION UNITIZATION AGREEMENTS
I. Introduction
The legal measurement of jurisdiction, instead of political dimensions,
could properly categorize unitization agreements based on the location of
the unit area. After considering such legal measurement, this research
establishes two new classifications, sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements,
and cross-jurisdiction unitization agreements. A sole-jurisdiction unitization
agreement is when the entire unit area and unit operations take place within
a geographic territory under one particular jurisdiction. Compliance for a
unitization agreement taking place in only one jurisdiction is much less
complicated than cross-jurisdiction unitization agreements, where the unit
area or operations extend across two or more separate jurisdictions.
This chapter will focus exclusively on sole-jurisdiction unitization
agreements and their legal features, like the mineral ownership patterns and
property laws, the conservation policy, and the documentation procedure
that shapes the unitization agreement. The author provided a separate
section in this chapter for sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements in the
United States because the specified legal features of sole-jurisdiction
unitization agreements in the U.S. are quite distinct from the rest of the
world. In addition to a significant amount of unit operations, the model
fiscal regime in the United States — concession contracts — differs from
the use of production sharing contracts that other major oil-producing
countries use to develop their oil and gas reservoirs. This chapter will also
discuss how the different ownership and fiscal systems could impact
different roles and authorities for each unit party, especially for mineralinterest owners who are often individuals in the United States but host
governments in the rest of the world.
II. Sole-Jurisdiction Unitization Agreements in the United States
The United States is nicknamed the world’s "unitization capital" due to
the abundance of unit operations and unitization laws and regulations that
exist in the country.741 To further explain this qualification, the author will
provide an overview of the U.S. oil and gas conservation revolution. Next,
the dissertation examines oil and gas pooling, a common conservation tool,
which is incorrectly introduced as an identical term for unitization in the
United States and perhaps overseas. Lastly, this section analyzes the
741. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 7.
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documenting procedures for unitization agreements and unit operating
agreements that occur in the territories of one jurisdiction either in
individual states or fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the U.S. federal
government.
A. The Legal Background of Unitization in the United States
The 1858 and 1859 North American implementation of the salt-boring
marks the beginning of the modern oil and gas industry in the world.742
Additionally, the late Nineteenth Century creation of petroleum engineering
as a scientific field in the United States contributed to the development of
useful techniques for developing reservoirs.743 Accordingly, the United
States enjoyed significant oil discoveries in the early Twentieth Century,
such as the Lucas gusher on Spindletop Hill in Beaumont, Texas, in
1901.744 Moreover, the concentration of petroleum engineers studying
reservoir dynamics and how to best exploit natural energy drives745
facilitated substantial oil recovery in the world, particularly in East Texas in
the 1930s.746 By then, the United States was producing two-thirds of world
oil production.747 Perhaps, the United States could have obtained these
742. See John B. Ballem, The Oil and Gas Lease in Canada, pg. 4 (University of Toronto
Press 1973) (stating that the first, modern oil well was drilled by Colonel E.L. Drake in
Titusville, Pennsylvania in June 1859. However, some scholars claim that the “honor” of the
first oil well in North America belongs to Petrolia in the Province of Ontario, Canada in
1858); See also Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 1.01.
743. Honeycutt, supra note 444 (stating that the foundations of petroleum engineering
were established during the 1890s in California. Petroleum technology courses were first
taught at the University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 1910, and the University of
Pittsburgh granted the first degree in petroleum engineering in 1915. By 1920, petroleum
engineers presented solutions to drilling challenges and designed advanced mechanical
techniques for the drilling operations and well pumping).
744. Yergin, supra note 76, at 68.
745. Honeycutt, supra note 444.
746. Yergin, supra note 76, at 230 & 282.
747. Charles G. Haglund, The New Conservation Movement with Respect to Petroleum
and Natural Gas, 22 KY. L. J. 543, 575 n. 68 (1933) (stating that in 1929, the total oil
production in the world was estimated about 1.48 billion barrels, and the United States
produced more than one billion barrels. The rest of oil was produced in Venezuela (138.9
million barrels [MMb]), Russia (98 MMb), Mexico (44.7 MMb), Persia(43 MMb), Dutch
East Indies (36 MMb), Rumania 33 (MMb), Columbia (20.4 MMb), Peru (12.5 MMb),
Argentina (10 MMb), Trinidad (8.7 MMb), India (8.3 MMb), Sarawak (West Borneo,
Malaysia) (5.3 MMb), Poland (4.7 MMb), Japan (2 MMb), Egypt (1.9 MMB), Sakhalin (1.2
MMb), Canada (1.1 MMb), Ecuador (1 MMb), Germany (0.7 MMb), Iraq (0.5 MMb),
France (0.5 MMb), Czechoslovakia (0.17 MMb), Italy (0.043 MMb), and others (0.022
MMb)).
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achievements much earlier if the petroleum industry had not faced an
internal barrier. While other parts of the world lacked access to modern
techniques and adequate capital investment, the major hindrance to the U.S.
petroleum industry was its legal system, which failed to adapt its
regulations to the technical advances preventing waste and promoting oil
production. In 1916, William F. McMurray and James O. Lewis from the
United States Bureau of Mines, were the first technicians to criticize the
American “drill-and-produce-as-you please system” and proposed a
compulsory version of unit operations could prevent severe consequences
of the current legal regime.748
In the United States, private individuals and entities own the majority of
land.749 Moreover, the private ownership system of property rights in the
United States, and Canada, exceptionally includes ownership rights to oil,
gas, and other minerals.750 U.S. mineral ownership is regulated by English
common law, both at the federal and state levels.751 Among the doctrines of
English Common Law, the “rule of capture,” also known by many in the
early years as “the rule of piracy” or “the role of jungle,” was the most
troublesome principle until it was modified in the Twentieth Century.752 To
prevent disorder in the American oil and gas industry, the federal and state
governments, through their conservation agencies, took a more active role
in governing the industry.
1. Mineral Ownership in the United States
In the United States, approximately sixty percent of the land is owned by
private individuals and entities.753 Furthermore, the United States legal
system has long protected the exclusive right of private owners to benefit
from the substances found below their lands, including oil, gas, and other
748. Hardwicke, supra note 536, at 13 (stating that Long before that, Chester E. Gilbert
and Joseph E. Pogue recommended the integration of lands "at least up to the point where
each geological unit is occupied by a single producing activity" to prevent over-production
and waste in 1918).
749. Nickerson et al., supra note 554 (stating that the United States Department of
Agriculture, in a report in 2011, confirmed that sixty percent of the land in the United States
was privately owned).
750. See Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 54; see also Ballem, supra note 739, at pg. 8.
751. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 54 (stating that the State of Louisiana exceptionally
follows the French civil law in the US. Also, the English common law of the State of Texas
has been under impact of the Spanish Mexican civil law has impacts).
752. Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil
and Gas, Aba Sec. Mineral & Nat. Res. L. Proc. 1, 4 (1935).
753. Nickerson et al., supra note 554.
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minerals.754 As a result, the federal and state governments have no
sovereignty privilege over the mineral substances underlying private lands
in the United States, in contrast to governments in other countries. 755 The
unique private ownership system has complicated the status of mineral
ownership in the United States.756 Such complexity has also affected the
“mineral development” and industry in the United States.757
In the United States, only forty percent of U.S. land is considered public
land; twenty-nine percent is owned by the federal government, mostly in
the West, about nine percent is owned by state and local governments, and
about two percent is held in Indian trust.758 Each year, the U.S. federal
government makes money by awarding oil and gas licenses on federal and
Indian land.759 The mineral deposits on federal onshore land, along with
Indian land, are managed by the Bureau of Land Management (‘‘BLM’’);
the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (‘‘BOEM’’) controls the mineral
substances in the federal offshore lands.760 Moreover, each state
autonomously regulates its mineral rights through a specific governmental
entity.
2. The Rule of Capture
In the early years of oil and gas development in the United States, the
common law courts adopted the rule of capture to determine hydrocarbon
ownership due to the fugacity of oil and gas deposits.761 The U.S. courts, for
that purpose, analogized the rules for ownership of wild animals and
groundwater to formulate the rule of capture for oil and gas ownership.762
754. Kuntz, supra note 691, at § 2.1.
755. Id. see also Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 12.
756. Kuntz, supra note 691, at § 2.1.
757. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 54.
758. The United States Department of the Interior, Public Land Statistics (Oct. 14, 2017),
https://www.blm.gov/public_land_statistics/pls15/pls2015.pdf.
759. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 1081 (stating that “in Fiscal Year 2011, the federal
government generated over $11.2 billion in bonuses, rents, royalties, and other revenues
from mineral leasing activities on federal (onshore and offshore) and Indian lands”).
760. Id. at 1082.
761. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture-An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 Envtl. L. 899, 906-07 (2005); Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v.
De Witt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889) (adopting the rule of capture); Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S.
665 (1895) (adopting the rule of capture).
762. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 2.01 (stating that the Pennsylvania Court, in
the De Witt case, adopted the analogy of ownership of wild animals to apply the rule of
capture on the oil and gas ownership. Also, the court in People’s Gas Co. v. Tyner, 131 Ind.
277, 31 N.E. 59 (1892) applied the analogy of groundwater).
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Describing a potentially adverse outcome from the rule of capture,
Professor Kramer and Martin (two famous unitization intellectuals),
deduced that an interest owner could obtain ownership to extracted
hydrocarbons from his tract, even if there was evidence that the
hydrocarbons initially migrated from neighboring tracts.763
Another adverse consequence of the rule of capture was “the offset well
or self-help protection rule” in which the court granted the neighbors the
right to implement the same chaotic strategy of drilling a well to protect
against drainage.764 As a result of the rule of capture and the offset well
rules, the U.S. oil and gas industry encountered the following two
controversial issues: over-drilling and early exhaustion of reservoir energy
drives.765 The oil price dropped from $3.06 per barrel to $1.60 per barrel
because of overproduction in 1920.766
The economically devastating consequences of overproduction provoked
severe criticism from oil investors and petroleum technicians in the United
States. Among these voices, Henry L. Doherty valiantly disapproved of the
rule of capture and warned about the consequences of the legal regime on
the industry.767 Doherty strongly recommended that the U.S. government
immediately utilize its regulatory authority to prohibit the waste of
hydrocarbons.768 In particular, Doherty proposed a formula for unit
operations upon the entire oil and gas reservoir to be imposed by federal
authority.769 Proponents of federal or state government involvement, like
Doherty, alleged that limited instructions from conservation agencies were
inadequate to prevent waste and over-drilling.770
3. Conservation Policy in the United States
The common law had, however, made efforts to limit the rule of capture
and the power of individuals to damage the reservoir and trample their
neighbors’ rights. In the early years of the Twentieth Century, the common
law doctrine of “correlative rights” obliged the owners of mineral interests
763. Id.
764. Id. (stating that the Court used the similar language and the offset-drilling rule in the
case of Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 A. 801 (1907)).
765. Id.
766. Hardwicke, supra note 536, at 15.
767. Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 13.
768. Hardwicke, supra note 536, at 6-7 (stating that in 1924, Mr. Doherty had expressed
his sever concern in a letter to President Coolidge stated that the United States would run out
of oil if the government did not intervene).
769. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 2.02.
770. Hardwicke, supra note 536, at 13.
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to operate reasonably without disturbing adjacent mineral rights owners.771
In 1900, the Supreme Court of the United States decided to apply the
doctrine of correlative rights in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, as one of the early
attempts to prevent the waste of oil and gas.772
Both the federal and state governments issued laws and regulations to
conserve oil and gas and prevent waste because crude oil and natural gas
directly benefited the public interest.773 For example, in 1919, the Railroad
Commission — the oil and gas conservation agency in Texas — modified
the rule of capture by issuing a “well-spacing” rule to prevent overdrilling.774 Similarly, the conversation agencies in many states passed rules
of “proration” to limit oil and gas recovery based on market demand and
the storage availability to prevent waste and overproduction.775
Every major producing state formed an independent conversation agency
to regulate oil and gas production in the early years of petroleum
development.776 Also, the Bureau of Mines of the United States, the federal
conversation agency, began publishing monthly advisory reports regarding
each state’s petroleum demand in 1933.777 The growing inclination of the
U.S. federal government to centrally conserve oil and gas pushed oil-

771. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 60.
772. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 2.01; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190
(1900).
773. Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 4.
774. Id. at pg. 11 (stating that the Rule 37, the well-pacing rule, prohibited the drilling of
wells less than 300 feet apart and less than 150 feet from property lines).
775. Id. at pp. 9-10 (stating that the proration rate could not exceed the maximum
efficient rate (MER) of the well. Also, the proration rule did not apply to the marginal wells
that needed to produce oil in their full capacity, otherwise it would “cause their premature
abandonment with resultant waste.”).
776. The Railroad Commission of Texas, History of the Railroad Commission (Sep. 15,
2017), http://www.rrc.state.tx.us/about-us/history/ (stating that the Railroad Commission of
Texas was established in 1891 to regulate the rail industry of the 1800s, but it has been given
the responsibility for overseeing the activities of many different industries, such as oil and
gas); The Oklahoma Corporation Commission, Oklahoma Corporation Commission History
(Sep. 15, 2017), http://www.occeweb.com/Comm/commissionhist.htm (stating that the
Oklahoma Corporate Commission has been conserving oil and gas since 1914).
777. The United States Department of Energy, Our History (Sep. 15, 2017), https://
energy.gov/fe/about-us/our-history (stating that the United States federal government also
established the Petroleum Administration for War during the World War II and later the
Petroleum Administration for Defense to conserve oil and gas. MYRES, THE LAW OF
POOLING, at 9-10. The Bureau of Mines, which was under supervision of the US
Department of Interior, was abolished in 1996 and merged into the US Department of
Energy in 1996).
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producing states to establish a regional conversation agency, “the Interstate
Oil Compact Commission,” in 1935 to “prevent the encroachment of the
federal government.”778
One of the essential conservation policies designed by major oilproducing states and the federal government to limit the rule of capture and
protect correlative rights was “pooling” the mineral reservoir, which also
assisted in the implementation of the rule of spacing.779 More importantly,
the concepts of pooling and unitization are very similar in the United
States.780
B. Pooling of Oil and Gas Reservoirs
Pooling and unitization are two effective methods used by conservation
agencies to prevent waste and promote production. Both pooling and
unitization aim to consolidate mineral and working interests to conserve the
oil and gas industry. This link between pooling and unitization can lead to
misidentifying the concepts, like how the U.S. courts and the oil industry
unexpectedly applied pooling and unitization interchangeably.781 For
example, the court confused the term “compulsory pooling” with
unitization in Energy Development Corp. v. Moss.782
Regardless of the close connection between the terms pooling and
unitization, these two terms have different meanings and purposes.783 To
distinguish the definitions and objectives of pooling and unitization,
Professor Kramer and Martin note that pooling takes place when two or
778. Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 5; The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission
(IOGCC), About the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (Sep. 15, 2017),
http://iogcc.publishpath.com/about-us (stating that the Interstate Oil Compact Commission
later became the Interstate Oil and Gas Commission Corporate (IOGCG)).
779. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 3.02.
780. Id.
781. See Martin & Kramer, supra note 534, at 794; see also Kramer & Martin, supra
note 494, at § 1.02
782. Energy Development Corp. v. Moss, 214 W. Va. 577, 591 S.E.2d 135 (2003);
Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 1.02 (stating that “in Energy Development Corp. v.
Moss, 214 W. Va. 577, 591 S.E.2d 135, 161 O.&G.R. 918 (2003), the court analyzed the
West Virginia Coalbed Methane Act, W. Va. Code § 21-21-1 et seq., reproduced at §
30.48D, as encompassing the “unitization” of CBM. In reality, the structure and organization
of the Act is clearly a compulsory pooling regulatory regime because the basic building
block for the regime is the creation of individual drilling units. The Act itself on numerous
occasions describes the actions of the Coalbed Methane Review Board as entailing pooling
not unitization. . . . Fortunately, the mislabeling did not have an impact in the court’s
resolution of the underlying issue relating to the ownership of coalbed methane gas”).
783. Id. at §3.02.
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more interest owners combine their small tracts, entirely or partially, to
create the required acreage to drill one well in compliance with wellspacing laws.784 Alternatively, unitization requires the combination of
mineral and working interests in several tracts that contain the entire or a
part of a joint petroleum reservoir.785 In other words, unitization parties
merely concentrate on the hydrocarbon reservoir and plan to utilize the
natural energy drives of the reservoir efficiently, whereas pooling parties
typically aim to form an area with limited acreage to conform with
conservation agency regulations and to drill one well.
One of the early laws that the conservation agencies implemented to
prevent waste and over-drilling was the rule of well spacing. The wellspacing rule consequently required the owners of small tracts to pool their
interests and form a pooling unit or drilling unit.786 The conservation
agency in all oil and gas producing states, except Kansas, adopted forced
pooling to implement the well-spacing regulation.787 Primary producing
states began adopting compulsory pooling rules when the oil price increase
contributed to significant upheaval in the global market in conjunction with
the Arab oil embargo in the 1970s.788
In the United States, lessees and lessors of smaller tracts voluntarily form
pooled units through “the community lease,” a pooling clause in the oil and
gas lease, or a separate pooling agreement.789 Additionally, a court or
conservation agency can order parties to create a pooled unit.790
1. The Community Lease
In the United States, mineral-interest owners can create a pooled unit by
voluntarily participating in a “community lease.”791 The community lease is
defined as “a single lease [granted to a lessee] covering two or more tracts

784. Id. at §1.
785. Id.
786. Sullivan, supra note 528, at 356; Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 1.02
(stating that “without minimum well spacing requirements, pooling as such would not have
developed).
787. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 3.02
788. Id.
789. Id. at §7.
790. Id.
791. Id; see also Hoffman, supra note 1, at (stating that the terms “joint” and
“community” lease are frequently applied synonymously to this type of conveyance;
however, the concept of “community” is somewhat more descriptive of precise situation).
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executed by the separate owners as if they were joint owners.”792 Most
jurisdictions do not apply the theory of “cross-conveyancing” to the
community lease; instead, many states, including Texas, recognize the
community lease as a temporary contract between parties to apportion
royalties.793 Additionally, most jurisdictions interpret the signature of a
lessor on a community lease to be evidence of an intention to pool his
mineral interest with other signatory lessors.794 However, there have been
different legal approaches regarding the courts’ ability to look for language
showing “a contrary intent” of the lessors to enter a pooling arrangement by
signing the community lease.795
2. The Pooling Clause
The pooling clause in the oil and gas lease is the most popular instrument
in the United States oil and gas industry to implement spacing and proration
rules issued by conservation agencies.796 The lease pooling clause grants a
working interest owner with the right and authority to consolidate small
tracts and mineral interests to create a drilling unit and allocate oil
production to tract owners.797 Lease pooling clauses are drafted to take
many forms, some include detailed provisions, and others are briefer.798
Pooling by the lessee under a lease pooling clause is considered “voluntary
pooling” because the pooling clause proffers the lessee the right to elect
whether to pool or not.799 Nevertheless, the content of the pooling clause
limits the lessee’s legal authority; more importantly, the lessee must use the

792. See Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 7.03; see also Martin & Kramer, supra
note 534, at 175.
793. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 444
794. See Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 7.03; see also Lowe et al., supra note
450, at 443 (stating that New Mexico is the only exceptional jurisdiction that does not
presume an intention to pool or not pool by reason of a community lease).
795. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 7.03 (stating that Texas jurisdiction requires
that the community lease must include a language clearly stating that they do not intend to
pool their mineral interests. Some other states, such as California, Louisiana, and Oklahoma
have adopted the second approach that “extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine the
true intent of the lessors, and the court is free to look at matters outside the express language
of the community lease”).
796. Hoffman, supra note 583, at 87 (stating that the pooling clause has also been added
in the amendment of the oil and gas lease after the lessee obtained adequate information
confirming the necessity of pooling).
797. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 279.
798. Hoffman, supra note 583, at 91-92.
799. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 279.
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pooling power in “good faith.”800 Many oil and gas law scholars point out
that a “separate” voluntary pooling agreement would be an alternative for a
lessee to seek if the oil and gas lease lacks a pooling clause.801 However, the
lessee will likely be unable to obtain the right to pool through a voluntary
pooling agreement if the lessors reject the addition of a pooling clause in
the original lease or its amendments, particularly if the lessee desires to
draft a brief pooling clause.
3. Pooling Agreements
a) Voluntary Pooling Agreement
The mineral interest and working interest holders sign a separate and
independent voluntary pooling agreement to acquire “a well-drilling permit
under applicable spacing rules” issued by the conservation agency.802 The
lessors and lessees agree to sign “separate” and “independent” voluntary
pooling agreements, which are “special” and “exclusive” contracts to pool a
specified area that is subsequently entered into if the original oil and gas
lease lacks a pooling clause.803 However, the pooling agreement, in contrast
to the unitization agreement, is considered to be a simple and short
document because, in most cases, it aims to form “a single-well unit” on a
limited amount of land.804 The negotiation between the parties to reach a
voluntary pooling agreement might be unsuccessful due to their
disagreements over many matters, including “the desirability of drilling, the
timing of drilling, the allocation of production and drilling costs, the
location of the well, the designation of the operator, and the particular
acreage to be included in the unit.”805 If the parties fail to agree on pooling,
the lessee or lessor may unilaterally apply for the conservation agency to
intervene and issue a compulsory pooling order.806
b) Compulsory Pooling Order
The conservation agency can issue a compulsory or forced pooling order
after one of the “authorized” parties of the oil and gas lease applies for the
mandate to pool the drilling unit, and the agency completes a hearing to
800.
801.
802.
803.
804.
at 141.
805.
806.

Id. at 280.
See id; see also Hoffman, supra note 583, at 87.
Martin & Kramer, supra note 534, at 795.
Hoffman, supra note 583, at 139.
See Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 7.05; see also Hoffman, supra note 583,
Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 697.
Id.
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discuss the pooling proposal.807 The Manual of Oil and Gas Terms
describes the concept of compulsory pooling as “[t]he bringing together, as
required by law or a valid order or regulation, of separately owned (or
separate interest in) small tracts sufficient for the granting of a well drilling
permit under applicable spacing rules.”808 Almost all United States
jurisdictions embrace regulations authorizing forced pooling.809 Moreover,
the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission presented various
compulsory pooling provisions in Section 11 of the 2004 Model of Oil and
Gas Conservation Act.810 However, a compulsory order will not force “nonconsenting” lessees of the pooling operation to bear their share of the
drilling costs before determining the commerciality of the well.811 The
pooling operator and participating lessees, who paid the non-consenting
parties’ share of the cost, will be reimbursed from the oil profit share. 812
The non-consenting parties are not responsible for any operating cost
payments in the case of “dry hole” or non-commercial production.813
In the United States, the courts may also issue compulsory pooling
orders known as “equitable pooling” or “judicial pooling.”814 The pooling
agreement on federal lands is called “the Communitization agreement” and
is governed by the Mineral Leasing Act.815
Conservation agencies are unable to adequately protect correlative rights
and eliminate waste and over-drilling through statutory pooling because this
approach does not prohibit the non-consenting parties or other lessees from
drilling wells on adjacent tracts that are not subject to the pooling
contract.816
C. Procedures to Draft Unitization Agreements in the United States
Well spacing and proration rules, as well as the compulsory pooling
approach, do not comply with the technical and geological
807. Id. see also Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 6.01.
808. Martin & Kramer, supra note 534, at 184.
809. Lowe et al., supra note 450, at 697 (stating that Kansas is the only state has not
enacted the forced pooling yet).
810. The Interstate Oil And Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), Model Statutes: 2004
Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act (Oct. 15, 2017), http://iogcc.ok.gov/Websites/iogcc/
docs/ModelAct-Dec2004.pdf.
811. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 6.01.
812. Id.
813. Id.
814. Id. at §6.02.
815. Id. at §16.04.
816. Anderson & Smith, supra note 456, at 281.
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recommendations to cover and control the entire oil and gas reservoir.817
Therefore, conservation agencies are unable to eliminate waste and overdrilling, as well as adequately protect the correlative rights of mineral and
working interest owners.818
The optimal approach to protect correlative rights and prevent waste is to
unitize the entire reservoir at a primary phase of operations, such as
exploration because it would significantly save capital and reduce the
number of redundant wells.819 Unitization scholars label these types of
unitization as “field-wide” and “exploratory” unitization.820 Two
advantages of unitization over other conservation methods are uniformity
and consistency across producing states.821 For instance, the Interstate Oil
and Gas Compact Commission (“IOGCC”), a joint conservation agency
that represents most producing American states, presented many sections
covering the exploratory unitization in the 2004 Model of Oil and Gas
Conservation Act.822 Exploratory unitization has not been a widely-used
conservation mechanism on privately-owned land in the United States
because most conservation laws expect applicants to demonstrate that unit
operation is the only way to succeed in conducting “enhanced recovery or
pressure maintenance operations.”823 The conservation agency narrowed
beneficial capacities of unitization to enhanced recovery operations in the
development stages of the field.824 Besides, field-wide unitization has not
been common in many states, particularly Texas — the largest oilproducing state in the U.S. that does not force unitization.825 Mineral and
working interest owners often reject potential unit operations; therefore,
many lessees could continue recovering oil from reservoirs underlying
tracts outside of the unit.826

817. Id. at 280.
818. Id. at 281.
819. Id. at 284.
820. See Doggett, supra note 553, at 3; see also Anderson & Smith, supra note 456, at
286.
821. Anderson & Smith, supra note 456, at 284.
822. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), supra note 807.
823. Anderson & Smith, supra note 456, at 285.
824. Id.
825. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Crude Oil Production – 2016 (Oct.
20, 2017), https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_a.htm.
826. Weaver, supra note 449, at 319.
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In the 1920s and 1930s, long before the first American forced unitization
statute was enacted in 1945,827 most petroleum engineers, geologists, and
investors recognized the necessity of unitization. However, voluntary
agreements were rarely reached because numerous parties often owned
interests in any given field, making it unlikely for all, or an absolute
majority, of the owners to agree on consolidating their interests.828
Additionally, the decision regarding the viability of the unit operation
entails gathering and analyzing a considerable volume of technical and
economic figures.829 Perhaps, the lack of accurate information in the United
States in the early Twentieth Century was the main reason that landowners
and investors were not confident enough to enter into the unit operation.
Although conservation laws in almost all states, except Texas and
Pennsylvania, authorize forced unitization,830 the conservation agencies are
unable to issue compulsory orders unless “a significant percentage of” tract
owners and lessees voluntarily sign a unitization agreement and submit it to
the related conservation agency.831
Furthermore, two legal issues have concerned the oil and gas industry in
the United States since the beginning of unitization. First, the parties may
incur liability under federal antitrust law once they sign the voluntary
unitization agreement.832 Federal antitrust law, particularly the Sherman
Act, targets any cooperative agreement signed by individuals who
“unreasonably” affect “fixing prices” and deprive others of the business.833
This body of law would not apply to a voluntary unitization agreement
whose signatory parties’ intentions are only to prevent waste and promote
production.834 For example, many unitization laws prohibit joint oil
marketing or refining, with some exceptions for natural gas, to avoid

827. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.01 (stating that Oklahoma was the first
state that pass “a generally-applicable compulsory unitization law” in 1945).
828. Id.
829. Id.
830. Rogers, supra note 520, at 427 (citing e.g., Ala. Code§§ 9-17-80 to -88 (2015); Ark.
Code Ann. §§15-72-308-310, 15-72-313-315 (Repl. 2009); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 52, §§
287.1-13, 287.15 (West 2015)); see also, Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17-18.
831. Anderson & Smith, supra note 456, at 285
832. Chiawen C. Kiew, Contracts, Combinations, Conspiracies, and Conservation:
Antitrust in Oil Unitization and the Intertemporal Problem, 99 Nw. Ul Rev. 931, 934 (2004).
833. Sullivan, supra note 528, at 365.
834. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 26.03.
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violations of federal antitrust laws.835 Moreover, forced unitization is
considered “a sovereign act of states;” therefore, the Sherman Act does not
apply to compulsory unitization agreements.836
Another traditional concern of landowners and lessees is that the tax
authority could recognize their unit cooperation as a new legal entity, either
in the form of a corporation or a partnership; accordingly, this new entity
would be subject to its own taxation, in addition to the income tax of the
individual participants.837 However, both legal scholars and the government
tax entity confirmed that this investor concern was resolvable. The element
of taking profit in kind in the unitization agreement stops the Internal
Revenue Service from recognizing voluntary unitization to form a
corporation.838 Also, the signatory parties to voluntary unitization would be
waived from additional tax payment if they merely state that their unit
operation is not a form of partnership.839 In the United States, the
consenting parties of unitization typically take three main steps —
negotiation, approval, and documentation — to accomplish unitization and
unit operation agreements.
1. Negotiation Procedures of Unitization Agreements
a) The Feasibility of Unitization
Working-interest owners or lessees are usually the first parties to propose
the idea of unit operations to other interest owners of adjacent tracts.840 It is
critical to contact all working interest owners of adjacent tracts overlying
the targeted reservoir to consider the most significant recovery possible.841
Parties can’t make a final decision on unitization unless a temporary
committee collects required technical and fiscal information as well as a
legal evaluation, verifying the feasibility and commerciality of the unit

835. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 39 (stating that joint marketing of gas can
enable producers to negotiate better terms with buyers, which in turn can result in higher
recoveries of gas).
836. Sullivan, supra note 528, at 368.
837. Myers, supra note 441, at pp. 252-253.
838. Doggett, supra note 553, at 30-31 (stating that if the partners take their profit in
cash, their unit cooperation most will probably create a corporation, which would be subject
to anti-trust law as well).
839. Id. at 34 (stating that the 1954 Internal Revenue Code allows the unit parties to elect
to be excluded from partnership treatment).
840. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.01 (stating that the royalty interest owners
could also introduce a unitization proposal).
841. Id.
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operation.842 By then, the lessees should notify royalty-interest owners and
inform them of the unitization proposal to help them decide whether to
participate with their full interest or exclude a part of their right.843 This
negotiation procedure may take a significant amount of time because every
involved party may propose a different method on complex issues.
Moreover, it is difficult to attain an absolute majority of interest owners
to voluntarily agree on unitization because the “fractionalized ownership
pattern” of property rights in the United States has created too many
individual interest owners.844 A common way to alleviate this
fractionalization problem is for the consenting parties to apply for forced
unitization. However, the conservation agency will require the unit
applicants to guarantee and submit their application confirming that a
certain percentage of both mineral-interest and working-interest owners
agree to join the agreement.845 Across the United States, the minimum
percentage of consenting parties varies from approximately sixty-five
percent to eighty-five percent.846
The private ownership system in the United States is also the main
reason that negotiations between consenting parties bifurcate into two
separate agreements.847 At first, royalty-interest owners and workinginterest owners agree to operate within a unit by signing a unit agreement
(UA).848 Then, only working-interest owners of separate tracts sign a unit
operating agreement (UOA) to regulate the day-to-day operational details
of unitization.849 Perhaps, the traditional desire of lessors to deal with “a
short and less complicated” draft of oil and gas contracts, including unit
agreements, encouraged the American oil industry to formulate a separate
UOA to avoid bothering lessors with technical and operational aspects of
unitization.850
Another essential part of the initial negotiation among the workinginterest owners relates to the designation of the unit operator and the extent

842. See id; see also Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 76.
843. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.01; Sullivan, supra note 528, at 370 n. 6
(stating that “in most cases, an educational program is undertaken to show the purpose and
the advantages of the unit operation”).
844. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.01
845. Id. at 18.
846. Id.
847. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
848. Id.
849. Id.
850. Sullivan, supra note 528, at 370.
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of the operator’s authority. A conventional approach is to appoint the lessee
owning the greatest interest in the unit area as the operator.851
b) The Participation Formula
The implicated parties, especially lessees, will not sign the unitization
agreement or unit operating agreement unless they negotiate and agree on a
formula to determine their share of the unitized substance.852 The
determination of the formula is a prolonged and challenging process, but
many scholars highlight the participation formula as “the heart of the
unitization agreement” because of its outstanding significance in the
unitization agreement.853 The share of production allocated to each party
should be equal to the value of their contribution to the unit.854 The value is
assessed using many factors, including the “productive acre-feet of oil and
gas in place,” the position of the contributed interest in the unit area, the
volume of the previous recovery, the “number of existing wells,” and the
facilities valuation.855 Nowadays, lessees and operators can quickly evaluate
their initial unit production share through advanced computers and
software.856 The parties will often include a provision to allow modifications
to the initial allocation formula when they discover new information
subsequently.857
The federal or state governments will attend negotiations and the signing
of the agreement if they own a property interest in the unit.858 More
importantly, the vital role that the conservation entities play in approving
the UA and UOA signifies the magnitude of the states’ involvement in
these agreements.859
2. Conservation Procedures of Unitization Agreements
The conservation acts in almost all states grant the conservation agency
the authority to intervene in both voluntary and compulsory unitization

851. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.02.
852. See Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 77; see also, Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at
§ 17.02.
853. See Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 77; see also, Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at
§ 17.02.
854. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.02.
855. Id.
856. Id.
857. Id.
858. Sullivan, supra note 528, at 370.
859. Id.
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agreements.860 Conservation agencies intervene in cooperative operations of
the oil and gas development to ensure that the agreement does not violate
the federal’s and state’s anti-trust laws.861 Furthermore, the state
commission requires non-consenting owners, who arbitrarily refuse a
unitization proposal of the majority of adjacent interest owners, to prevent
waste and promote recovery.862 The conservation agencies of the various
states have designed unique procedures for approving voluntary unitization
agreements than the process for compulsory unitization agreements.863 In
voluntary unitization agreements, most conservation agencies provide a
notice to the parties to attend public hearing sessions, then issue the
approval.864 In the compulsory unitization context, an interested owner
should apply or file a petition in some states to commence the procedure.865
After delivering notice and conducting the hearing sessions, lawyers,
petroleum geologists, and engineers may testify to help the agency reach
the required “findings” before issuing the forced unitization order.866
Finally, some conservation agencies, like in Alaska, could terminate the
unit operation if an “incurable default” occurs.867 The Interstate Oil and Gas
Compact Commission (“IOGCC”) includes a similar procedure in Part VI
of the 2004 Model of Oil and Gas Conservation Act.868
3. Documenting Unitization Agreements
Lawyers will prepare drafts of unitization agreements after all interest
owners approve the technical, financial, and legal terms to operate their
joint oil and gas reservoirs in a unitization plan. The unitization agreement
is the “vehicle” of unit operation.869 The United States regime of private
property ownership has probably been the main reason that numerous
parties end up signing two different unitization agreements.870 The royaltyinterest owners or lessors sign a UA with working-interest owners or
860. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 18 (stating that the conservation agencies of
Texas and Pennsylvania are not allowed to issue a compulsory unitization order).
861. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
862. Id.
863. Kramer & Martin, supra note 494, at § 17.03 (stating that Texas and Pennsylvania
have no compulsory unitization statutes and are the exceptions).
864. Id.
865. Id. at §18.02.
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. The Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC), supra note 807.
869. Myers, supra note 441, at pg. 100.
870. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
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lessees, and a UOA is only signed between lessees to control the
operational matters of unitization.871 The reason that lessors are not
typically signatory parties to the UOA is that royalty-interest owners are not
interested in the daily operational activities that are covered by the UOA.872
a) Model Forms
The United States oil and gas industry, via active organizations, has
furnished several model forms to facilitate the composition of unit
agreements and unit operating agreements. Among them, the Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation presented two model forms of unit
operating agreements; Form 1 is for undivided interests, and Form 2 is for
divided interests.873 Additionally, the American Petroleum Institute has
prepared two model forms for unit agreements and unit operating
agreements, which have become very popular in the industry and have
provided many revisions since 1957.874
b) Minimum Percentage of Participating
A unit agreement, which is engaged in by both lessors and lessees, is the
legal document that generates a unit and unambiguously allocates “the basis
for sharing costs and production.”875 To issue a compulsory unitization
order, the conservation agency requires a voluntary unit agreement to be
signed by a supermajority of lessees and lessors.876 In addition to regulating
the interests of signatory parties, the unit agreement may influence nonsignatory parties, particularly non-consenting lessors.877 However, only
signatory lessors may file claims under the unit agreement.878 Because the
unit agreement involves both lessors and lessees, its language prevails over
any potentially ambiguous or contradictory language in unit operating
agreements.879

871. Id.
872. Id. at 70.
873. Myers, supra note 441, at pp. 37-38 (placing the original version of both model
forms of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation in the last sections of his book).
874. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
875. Id. at 69.
876. Id. at 70.
877. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.02.
878. Id.
879. Id (stating that the API Model Form Unit Operating Agreement expressly provides
that if there is a conflict between the terms of it and the Unit Agreement, the language of the
Unit Agreement prevails).
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c) Unitization Agreements and Unit Operating Agreements
On the other hand, a unit operating agreement, which is only signed by
lessees, allocates the cost of drilling and operation and designates one
lessee or more to control the operation and determine the authority of the
unit operator.880 Furthermore, the UOA regulates the “day-to-day
operations of the unit” and grants the designated unit operator-specific
authorities.881 Most model forms of UOAs bestow complete authority to
possess and sell the share of production upon each lessee.882 The UOA has
similar provisions to a Joint Operating Agreement (JOA).883 However, the
JOA is designed for a cooperative agreement among lessees to jointly
operate in one specific lease, while the UOA includes many parties and
leases related to the entire oil and gas reservoir.884
III. Sole-Jurisdiction Unitization Agreements Outside of the United States
The ownership regime of mineral rights in each country has a discrete
influence on mineral development, including unitization procedures. The
United States, as well as Canada, to a limited extent, recognize the private
ownership system of mineral rights.885 In Canada, eleven percent of the land
and its mineral substances are considered freehold or privately owned,
while the rest is owned by the Canadian government (referred to as the
Crown).886 The private ownership regime of minerals in Canada has played
a crucial role in the early economic growth of Canada by discovering and
developing oil and gas reservoirs in the privately possessed lands.887
However, the majority of oil and gas laws and leases, as well as unitization
procedures and regulations in Canada have been imported from major oil
and gas producing states in the United States.888
880. Id. at §17.01
881. Id. at §17.02.
882. Id.
883. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 17.
884. See id; See also Eduardo G. Pereira, Joint Operating Agreements: Risk Control for
The Non-Operator, 34 (Globe Business Publishing Ltd. 2013).
885. Id. at 12.
886. Cameron Wyatt, Mineral Rights in Canada, Pipeline News (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://www.pipelinenews.ca/opinion/columnists/mineral-rights-in-canada-1.2102451.
887. Michael Crommelin, Government Management of Oil and Gas in Alberta, 13 Alta.
L. Rev. 146 (1975).
888. See Ballem, supra note 742, at pg. 6; see also C. T. Mullane & A. P. G. Walker, The
Pooling Clause and the Effects of Unitization on the Oil and Gas Lease, 4 Alberta L. Rev.
250, 266 (1965).
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In the rest of the world, the government of a country maintains the
ownership of mineral interests, including oil and gas in its territories.
Moreover, the governments are the only mineral-interest owners who
collect “production shares, royalties, taxes, and other contractual benefits
from all license areas.”889 This section will examine unitization agreements
in jurisdictions that adopted the “sovereign” ownership regime of mineral
rights, meaning the oil and gas are owned and run by the governments,
especially in major oil-producing countries.890
To examine the pertinent mineral rights of these governments, this
dissertation will only focus on the model of production sharing contracts,
(“PSCs”) because the PSC is the most common model of oil and gas
upstream contract among major producing regions,891 except in the United
States and Canada.
A. Overview of Mineral Rights and Unitization Outside of the United States
Decades before the discovery of oil in North America, the crude oil
industry began in Baku, Azerbaijan, in the 1820s.892 However, the
development of petroleum geology and engineering, along with the
advanced design of well-boring equipment, such as cable drilling rigs, in
the United States, made North America the forerunner of the modern oil
industry in the world.893 Major oil companies soon benefited from the
advanced techniques and tools in the United States to discover and recover
oil and gas from petroleum reservoirs in other regions of the world.894
Nevertheless, the growth of the oil and gas industry in the United States
was not as rapid as the rest of the world in the early Twentieth Century
889. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 12.
890. This research will mainly benefit from the seminal analysis that Professor
Jacqueline Weaver and David Asmus jointly drafted in 2006 and compared the unitization
legal framework of twelve oil-producing countries — including Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil,
China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, United Kingdom, and
Yemen — in their 2006 comparative analysis. Jacqueline Lang Weaver & David F Asmus,
Unitizing oil and gas fields around the world: A comparative analysis of national laws and
private contracts, 28 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 3, 10 (2006).
891. Kirsten Bindemann, Production-Sharing Agreements: An Economic Analysis,
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, p. 17 (Oct. 1999), https://www.oxfordenergy.
org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/WPM25-ProductionSharingAgreementsAnEconom
icAnalysis-KBindemann-1999.pdf.
892. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 41 (stating that eighty-two oil pits had been hand-dug
in Baku, Azerbaijan by 1829. At that time, Azerbaijan was part of the former Soviet Union).
893. See Ballem, supra note 772, at 6; see also Honeycutt, supra note 447.
894. Id.
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because most American jurisdictions inhibited the progress of the
petroleum industry through legal restrictions, such as the private ownership
system of minerals and the rule of capture.895 Outside of the United States,
there were minimal legal hindrances restricting the oil and gas industry. The
jurisdictions of the producing regions avoided adopting the private
ownership system or any legal doctrine that would complicate local mineral
development.
1. Mineral Ownership Outside the United States
Outside of the United States, oil, gas, and other minerals “belong to the
state itself, or to a nominal figure, such as the British Crown, or else they
may be vested in a state-owned entity such as the state oil company.”896 The
right of mineral ownership and control for the states “stems from the
internationally recognized principle of permanent sovereignty over natural
resources” on their national lands and continental shelves.897 The states may
assign their mineral ownership rights to a foreign enterprise through the
concession contract model, which is a granting instrument to develop
petroleum.898 In the PSC model, in which the states take royalties, tax,
rentals, and a share of the profit, the foreign investors will not own the
underground minerals “in situ or even in the wellhead.”899 However, most
PSCs allow the foreign oil contractors to take their cost oil and share of
profit oil in kind after the produced hydrocarbons are delivered to the points
which are designated to export the products.900
This dissertation will use the term “government,” instead of “state,” to
avoid confusion with the fifty states within the United States. Black’s Law
Dictionary defines government as “the sovereign power in a country or
state;” more importantly, it “refers collectively to the political organs of a
county regardless of their function or level, and regardless of the subject
matter they deal with.”901 This conception of government allows the author,
in contrast to the terms “state” and “country,” to include the jurisdiction of
more oil-producing governments, which are not sovereign states, in this
895. Myers, supra note 444, at pp. 18-20.
896. Mohammad Alramahi, Oil and Gas Law in the UK, §1.30 (Bloomsbury Professional
Ltd 2103).
897. Id. at §1.31 (stating that the UN General Assembly, in the 1194th plenary meeting,
issued Resolution 1803 (xvii) regarding the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources
in 1962).
898. Id. at §1.33.
899. Smith et al., supra note 636, at 464.
900. Id.
901. Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
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research to survey their unitization provisions. For instance, this research
analyzes the Kurdistan region, which is one of the substantial oil and gas
producing regions in Iraq and the world, while the petroleum law and fiscal
regime of Kurdistan are distinct from the Federal Government in Iraq.902
2. The Historical Background of Unitization Outside of the United States
While the United States oil industry was reluctant to accept field-wide
unitization in the early stage of operation, the international oil firms and
their licensors implemented many unit operations in the rest of the world,
especially in the Middle East, Europe, East Asia, and Latin America in the
1920s. For instance, two giant Venezuelan oil fields, the Mene Grande and
El Mene, were operated through unitization in 1928.903 In Europe, most oil
pools were unit operated, such as Pechelbronn, France in 1924-25, and in
1928 in Baku and Grozny, which were in the Soviet Union.904 In the Middle
East, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOI) operated the unitized Masjid
Suleiman oil field in Iran and the Baba Gurgur oil field in Kirkuk, Iraq in
the 1920s.905
Two main factors helped the oil and gas industry outside of the United
States, and Canada accomplish field-wide unitization in the early stages of
operation. First, the majority of governments conceded their mineral rights
as a single license block to one or a few international oil companies. For
instance, in 1901, the Shah of Persia offered the exclusive right to William
Knox D’Arcy to search for oil in all of Persia.906 Additionally, the size of
each license block was over one hundred thousand acres in the Turkish
territories.907 Similar concession licenses were offered to one or two oil
902. Article 121, Dustūr Jumḥūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of
2005 (authorizing the Kurdistan region to issue its own laws and regulations through its
regional parliament). Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The
Kurdistan Region – Iraq). The Kurdistan region has passed its own oil and gas law in 2007
while the Iraqi federal government has yet to issue such law in Baghdad.
903. Haglund, supra note 747, at 576-577 (stating that the oil production of the Mene
Grande oil field was over fifteen million barrels in 1928).
904. Id. (stating that the total oil production of Baku and Grozny was over eighty-five
million barrels in 1928).
905. Yergin, supra note 76, at 130 (stating that the Masjid-i-Suleiman oil field in Iran
was the first oil discovery in the Middle East in 1908, and the Baba Gurgur oil field was
discovered in Kirkuk, Iraq in 1927); see also Haglund, supra note 747, at 576-577.
906. Yergin, supra note 76, at 120 & 131 (Kindle ed. Free Press 2011) (stating that after
the oil was discovered in Masjid-i-Suleiman in 1908, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was
fully assigned the D’Arcy Concession in 1909).
907. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 7 n. 6.
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companies in Latin America, Europe, North Africa, and Asia.908 Due to the
generous policy of the governments in those regions, the awarded oil
companies were able to operate the entire potential oil and gas reservoirs
efficiently. As a result, the operating plans of oil companies experienced
minimal third-party disputes, neither over the surface interests nor the
mineral rights.
Second, international oil companies, supported by their colonialist
governments, made pacts to avoid competing with each other in most
regions. As a result, these international oil companies pledged to operate in
those regions jointly, like “sisters.”909 To illustrate, the Anglo Persian Oil
Company, Royal Dutch Shell, and the French Oil Company (later Total)
signed “the Red Line Agreement,” to jointly discover oil in the former
territories of the Ottoman Empire in 1928.910 Under these arrangements, no
competition regarding unilateral operations in a reservoir emerged among
the licensees.
The unitization process was transformed in these regions due to the
dramatic modification of their countries’ policies and economic status,
beginning in the 1960s. The spread of socialist-nationalist regimes and oil
nationalization in the 1960s, as well as the rapid rise of oil prices in the
1970s, propelled international oil companies to be content with applying for
small licenses in those regions.911 Furthermore, the international oil firms
were contractually obligated to relinquish their working rights to part, or all
of the concession area not exploited through oil operations to the
government. Governments started providing international investors with
smaller blocks to maximize their resource rent in the 1980s and the
1990s.912 Due to the increasing number of contractors, the development of
oil and gas reservoirs through unitization evolved into a more extensive
procedure, but still not as long as the American process.

908. Haglund, supra note 747, at 576-577.
909. Yergin, supra note 76, at 120 & 485 (stating that the “Seven Sisters” included
Standard of New Jersey (Exxon), Standard of New York (Socony-Vacuum, later Mobil),
Standard of California (Chevron), Texaco, Gulf Oil, Royal Dutch Shell, and Anglo-Persian
Oil Company (BP)).
910. Id. at 180.
911. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 8.
912. Id. (stating that many smaller blocks became available by the relinquishment of
larger blocks in the 1980s and 1990s).
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3. The Importance of Unitization Outside of the United States
Outside of the United States, host governments, as the sole mineral
owners, will not suffer drainage if one of their licensees drains hydrocarbon
from another tract within their territories.913 As a result, the host
governments, unlike in the United States and Canada, do not pursue unit
operations to protect the correlative rights of lessors or licensors. However,
two main factors since the 1970s have encouraged host governments outside
of the United States and Canada to treat unitization favorably. Competitive
operations between licensees and over-drilling have caused the depletion of
natural energy drives of reservoirs, the increase in operational cost, and
surface and environmental damages.914 The prevention of “physical and
economic waste” through unitization has not only become a significant
objective of producing governments to increase their resource rents, but it has
also become important for consuming countries whose economic growth and
energy security depend on the available, accessible, and affordable
hydrocarbon deposits.915
B. Host Governments and Unitization Agreements
Outside of the United States and Canada, mineral rights do not belong to
private individuals and bodies, but rather to governments.916 When host
governments award licenses to investors to develop oil and gas reservoirs,
such as through the PSC model, the host governments reserve various
benefits through their interests, including the oil and gas contracts. When
unitization is utilized on the adjacent licenses, the participation interests of
the host governments in each license are converted to unit interests.
Additionally, the jurisdiction of the host government regulates the petroleum
licenses and the unitization agreements between two or more licensees that
are located entirely within its territories.917
1. Unit Interests of Host Governments
All host governments that award oil and gas licenses to foreign enterprises,
either through direct negotiations or bidding rounds, will retain a share of
interests in the signed PSCs. The host governments, like the individual
lessors in the United States, take “production shares, royalties, taxes, and
913.
914.
915.
916.
917.

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 7-13.
Id. at 7 & 12.
Id. at 13.
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other contractual benefits from all license areas.”918 The host government’s
amount of interests retained in a PSC may differ significantly from contract
to contract. For example, some Indonesian PSCs provide the host government
with five percent of participation interests while Indonesia received over fifty
percent of participation interests in another set of signed PSCs.919 However,
the most common rate of governments’ interests ranges from fifteen percent
in Malaysia and Vietnam to 25 percent in Angola.920
In most PSCs models, the host governments guarantee their participation
right in the oil and gas operations through their National Oil Companies
(“NOC”s).921 For instance, the 2007 Kurdistan Model PSC states that the
Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) would maintain an “option” of
“participating” in the contract through a “public company” anytime during
the contract term.922 The host governments can also opt to have carried
interests, like the private lessors in the United States and Canada who only
own the carried interests. The host governments who prefer carried interests
do not want to participate in the petroleum operations or pay the operational
costs.923 Therefore, host governments holding carried interests do not
participate in the Joint Operating Agreement (“JOA”), which “sets out the
rights and obligations of the parties” involved in the operations.924 The
Kurdistan region, for instance, has selected only to have carried interests in
its PSCs because the region has yet to establish its own public oil
company.925 Furthermore, a host government that wants to participate in the
operation through a public firm could structure the arrangement to hold a

918. Id. at 7 & 12.
919. Bindemann, supra note 891, at 17.
920. Id.
921. Id. (stating that PSAs without participation can be found e.g. in Egypt, Oman, Qatar,
Yemen, the Philippines, Nigeria and Turkmenistan).
922. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – The Ministry of Natural Resources,
Model Production Sharing Contract 2007, art. 4.1, http://mnr.krg.org/images/
pdfs/KRG_Model_PSC_production_sharing_contract_20071112.pdf.
923. Martin & Kramer, supra note 537, at 128 (defining the ‘carried interest” as “a
fractional interest in oil and gas property, usually a lease, the holder of which has no
personal obligation for operating costs, which are to be paid by owner or owners of
remaining fraction, who reimburse themselves therefore out of production”).
924. Eduardo G. Pereira, Joint Operating Agreements: Risk Control for The NonOperator, 34 (Globe Business Publishing Ltd. 2013).
925. The KRG has published the majority of its signed PSCs. The Krg - Ministry Of
Natural Resources, PSCS Signed, (Nov. 5, 2017) http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/theministry/contracts/pscs-signed.
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carried interest during the exploration stage to avoid bearing the operational
risks and costs.926
When unitization of the oil and gas reservoir between two or more license
blocks is required, the participation interests of the host governments,
including the working interests of the foreign oil companies, in a license will
be documented as “unit interests” in unitization agreements.927 Outside of the
United States and Canada, each license block or tract contributes a certain
percentage share of petroleum deposits in the unit area, based upon “either
hydrocarbon in place or recoverable reserves.”928 The unit parties rely on
geological, geophysical, and engineering analyses of reservoirs to obtain
accurate data and figures to ascertain the tract interests.929 The determination
of tract participation in the unit is considered a key component in the
calculation of unit interests of both the host government and the IOC. The
unit interests of a host government, in the sole jurisdiction unitization of two
or more tracts, could be calculated by multiplying its participating interests in
each tract by that tract’s interest in the unit and then adding up the results.930
Table (4.1) illustrates how the unit interests of a host government (“HG”) are
determined when the HG owns different participation interests in two tracts
forming a unit.

Tract

Tract Participation
in Unit (Y)

HG Interest in Tract
(Z)

Unit
Interest
(Y x Z)

#1

40%

20%

8%

#2

60%

30%

18%

Total Unit Interest of HG =

26%

Table (4.1): The calculation of unit interests
of a host government (HG)931
926. Bindemann, supra note 891, at 17.
927. Paul F Worthington, Contemporary Challenges in Unitization and Equity
Redetermination of Petroleum Accumulations, 34th Annual Convention & Exhibition of
Indonesian Petroleum Association (2010).
928. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 80-81.
929. Id. at 81.
930. Id. at 83.
931. Id.
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2. The Conservation Role of Host Governments in Unitization
Agreements
Host governments, through a governmental entity, execute the
conservation laws and regulations to regulate the unitization of oil and gas
reservoirs that are located entirely within their territory. The role of the
conservation agency may differ from one host government to another,
especially in the United States and Canada. For instance, the protection of
correlative rights has not been a primary task of the conservation agencies
in host governments, except in the United States and Canada, where the
protection of correlative rights was one of the leading reasons behind the
establishment of conservation agencies.932 The conservation laws of all host
governments, however, use unitization of oil and gas reservoirs to prevent
“physical waste” and “economic waste.”933 Due to physical and economic
waste, in the absence of unitization, producing host governments will earn
less revenue while foreign enterprises benefit from low tax payments and
high-cost recovery.934 Therefore, unitization is a preeminent instrument to
increase the “resource rent” of the producing host governments.935
The relevant conservation body to approve unitization could be the
hydrocarbons related ministry or agency, or the national oil company in
some countries.936 The public oil companies of Angola, China, and Ecuador
are the only authorized entities to approve unit operations.937 In other
countries, such as Brazil, Colombia, and Egypt, a petroleum agency is
responsible for unitization approval.938 The hydrocarbon-related ministries
or the ministry councils in Azerbaijan, Nigeria, Russia, the United

932. Id. at 36.
933. Id. at 35.
934. Id. at 13.
935. Martin & Kramer, supra note 537, at 911 (defining resource rent as the profits of an
investment that remain after deducting that income which corresponds to the minimum
return necessary to attract investment to the project in the first place. Such rent is a function
of the quality of the resource, its location and the numerous other variables that affect the
rate of return necessary to attract investment).
936. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 53.
937. Id. at 53-55 (stating that Sonangol in Angola, PetroEcuador in Ecuador, the China
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) for onshore unit, and the China National Offshore
Oil Corporation (CNOOC) for offshore unit are the authorized organs of these countries who
approve unitization).
938. Id. 54-55 (stating that the National Petroleum Agency (ANP) in Brazil, the National
Hydrocarbons Agency (ANH) in Colombia, and the General Petroleum Corporation in Egypt
are the authorized agencies to approve unitization).
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Kingdom, Yemen, and the Kurdistan region of Iraq manage unitization
procedures.939
Most host governments expect foreign contractors to voluntarily agree,
within a reasonable period, on the unitization of petroleum reservoirs that
extend across their contract boundary lines.940 Unitization in the Kurdistan
region of Iraq applies to the same conservation requirement.941 However,
most host governments do not have a required minimum percentage of
participating parties in their voluntary agreements.942 Like in the United
States, the agreed parties have to submit their draft of unitization
agreements to the conservation agencies for the host governments’
approval.943 The jurisdiction of host governments requires the IOCs to
apply for such approval to monitor the economic benefits that their
countries will obtain within the unit plan.944 In Indonesian, for instance, the
conservation entity has the right of “complete discretion over the approval
or disapproval of the unitized exploitation.”945 In the event of the parties’
failure to agree on unitization, all host governments, except Azerbaijan, will
intervene to force unitization.946 Because many IOCs may object to such a
compulsory unitization order, some PSCs, including the 2007 Kurdistan
region model of PSCs, explicitly recognize the right of the objecting IOCs
to apply for arbitration.947 Besides, the conservation agency reaffirms the
obligations of the unit operator to support the domestic supply and the local
content in the unitization agreement.948

939. Id. at 53-57; see also Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of
2007 (The Kurdistan Region – Iraq) art. 47.
940. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 34 (stating that the governments of Angola,
Brazil, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom clearly obliged
the contract parties to try to agree on unitization voluntarily).
941. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq) art. 47.1.
942. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 51.
943. Id. at 22.
944. Id. at 73.
945. Id. at 33 (stating that the Decree 402 of 1967 offered such right to the Indonesian
Director General of Oil and Gas).
946. Id. at 34-35; see also Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of
2007 (The Kurdistan Region – Iraq) art. 47.2.
947. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 33; see also Oil and Gas Law of The
Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan Region – Iraq) art. 47.3.
948. Id. at 22.
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C. Documenting Unitization Outside of the United States
Outside of the United States, the documentation process begins when the
parties are negotiating the terms and issues of the unit agreement. The
negotiation procedures among international parties are not subject to the
same legal obstacles as the United States, such as various interest holders
and the minimum percentage of voluntary agreements.949 However, the
unitization negotiation outside of the United States is still considered a
time-consuming and complicated process because the unit typically consists
of substantially large blocks in which the data may be conflicting.950 A
recommended strategy to avoid the prevalence of such conflicting data is to
have the parties start their negotiations in the early stage of operations in
their blocks so that the unit parties can analyze upcoming data in the field
together.951
Outside of the United States, the documentation of unitization contains
three main stages during which the unit parties either prepare new
unitization agreements or present amendments to the signed unitization
agreements. First, the unit parties prepare a draft of the “pre-unitization
agreement,” which consists of many initial studies and preliminary
agreements. Next, the agreed parties provide comprehensive and
multifaceted details of unitization in a formal agreement. Later, the parties
will amend the unitization agreement by adding redetermined terms and
figures.
1. Pre-Unitization Agreements
The initial objective of the consenting parties to the unit operation is to
sign pre-unitization agreements, which are recognized as “preliminary
contracts,” such as a letter of intent (LOI) or a memorandum of
understating (MOU), in the petroleum industry.952 Because most host
governments require licensees to conduct unitization during the early
development phases of the field, the parties will prefer the preliminary
measures, such as “joint technical studies,” to be regulated by preunitization contracts, which cover the essential and complicated prospects
949. Kramer & Martin, supra note 497, at § 17.
950. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 67; see also Owen L. Anderson & John S.
Lowe, Unitization Agreements (Chulalongkorn University, Thailand 2012).
951. Anderson & Lowe, supra note 950.
952. Peter Roberts, Petroleum Contracts: English Law and Practice, 3.09, 4.06 (Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed. 2016) (stating that parties of a transaction sign a preliminary
contract to make a temporary arrangement, “which acts as the precursor to their later entry
into a further, more detailed, fully termed contract”).
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and principles of unitization agreement within a time-consuming
negotiation process.953 Typically, the unit parties sign a pre-unitization
agreement “at the time of discovery (or appraisal) of a common reservoir,
generally before commerciality is declared.”954
In the preparation process of pre-unitization agreements, the unit parties
are not restricted by standard model forms, and the drafter may choose
different sizes or scopes of the contracts.955 The unit parties may draft
several pre-unitization agreements to cover separate matters, such as
confidentiality, data exchange, group study of seismic and operations,
sharing data acquisition costs.956 In the pre-unitization agreement of Papua
New Guinea, for instance, the participating parties included the authority,
work program, and budget of a pre-unitization committee, along with many
annexes regarding other pre-unitization concerns.957 The pre-unitization
agreement is no longer valid once the host government approves a final
unitization and unit operating agreement.958
2. The Unitization and Unitization Agreement
The unit parties do not sign the principle unitization agreement once the
seismic data confirms the necessity of unit operation because the parties
need to accumulate extensive information regarding the reservoir and the
most suitable methods of the field’s development and production.959 Unlike
in the United States and Canada, most host governments favor a single
unitization and unit operating agreement (UUOA), which includes all
technical, operational, economic, and legal matters.960 The preference for
drafting one agreement, the UUOA, stems from the fact that the host
government, within its territories, is the only mineral rights owner in all
licenses awarded to investors, in contrast to the United States and Canada,
where too many lessors are involved in a potential unit area.961 The UUOA,
in all likelihood, will not contain conflicting provisions that may arise from
953. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 23, 67-68.
954. Id. at 23.
955. Id. at 68 (stating that the Indonesian pre-unitization agreements contained fourteen
pages, and the one in Papua New Guinea was drafted in fifty pages in addition to many
annexes).
956. Id.
957. Id. at 69.
958. Id (stating that in other words, pre-unitization agreements terminate upon execution
by the parties of a definitive unitization agreement).
959. Id. at 28, n. 57.
960. Id. at 70.
961. Id.
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two separate agreements.962 Most importantly, the conservation bodies need
to examine operating details to approve the development plan of
unitization.963
Outside of the United States and Canada, the unit parties, particularly the
host government, highlight that the UUOA is only a contract; therefore, the
unit parties will not transfer their property interests among themselves.964
The UUOA grants each participating tract an undivided percentage of
interest, which is also called tract interest, from the production of unit
operations, even if all production is recovered from one tract.965 In
exchange, the UUOA requires each tract interest owner to bear the
operational costs, with undivided percentage, and other responsibilities that
are already determined in the unit operation.966
Before the formation of a unit, foreign oil firms already entered into a
JOA to regulate the daily operational concerns of each block.967 Also, the
jurisdiction of the host government may allow the NOC to participate in the
JOA for a fixed limit, for instance, only in the development stage.968
Therefore, a few parties typically enter into the JOA. However, the UUOA
is known as a “super Joint Operating Agreement” that merges all blocks of
interests in one or more common reservoirs, and several operators and nonoperating parties subsequently become involved in the UUOA.969 The
UUOA regulates the necessary cooperative operations among the licensees
and also authorizes the unit operator to interact with operators of other
JOAs in the participating blocks regarding their interfering operations.970
Outside of North America, the host governments do not select various
model forms of unitization agreements. Very few host governments have a
model form UUOA to facilitate the process of drafting. Ecuador has a
model form unitization agreement called “the Operating Agreement for the
Unified Production of the Common Deposit."971 Nevertheless, the
Ecuadorian model fails to embrace many required provisions, such as the
962. Id.
963. Id.
964. Anderson & Lowe, supra note 950.
965. Id. at 78.
966. Id.
967. Pereira, supra note 924, at 34 (stating that parties of a JOA are either the operator,
who leads the joint venture and non-operators, who take responsibility to contribute their
share of operational costs).
968. Id. at 40.
969. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 22.
970. Id.
971. Id. at 59.
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procedure for operator removal and the interest sharing adjustment.972 The
Association of International Petroleum Negotiators (“AIPN”), a Houstonbased petroleum institute, presented a model form of the sole-jurisdiction
UUOA in 2006, named the “Model Form International Unitization and Unit
Operating Agreement,” containing twenty-one Articles and seventeen
Exhibits.973 The AIPN scholars are revising the 2006 model form of
UUOA, which includes required provisions of the cross-border
international unitization and unit operating agreement.974
3. Redetermination of Unit Interests
Before signing the UUOA, it is unlikely that the unit parties will have
sufficient technical data on the reservoir to determine the unit interests
because most unit operations begin at the early development phases of the
reservoir.975 During production, the unit operator obtains more data, which
may be different from the initially relied-upon data, to create the “unit area”
and “unit substances” in each tract.976 The new data will affect the share of
unit parties in the operational costs and the volume of unit production,
particularly the overall host government’s takes, such as royalty and tax.977
The unit operator will present information to the unit parties to negotiate for
a potential adjustment of tract interests once new data comes to light. The
expression of “redetermination” detonates any modification of tract interest
that may occur after signing the UUOA.978 The redetermination may require
the expansion of the unit area to include a more substantial subsurface of
participating tracts or new tracts.979
One of the main features of the redetermination of unit interests in the
UUOA is that the adjustment of tract interests will not establish a new
value; instead, it only modifies the determined value of interests.980
Although there is no restriction on the total number of redeterminations, the
972. Id.
973. Association of International Petroleum Negotiations (AIPN), Model Form
International Unitization and Unit Operation Agreement (2006), https://www.aipn.
org/forms/store/ProductFormPublic/unitization-and-unit-operating-agreement-2006.
974. Association of International Petroleum Negotiations (AIPN), Model Contract:
International Unitization and Unit Operation Agreement – Revision Of 2006 Model Form,
https://www.aipn.org/model-contracts/ (last viewed on November 15, 2017).
975. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 84.
976. Id. at 74-80.
977. Id. at 84-95.
978. Id. at 84.
979. Id.
980. Id.
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unit operator is practically able to apply for one or two redeterminations of
unit interests.981 Also, the unit operator will usually not apply for
redetermination in the end life of the reservoir because of possible low
recovery and high operational costs.982 Finally, the unit parties may not be
able to agree on the redetermination bases, and in such case, the unit parties
could turn to expert determination, arbitration, or litigation to resolve their
disputes.983
IV. Conclusion
Sole-jurisdiction unitization agreements in the United States entail more
complicated and time-consuming procedures than in the rest of the world,
despite the high degree of host government involvement in the unit
operations elsewhere. Although the United States has successfully operated
numerous unit operations for decades in comparison to other countries,
many legal characteristics, predominantly the private ownership system of
mineral rights and the rule of capture, have inhibited the potential for more
unitization in the United States. Outside of the United States, solejurisdiction unitization agreements have primarily confronted the common
challenges of determination and redetermination of tract interests during the
development stage of oil and gas reservoirs.

981. Id. at 85.
982. Id. at 86.
983. Id.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CROSS-JURISDICTION UNITIZATION AGREEMENT: A LEGAL
SOLUTION TO THE ISSUE OF CROSS-JURISDICTION PETROLEUM RESERVES
BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ
I. Introduction
Together, Iraq and Iran share the greatest number of significant joint oil
reserves than any of their other neighbors. Neither country has developed
the majority of these joint oil fields, which means there is less information
about the geography and technical matters of these fields. As a result, Iraq
and Iran are incentivized to closely cooperate in unitizing their joint fields
without much concern about dissimilar information about the reservoirs.
The majority of these joint oil fields between Iraq and Iran are located in
the central and southern frontier lands. Some of these joint fields hold more
than tens of billions of barrels of oil, particularly those near the Persian
Gulf. Since the establishment of a new Iraqi government after the fall of the
Saddam regime in 2003, the countries have discussed the joint management
of their shared oil fields. However, various political, economic, and
technical factors prevented the unitization of the joint fields. This chapter
will discuss the position of both countries in the global energy market, the
level of energy cooperation between them, the joint initiatives to negotiate
unitization, and the incidents and military confrontations over these joint oil
fields between Iraq and Iran. Finally, the chapter focus on the necessity of
and potential steps toward a cross-jurisdiction unitization treaty and unit
operating agreement between Iraq and Iran.
II. Energy Relationship of Iraq and Iran
A. Iran
The vast fossil fuel deposits in Iran, amassing 157 billion barrels of
proven oil reserves and about 1,200 trillion cubic feet (Tcf) of proven
natural gas reserves, has contributed to Iran establishing a significant role in
the global energy market and economy.984 Iran, a founding member of
OPEC, has continuously increased production of and exports of natural gas,
leading to its rank as the world’s third-largest producer of dry natural gas

984. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Country Analysis Executive
Summary: Iran, 1 &5 (Jan. 2019). (stating that Iran is the world’s fourth largest and second
largest reserve holder of oil and natural gas, respectively).
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after the U.S. and Russia.985 The majority of producing oil fields in Iran are
located onshore in the southwest portion of the country, near its border with
Iraq, whereas the Persian Gulf holds the majority of Iranian natural gas
reserves (see figure 5.1).986 Currently, Iran produces less than one-third of
its peak crude oil production rate, which occurred in 1976.987 On the other
hand, Iran successfully enlarged its natural gas sector and produced about
9.5 Tcf natural gas in 2017 (10% more than its 2016 output).988 However,
increasing domestic consumption of hydrocarbons prevented Iran from
achieving its potential revenue from the natural gas sector.989

985. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 2018 Annual Statistical
Bulletin (2018); U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 984, at 5. Iran
increased its natural gas production from 199 billion cubic meter (bcm) in 2013 to 238 bcm
in 2017. In 2017, the natural gas production of the U.S. and Russia were 762 bcm and 649
bcm, respectively.
986. U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 984, at 7 &15 (stating that 55%
of gas production of Iran is produced from its largest field, South Pars, which is jointly
shared with Qatar in the Persian Gulf).
987. Hossein Akhavi-Pour et al., The Economy, Iran: a Country Study 162 (5th ed. 2008)
(stating the peak production of Iranian crude oil, 6.6 MMB/D, occurred in 1976); Org.
Petroleum Exporting Countries [OPEC], 2018 Annual Statistical Bulletin, supra note 985, at
32; U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), Iran Has Produced and Exported Less
Crude Oil Since Sanctions Announcement (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/today
inenergy/detail.php?id=37352. (the oil production rate of Iran was 3.86 MMB/D in 2017,
which sank to 2.7 MMB/D in June 2018.)
988. U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 984, at 14 (stating that the
gross dry natural gas production of Iran was about 7.3 Tcf in 2017. After the U.S. and
Russia, Iran is the third-largest producer of dry natural gas in the world).
989. Id. at 11 & 14 (stating that the crude consumption of Iran was 1.7 MMB/D in 2017.
Also, Iran is the fourth-largest consumer of natural gas in the world by consuming 6.9 Tcf
natural gas,)
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Figure (5.1): Proven Oil & Gas Reservoirs of Iran990
The investment in developing the Iranian oil sector began in the late 19th
Century991. The commercial production of Iranian crude oil commenced
because of an oil concession by the Shah of Persia to William Knox D'Arcy
in 1901.992 The first Persian oil discovery occurred in Chia Surkh (Red
990. The Biggest Obstacle to Iran’s Energy Makeover is Itself, Worldview Stratfor,
https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/biggest-obstacle-irans-energy-makeover-itself.
991. See G. M. Lees, The Oilfields of the Middle East, 3 World Petroleum Congress 94
(1951) (stating that in 1855, the British geologist, William Loftus, had presented “the first
scientific description of the oil occurrences of Iran (Persia) and Iraq, and the first project for
mineral and petroleum development in Iran by British interests dates from 1872.” A joint
British-German company conducted the first exploration operation in South (Qishm Island)
and Southwest (Daliki, Bushihr) Iran in 1891-93); see also Yergin, supra note 76, at 119
(stating that Shah of Persia provided Baron Julius de Reuter, founder of the Reuters news
agency, with a concession in 1872 and again in 1889 to exploit and produce oil in Iran).
992. Yergin, supra note 76, at 120-21 (stating that D’Arcy was able to convince
Muzaffar al-Din Shah Qajar of Persia to award a sixty-year concession allowing him to
exclusively develop oil and gas in the whole Iran; in exchange, Shah of Persia received
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Mountain) in the Northwest of Qasr Shirin, Kermanshah, near the frontier
of Persia with the Ottoman Empire (present Iraq) in 1903.993 Five years
later, D’Arcy’s firm, which later merged into the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, was surprised by a massive oil discovery in Masjid Suleiman.994
The Iranian oil industry, which was the largest oil producer in the Middle
East in the 1940s, supported Britain and the allies during and after World
War II.995
The Iranian oil industry has been influenced by two major political
incidents. First, the absolute ownership and control of the British firm over
Iranian oil fields ended when the Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad
Mossadegh, nationalized oil in 1951.996 The 1979 Islamic revolution, along
with its subsequent crises, including the U.S. embargo, also affected the
Iranian oil industry.997 As a result, the Iranian oil and gas sector — after
golden decades of high production — suffered over the last four decades
because of political turning points, including the 1979 revolution,998 the
1980-88 Iran-Iraq War,999 and the U.N. and American economic sanctions
against the Islamic Republic of Iran.1000 Due to recent sanctions of the U.S.
“twenty thousand pounds in cash, with another twenty thousand pounds’ worth of shares, as
well as 16% of ‘annual net profits.’”).
993. Lees, supra note 991, at 94; E. Willard Miller, The Role of Petroleum in the Middle
East, 57 Sci. Monthly, no. 3, Sep. 1943, at 240, 242; ٤٥٦۳  روزﻧﺎﻣﮫ دﻧﯿﺎی اﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﺷﻤﺎره،ﻏﺮﺑﯽ
ﻣﯿﺎدﯾﻦ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺖ در ﺳﺮﺣﺪات.
994. Lees, supra note 991, at 94 (stating that the oil production of “Masjid-i-Sulaiman
reached nearly 900,000 tons in 1918,” and its peak production rate of more than 112 million
tonnes occurred in 1951); see also Yergin, supra note 76, at 130-31 (stating that in 1909, the
Burmah Oil Company and the Glasgow Branch of the Bank of Scotland agreed to financially
enhance the oil Concession of Persia through a new public enterprise, the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, and D’Arcy “received shares worth a market value of £895,000.”).
995. See E. Willard Miller, The Role of Petroleum in the Middle East, 57 Sci. Monthly,
no. 3, Sep. 1943, at 240, 242; see also Lees, supra note 991, at 95 (stating that the AngloPersian Oil Company doubled its production in Iran, from 16.8 million tonnes in 1945 to
31.75 million tonnes in 1950 to help the post-war re-construction of the Europe).
996. Yergin, supra note 76, at 525437 (2011), (Kindle ebook).
997. Id. at 682-85 (stating that the 1979 Islamic revolution removed the pro-western
regime of Shah in Iran; soon, the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini invaded the U.S.
Embassy in Tehran and took more than sixty American hostages for more than 15 months.
At the same year, hundreds of pilgrims, sympathized by the Iranian Islamic revolution,
seized the Great Mosque in Mecca, Saudi Arabia to protest the Saudi link to the West.).
998. Id. at 685.
999. Id. at 688.
1000. Ashish Kumar Sen, A Brief History of Sanctions on Iran, ATLANTIC COUNCIL
(May 8, 2018), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/a-brief-history-ofsanctions-on-iran (stating that in sixteen different years, either the U.N. or the U.S. have
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government against Iran in May 2018,1001 the Iranian oil export is expected
to drop drastically, from 3.8 MMB/D in 2017 to less than one MMB/D by
the end of 2019.1002
Currently, the Iranian oil industry is aiming to raise adequate capital and
have access to modern technology to increase its oil and gas production rate
to the targeted level.1003 However, the previous “buy-back” petroleum
contract model failed to attract foreign investors, and Iran is currently
struggling to develop its oil and natural gas fields because of the lack of
capital investment and advanced technology.1004 Over the last five years, the
Iranian government attempted to attract foreign investment in its oil and gas
sectors by modifying the petroleum contract model.1005 Nevertheless, major
foreign enterprises refrained from taking risks of investing in the Iranian
market and its oil industry due to the recent U.S. sanctions against Iran.1006

declared substantial economic, military, and scientific sanctions against the Islamic Republic
of Iran since 1979).
1001. U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 984, at 2 (stating the U.S.
government withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which
was an intranational agreement regarding the Iranian nuclear program and declared hefty
sanctions against Iran in May 2018).
1002. Patti Domm & Tom DiChristopher, US Sees Room to Be More Aggressive on
Sanctions and Take Iran Oil Exports to Zero, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/03/13/us-thinks-it-can-be-more-aggressive-in-taking-iran-oil-exports-to-zero.
html.
1003. Nima Nasrollahi Shahri, The Petroleum Legal Framework of Iran: History, Trends
and the Way Forward, 8 China & Eurasia F. Q. 111, 125 (2010) (stating that Iran needs
more than 70 billion USD to raise its oil production to seven MMb/d by 2020.).
1004. Paul Stevens, Prospects for Iran’s Oil and Gas Sector, CHATHAM HOUSE:
ROYAL INST. OF INT’L AFFAIRS, Research Paper (Mar. 2015), at 8.
1005. Rania El Gamal et al., As Iran Oil Tenders Near, Investors Still in the Dark on
Terms, Reuters (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-oil-contracts/asiran-oil-tenders-near-investors-still-in-the-dark-on-terms-idUSKCN12K1M1 (stating that
Iran presented a new model of petroleum contract, Iranian Petroleum Contract [IPC], set
aside the Iranian Buy-Back contract model, which had not provided the IOCs with a friendly
terms since 1990s).
1006. Stephanie Segal, The Economic Impact of Iran Sanctions, Ctr. Strategic & Int’l Stu.
[CSIS] (Nov. 5, 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/economic-impact-iran-sanctions; see
also Cyril Altmeyer, Total tells Iran it's quitting South Pars gas project, REUTERS (Aug.
20, 2018, 10:06 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-france-total-gas/total-tellsiran-its-quitting-south-pars-gas-project-idUSKCN1L51LH (stating that the French oil firm,
Total exited form the multi-billion-dollar project of South Pars, the largest natural gas
reserve of Iran in 2018); see also U.S. Energy Information Administration, supra note 984,
at 7 & 15 (stating that 55% of gas production of Iran is produced from its largest field, South
Pars, which is jointly shared with Qatar in the Persian Gulf).
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B. Iraq
As the western neighbor of Iran, Iraq also owns significant onshore oil
fields totaling more than 145 billion barrels of proven oil, which places Iraq
as the world’s fifth-largest owner of proven oil reserves.1007 Since late 2017,
Iraq increased its crude oil production to 4.5 MMB/D, making Iraq the
second-largest oil producer in the OPEC.1008 The oil export revenue
accounts for more than 85% of the Iraqi government’s total revenue.1009
Despite the considerable volume of proven natural gas in Iraq,1010 the
country has been unable to produce more than 10.5 billion cubic meters
(“bcm”) of natural gas per year.1011
The Iraqi oil industry was instituted shortly after the discovery of oil in
Iran in 1908. The successful production of crude oil in Iran by AngloPersian Oil encouraged Britain to expand its ambitions to control the
southern areas of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the area that later
became Iraq, which was “laying in a continuation of [the] proved structural
zone of Iran.”1012 After creating Iraq as a new state in 1920, the British
mandate of Iraq established the Iraq Petroleum Company (“IPC”), whose
major shareholders were the Anglo-Persian Oil Company and the Shell
Group, as well as French and American oil firms.1013 The 1927 discovery of

1007. 2018 Annual Statistical Bulletin, supra note 985, at 32; U.S. Energy Information
Administration, supra note 984, at 1.
1008. Id.
1009. International Monetary Fund (IMF), Staff report for the 2017 Article IV
Consultation with Iraq, IMF Country Report no. 17/251 (Aug. 9, 2017), Table 3, page 34
(stating that out of USD79 billion of the total Iraq revenue in the mid-2017, about USD69
billion was earned from crude oil export, which is about 86% of the total GDP).
1010. See British Petroleum (BP), 2018 Statistical Review of World Energy, at 26 (Jun.
2018), https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energyeconomics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2018-full-report.pdf (stating that the estimated
proved natural gas of Iraq in 2017 was more than 3.5 trillion cubic meter (Tcm), which it
places Iraq as the world’s 11th largest proved gas reserves); see also 2018 Annual Statistical
Bulletin, supra note 985, at 32 (stating that Iraq holds more than 3.7 tcm).
1011. See id. at 28; 2018 Annual Statistical Bulletin, supra note 985, at 115; see also Luay
J. Al-Khatteeb, Natural Gas in the Republic of Iraq, 37-38 (2013) (stating that the lack of
governmental policy and supporting legal framework for international investors to inject
foreign capital to develop the sector of natural gas in Iraq are the main reasons for such
devastating status of natural gas development in Iraq).
1012. Lees, supra note 991, at 94.
1013. See Yergin, supra note 76, at 188 (stating that the IPC was a new name that Britain
and its allies chose for the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) after the creation of Iraq.
Before 1920, British firm and its French and German partners was conducting oil
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oil in North Iraq emboldened Britain and its allies to sign “the 1928 Red
Line Agreement,” of which the IPC was awarded an exclusive concession
to discover and produce oil from Iraq and other areas of the dismembered
Ottoman Empire.1014
For more than two decades, the giant oil fields of Kirkuk in northern Iraq
were the main source of revenue for building the new state of Iraq.1015
Later, the discovery of giant oil fields in southern Iraq, including the
Rumaila and West Qurna oil fields in the 1950s and 1970s, considerably
increased the importance of Iraq’s role in the global energy market.1016
Before the invasion of Iran in 1980, Iraqi oil production reached 3.8
MMB/D.1017 The reckless aggression of Saddam Hussain — the President
of Iraq from 1979 to 2003 — towards neighboring countries of Iran and
Kuwait cost the Iraqi oil industry a significant amount of money during and
after the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war and the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.1018
Even after overthrowing Saddam’s regime in 2003, and the Iraqi
government was provided with considerable foreign funding, Iraq operated
far below its economic objectives, producing less than 2.5 MMB/D for

exploration in the southern territories of Ottoman Empire through the TPC which had been
awarded an oil concession by the Ottoman Emperor).
1014. Id. at 265 (stating that Britain had already excluded Kuwait from being part of the
consortium with other British allies. Later in 1940s, the U.S. “ruled out Saudi Arabia and
Bahrain”).
1015. Willard Miller, supra note 995, at 246-248 (stating that by the time the Iraq oil
pipeline was completed in 1935 to transport Kirkuk’s oil to Europe through the
Mediterranean Sea, the production of Kirkuk oil was quadrupled [up to 27 MMB per year].
In 1940s and 1950s, the oil revenue from Kirkuk, and Khanaqin oil fields were the main
source of public fund for major Iraqi projects, including, but not limited to, the irrigation
system of the middle and southern parts of Iraq, for instance the Habbaniya Lake project,
and the railroad project. Also, the Kirkuk fields was an important source of oil and fuel for
the British Army and its allies during and after the World War II).
1016. Mahendra K. Verma et al., Petroleum Reserves and Undiscovered Resources in the
Total Petroleum Systems of Iraq: Reserve Growth and Production Implications, 9
GEOARABIA 51, 53 (2004); see also Kamil Al-Mehaidi, Geographical Distribution of Iraqi
Oil Fields and Its Relation with The New Constitution (Revenue Watch Institute 2006)
(stating that the southern oil reserves form more than 70% of the total proved oil reserves of
Iraq).
1017. Robert E. Ebel, Geopolitics and Energy in Iraq: Where Politics Rule, 18 (2010).
1018. Abdul Jaleel Oda Hussain, The Oil Industry and Missed Opportunities in Iraq, 2
Eur. J. Acc. Auditing & Fin. Res., n. 6, (Aug. 2014), at 1, 9 (stating that Iraq’s oil export
decreased to 861,000 B/D in 1985, and after the invasion of Kuwait was less than 300,000
B/D in 1995).
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many years.1019 However, the oil sector in Iraq has remarkably grown to
produce over 4.6 MMB/D since 2014.1020 Despite the 2014 invasion of the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) and the 2015 collapse of oil prices,
the Iraqi central government was able to establish a less corrupt
environment for its oil industry.1021
The Iraqi government plans to produce up to 6.5 MMB/D by 2022.1022
Such a high objective will require general political and economic reform in
Iraq and legal and technical improvements to the Iraqi oil industry. The lack
of “power-sharing arrangements” among the main ethnic groups of Iraq —
the Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds — has been the main source of political
instability in Iraq since 2003.1023 To improve political, economic, and
security, the leadership of major political parties in Iraq, needs to reach a
consensus over the constitutional rights and obligations of the Iraqi central
government, the Kurdistan regional government, and other local
governorates.1024 The Iraqi Parliament also needs to pass its 2007 draft of
hydrocarbon law and modify its current petroleum fiscal regime of
Technical Service Contracts in a way that encourages major international
oil firms to invest in the oil and gas fields of Iraq.1025 Furthermore, Iraq
needs to fix technical issues facing its oil industry, including, but not
1019. See Ebel, supra note 1017 (stating that after the in 2003 invasion of Iraq, the U.S.
had provided the Iraq oil sector with $2.7 billion fund. However, the 2007 report of the U.S.
Government Accountability Office informed the Congress that “the oil production [of Iraq]
had consistently fallen below U.S. program goals.” The report stated that such failure had
stemmed from many internal reasons, including, but not limited to, the lack of adequate
metering system, corruption, theft, sabotage, and brain drain); see also Ahmed Mehdi, Iraqi
Oil: Industry Evolution and Short and Medium-Term Prospects, The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, 8-9 (2018) (stating that the al-Maliki government, 2006-2014, was unable to
increase the oil export capacity of Iraq more than 2.5 MMB/D).
1020. Ahmad Mahdi, Changing Fortunes for Iraq in 2019, Petroleum Economist (Jan. 31,
2019), https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politics-economics/middle-east/2019/
changing-fortunes-for-iraq-in-2019 (stating that the oil export of Iraq was 3.58 MMB/D in
August 2018).
1021. Mehdi, supra note 1019, at 8 (stating that the Abadi Administration, 2014-2018,
revealed many cases of corruption authorized by the former Prime Minster al-Maliki. Also,
Abadi took many initiatives to fix the mismanagement in the oil industry and reduce the
bureaucratic delay in facilitating the IOCs’ personnel in Iraq).
1022. Maher Chmaytelli, Iraq Cabinet Approves Raising Crude Oil Output Capacity,
Reuters (Apr. 02, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil/iraq-cabinet-approvesraising-crude-oil-output-capacity-idUSKCN1H81FL.
1023. Meghan O’Sullivan, Iraqi Politics and Implications for Oil And Energy, 4 (2011).
1024. Id. at 11.
1025. Christopher Clement-Davies, Iraq's Oil and Gas Framework, 4 Int’l Energy L. Rev.
138, 146-47 (2009).
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limited to, the shortage of required water or gas supply for injection
purposes, as well as the inadequacy of midstream and onshore storage
sectors to increase production from all oil fields of Iraq (see figure 5.2) to
accomplish its production rate objective by 2022.1026

Figure (5.2): Oil Reservoirs of Iraq1027
In addition to the Iraqi the central government, Iraqi Kurdistan has
played a semi-autonomous and noted role in the world energy market for
more than a decade.
1. The Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Iraqi Kurdistan is one of four main parts of the Great Kurdistan or the
land of the Kurds, that was gerrymandered by France and Britain after

1026. Mehdi, supra note 1019, at 15-21.
1027. Ebel, supra note 1017.
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World War I.1028 In ignorance of the Kurdish “self-determination” right and
in contradiction to the international pledge to establish a Kurdish state, Iraqi
Kurdistan came to be under the Mandate of Britain and then was annexed
by Iraq.1029 For more than eight decades, the Iraqi Central Government
(“ICG”), particularly during Saddam’s regime from 1979 to 2003, violently
suppressed the Kurdish resistance in Iraq.1030 Eventually, the 2005 Iraqi
Constitution recognized the establishment of a federal region for Iraqi
Kurds, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (“KRI”) (see figure 5.3).1031 However,
the ICG and the Kurdistan Regional Government (“KRG”) quarreled over
two major disagreements, which caused armed conflicts between the two
governments. The fate of the disputed territories between the ICG and the
KRG has sowed extreme dissension between the two governments for many

1028. M. R. Izady, Kurds and the Formation of the State of Iraq, The Creation of Iraq,
1914–1921, 95-96 (Reeva Spector Simon & Eleanor H. Tejirian eds., 2004) (stating that
following the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the World War I, Britain and France
gerrymandered Ottoman Kurdistan per the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement.).
1029. Id. at 98-102.
1030. Id. at 105 (stating that the aggressive answer of the British and Iraqi governments to
the Kurdish question in Iraq expanded the unrest of Kurdish tribes to major nation-wide
revolts of Kurds. During 1920-1932, the Britain Royal Air Force, brutally exterminated
several Kurdish tribes and villagers); Michael J. Kelly, The Kurdish Regional Constitutional
within the Framework of the Iraqi Federal Constitution: A Struggle for Sovereignty, Oil,
Ethnic Identity, and the Prospects for a Reverse Supremacy Clause, 114 Penn St. L. Rev.
707, 717-26 (2010) (stating that a major nation-wide rebellion of Kurds, led by General
Mustafa Barzani, forced the Iraqi central government to accept the Kurdish terms and to
declare establishing the autonomous Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) in 1970. However, the
Iraqi central government broke the peace deal and resumed the war with the Kurds in 1974.
The Iraqi central government, under leadership of Saddam Hussain, had never planned to
fully implement the 1970 peace agreement, particularly the restoration of oil-rich Kurdish
areas of Kirkuk and Khanaqin to the KRI. Later, the 1975 Algiers Accord allowed Saddam
and Shah of Iran to collude in thrashing the Kurds. From 1975 to 1988, the Iraqi government
committed genocide against the Kurds and destroyed thousands of Kurdish villages. To
change the demography of the KRI, Saddam’s regime removed hundreds of thousands of
Kurds from the KRI, particularly the oil-rich areas, and operated the Arabization
campaigns — thousands of Arab families from South Iraq moved to the KRI. In 1991, the
defeat of the Iraqi Army in the Second Gulf War provided the Kurds with an opportunity to
rise against the Saddam’s regime to liberate major parts of the KRI, formed a functioning
semi-autonomous administration with no control from Baghdad till 2003. After the removal
of the Saddam’s regime in 2003, the Kurdish request of “self-determination” was again
denied by the international and regional powers, forcing the Kurds to be content with
“autonomy and regionalism within a federal structure” in 2003).
1031. Article 117, Section 1, Dustūr Jumḥūrīyat al-ʻIrāq [The Constitution of the Republic
of Iraq] of 2005.
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years.1032 The ICG and the KRG have also had a legal dispute over the
constitutional authorities of Kurdistan to develop oil and gas resources
within the Kurdish region and in disputed territories.

Figure (5.3): Iraqi Kurdistan1033
Since the establishment of the KRI, the KRG has entered into petroleum
exploration contracts with several regional and international oil
companies.1034 In 2007, the KRI issued a local hydrocarbon law1035 and
1032. Larry Hanauer et al., Managing Arab-Kurd Tensions in Northern Iraq After the
Withdrawal of U.S. Troops (Rand National Defense Research Institute 2011) (referring to a
quote by General Raymond Odierno, former commander of Multi-National Force–Iraq
(MNF-I), considering Arab-Kurdish tensions “as the greatest single driver of instability in
Iraq.”).
1033. Samuel Helfont, Homage to Kurdistan, Foreign Policy Research Institute (April 13,
2016), https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/04/homage-to-kurdistan/.
1034. Robin Mills, Under the Mountains: Kurdish Oil and Regional Politics, Oxford Inst.
for Energy Stud., 8-9 (2016) (stating that the KRG signed oil contracts with many oil
companies, including Turkey’s Genel Energy/Petoil in 2003, Addax in 2005, Norway’s
DNO in 2004, Canada’s Western Zagros in 2006, and the UAE’s Crescent Petroleum/Dana
Gas in 2007.).
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model Production Sharing Contract (“PSC”),1036 which attracted
investments from major oil companies — including Chevron, Total,
ExxonMobil, Marathon, Hess, and Gazprom — in the inchoate Kurdistan
petroleum industry.1037 By 2012, the KRG signed over forty-five PSCs to
explore, produce, and develop its oil and gas reserves.1038
The KRG estimates the total oil reserves of Kurdistan, excluding
disputed territories, to be about forty-five billion barrels of oil.1039 Ignoring
the ICG’s order to deliver the total oil production of Kurdistan, the KRG
built its pipeline to export its crude to the global market through Turkey in
2013.1040 The current crude production of the KRG is more than 400,000
b/d.1041 The KRG claims that the Kurdish crude production rate can reach
two million barrels per day if the international oil enterprises invest more in
the development of the currently producing oil fields in the KRI.1042
Additionally, the KRI holds a considerable amount of natural gas.1043
C. Energy Cooperation Between Iran and Iraq
The political and economic relations between Iran and Iraq have
gradually improved since the fall of the Saddam regime in 2003 and led to
increased cooperation. The Islamic Republic of Iran, which is substantially
inhabited by the Shi’a denomination, has aimed “to preserve the unity of

1035. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007 (The Kurdistan
Region – Iraq).
1036. Model Production Sharing Contract (2007) (The Kurdistan region – Iraq).
1037. Mills, supra note 1034, at 11.
1038. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – The Ministry of Natural Resources,
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/oil/vision.
1039. Id.
1040. See Reuters, Iraqi Kurdistan Poised to Pipe Oil to World via Turkey (Apr. 17,
2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-kurdistan-oil/iraqi-kurdistan-poised-to-pipeoil-to-world-via-turkey-idUSBRE93G08Q20130417 (stating that the KRG upgraded the
delivery capacity of its pipeline to one million barrels in 2018).
1041. Patrick Osgood, Iraqi Kurdistan Begins its Recovery After a Difficult Year,
Petroleum Economist (Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/politicseconomics/middle-east/2019/iraqi-kurdistan-begins-its-recovery-after-a-difficult-year.
1042. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – The Ministry of Natural Resources,
http://mnr.krg.org/index.php/en/oil/vision.
1043. See Oil & Gas Journal, Worldwide Look at Reserves and Production, (Jan. 7, 2014),
https://www.ogj.com/home/article/17211002/worldwide-look-at-reserves-and-production
(stating that Iraq holds about 112 Tcf of proven natural gas reserves); see also Javier Blas,
Natural Gas: North Looks to Tap into Long-Term Export Potential of Vast Reserves,
Financial Times (Dec. 6, 2011) (referring to the U.S. Geological Survey that estimated the
proven natural gas reserves of Kurdistan up to 60 Tcf).
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the Shi’a political groups to ensure Shi’a dominance in the Iraqi political
system.”1044 Iran has also sought to eliminate Iraq’s economic and cultural
dependence on Turkey and Arab countries.1045 The “cultural-societal
commonalities” between Iran and Iraq have allowed for a dramatic shift in
Iran’s “economic and cultural-political” position in post-2003 Iraq.1046 With
such an opportunity, Iran plans to increase its trade worth with Iraq by up to
$20 billion (USD) per year in upcoming years.1047 Additionally, the
majority of Iranians — who are Shi’a believers — and the Iranian
government sought to maintain a stable, friendly, and long-term
relationship with Iraq in order to easily visit the most sacred Shi’a cities,
Karbala and Najaf, which are both in Iraq.1048
Given the considerable level of economic exchange between the two
neighboring states, Iraq has grown to be remarkably dependent on Iranian
natural gas and electricity in recent years.
1. Electricity and Natural Gas
The most indispensable commodity offering efficiency and comfort to
the daily life of Iraqis living in a desert environment — reaching
temperatures of 122 degrees Fahrenheit during summer — is “the steady
and reliable supply of affordable electricity.”1049 However, the majority of
Iraqis have suffered from a lack of affordable electricity for many years.1050
The ineffective Iraqi electricity industry has encountered three significant
challenges. First, the electricity infrastructure in Iraq suffers from “aging
and inefficient physical” conditions.1051 In fact, the Iraqi transmission grid
1044. Luay J. Al-Khatteeb, Natural Gas in the Republic of Iraq, 21 (2013).
1045. Kayhan Barzegar, Iran’s Foreign Policy in Post-Invasion Iraq, XV Middle East
Pol’y, no. 4, 54-55, Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs (2008).
1046. Id. at 55.
1047. Ahmed Twaij, U.S. Sanctions on Iran Will Harm Iraq, Foreign Pol’y, 21 Dec. 2018,
available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/21/u-s-sanctions-on-iran-will-harm-iraq/
(stating that Iran has dominated the Iraqi market with “cheap and affordable product,” and
its current trade with Iraq worth more than USD 12 billion. The Iranian President, Hassan
Rouhani, announced that Iran would double its trade with Iraq up to USD 20 billion in
upcoming years).
1048. Barzegar, supra note 1045, at 50.
1049. Ebel, supra note 1017, at 47.
1050. Id.
1051. Mins Read, Iraq’s Electricity Sector Is Caught in the U.S.-Iran Power Struggle,
STRATFOR, Dec. 11, 2018, https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iraqs-electricity-sectorcaught-us-iran-power-struggle (stating that the electricity generation facilities of Iraq include
“old-style turbine and steam turbine power plants”).
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system loses up to fifty percent of the generated power due to its decrepit
state.1052 Second, its electricity infrastructure has suffered from theft,
embezzlement, sabotage, and war destruction.1053 Finally, the electricity
generation capacity of Iraq is only 16 GW, which cannot fulfill the
country’s current electricity demand of 24 GW.1054 Furthermore, due to
uncontrolled population growth in the country, the Iraqi government
forecasts that it will need to generate up to 42 GW of electricity to meet
domestic demand by 2030.1055
To improve electricity capacity, Iraq has depended on the import of
electricity and natural gas from Iran. Iraq currently imports about 1.2 GW
of electricity from Iran.1056 Since 2013, Iran has provided Iraq with 9.1 bcm
of natural gas per year “to feed three Baghdad-area power plants.”
Meanwhile, Iraq loses more than 18 bcm of natural gas each year as a result
of flaring.1057 To capture the flared natural gas, Iraq needs billions of dollars
in foreign direct investment and modern technology to develop its
petroleum reservoirs.1058
On the other hand, Iran relies on close cooperation with Iraq to facilitate
its mid-stream project to transport Iranian natural gas to the regional and
European markets. Initially, Iran plans to transport its natural gas to the

1052. Id; see also International Energy Agency, supra note 266, at 32-33 (stating that Iraq
holds the highest rate of electricity losses among the Middle East countries).
1053. Ebel, supra note 1017, at 47 (stating that after the fall of Saddam’s regime, “thieves
took down power lines and stripped out the copper wiring that was to be sold on the black
market. Saboteurs blew up pylons carrying the power lines in order to disrupt electricity
flows. Electric power–generating plants were stripped of equipment, including computers
and documentation, rendering the plants inactive.”); see also Worldview Stratfor, Iraq’s
Electricity Sector Is Caught in the U.S.-Iran Power Struggle, Worldview Stratfor (Dec. 11,
2018), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iraqs-electricity-sector-caught-us-iran-powerstruggle (stating that Iraq estimated USD 7 billion damages done by the Islamic State’s on
its electricity infrastructure in 2014.).
1054. Worldview Stratfor, Iraq’s Electricity Sector Is Caught in the U.S.-Iran Power
Struggle, Worldview Stratfor (Dec. 11, 2018), https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/iraqselectricity-sector-caught-us-iran-power-struggle.
1055. See Al-Khatteeb, supra note 1044, at 28 (referring from an Iraqi Ministry of
Electricity Consultant that the KRI needs 6 GW and other parts of Iraq demands 36 GW of
electricity by 2030.).
1056. Worldview Stratfor, supra note 1054.
1057. Id.
1058. Id (stating the Iraq signed a 17-billion USD joint venture with Shell and Mitsubishi
to capture the flaring gas from southern oil fields of Iraq in 2013).
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European market through two different pathways — one is through Iraq,
Syria, and Lebanon; the other one through Iraq and Jordan.1059
2. The Global Oil Market
After the dominance of the Shi’a faction within the Iraqi government,
Iraq and Iran largely agreed on the necessity of controlling the global oil
market per their common interests and policy. Both Iran and Iraq are
unhappy with the Saudi-led OPEC policy of low oil prices and decreased
levels of oil production.1060 The traditional approach of Saudi Arabia, the
largest oil producer among OPEC members, is to maintain “oil prices to a
reasonable and balanced level for Western markets to retain market share
and prevent importers from adopting alternative sources of energy.”1061
However, both Iran and Iraq need to raise oil revenue as quickly as
possible, which is only obtained through a higher oil price.
Moreover, both Iran and Iraq want to be able to increase their production
volume as much as possible.1062 For that purpose, Iran relies on the support
of the Iraqi Shi’a political faction to guarantee its active role in Iraq and to
be able to have Iraq as its closest ally to fulfill its political and economic
agenda in the region and the world.1063
III. Cross-Jurisdiction Petroleum Reserves Between Iran and Iraq
In addition to “the Arabian foreland zone,” the Middle East contains oil
fields located “in the foothill zone along the mountain front of Iraq and
South-west Iran.”1064 Modern geology recognizes this area as “the
Mesopotamia foredeep basin” and “the Zagros mountain fold belt.”1065
1059. See Al-Khatteeb, supra note 1044, at 45 (stating that “the Iraqi Council of Ministers
authorized the Minister of Oil to sign the project of the gas pipeline across Iran, Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon and Europe on February 19, 2013.” Also, Iraq and Jordan agreed on the
construction of 1700-kilometer pipeline to transport Iranian natural gas from Basra, Iraq to
the Jordanian city of Aqaba on the Red Sea and ship it to the Europe in April 2013.)
1060. Sujata Ashwarya, Post-2003 Iran–Iraq Cooperation in the Oil and Gas Sector:
Initiatives, Challenges, and Future Scenarios, 4(1) Contemp. Rev. The Middle East 84
(2017).
1061. Id.
1062. Id.
1063. Barzegar, supra note 1045, at 55.
1064. Lees, supra note 991, at 97-98.
1065. International Energy Agency, supra note 266, at 50 (stating that the Zagros foldbelt
includes the oilfields located in the KRG, Kirkuk, Khanaqin, and the major oil producing of
Southwest Iran. Also, the Mesopotamian basin contains supergiant oil fields of Basra,
Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

782

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

Between these two zones, Iran and Iraq share a 900-mile border, starting
from Dalanper Mountain — the tripoint border between Turkey, Iran, and
Iraq — and reaching the coast of the Persian Gulf.1066 Through this distant
frontier land, several oil reserves — containing a considerable volume of
recoverable crude oil — cross the border between Iran and Iraq. Both states
are considering increasing petroleum revenue through a practical joint plan
to develop these shared oil fields. At the same time, such a highly beneficial
opportunity could end in a conflict between the two neighboring states if
they do not act jointly and the dispute remains unresolved.
A. Shared Oil Fields Between Iran and Iraq
Throughout their long borderline, Iran and Iraq share seven major oil
reserves that hold approximately 14 billion barrels of recoverable oil.1067
All seven shared oil fields between Iraq and Iran are located inland, which
usually feature lower risk and lower cost of operations, compared to
offshore fields.1068 More importantly, some of these shared on-shore oil
fields between Iran and Iraq have remained intact — including the Sohrab
oil field, with some in phase one of production — including the Neft Shar
oil field, and some shared oil fields are in the development phase — such as
the Azadegan oil field.1069 An important point to note when describing these
shared oil fields is that each state uses a different name for the part of the
oil reserves located on their side. For instance, Iraq refers to one of the
major shared fields on its side as the “Majnoon” oil field, whereas the same
oil field is referred to as the “Azadegan” oil field on the Iranian side.1070

1066. World Atlas, Which Countries Border Iraq?, https://www.worldatlas.com/articles/
which-countries-border-iraq.html.
1067. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 86.
1068. Abbas Maleki et al., Reviewing the Status of Common Squares and Strategies for
Exploiting Them, Terjarat Farda Weekly Issue No. 191, http://icmstudy.ir/wp-content/
uploads/2016/09/FILE.pdf?_x_tr_sl=fa&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc&_x_tr_sc
h=http (in Persian). Author’s original citation:
 ﻧﯿﻤﺎ ﺷﻤﺴﺎﭘﻮر، ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺻﺎدق ﮐﺮﯾﻤﯽ،ﻋﺒﺎسﻣﻠﮑﯽ
 ﮔﻨﺞ ھﺎی ﻣﺸﺘﺮک،وﻣﺤﺴﻦ ﺷﺎﻟﺒﺎف: ﻧﮕﺎھﯽ ﺑﮫ وﺿﻌﯿﺖ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺖ وﮔﺎز اﯾﺮان وﺳﯿﺎﺳﺘﮕﺪاری ﺑﮭﯿﻨﮫ ﺑﺮای ﺑﺮداﺷﺖ
 ﻣﺠﻠﮫ اﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ،–آﻧﮭﺎ۳۸  ﺻﻔﺤﮫ،۱۳۹٥  ﺷﮭﺮﯾﻮر۱۳ ،۱۹۱  ﺷﻤﺎرە،ﻣﯿﺎدﯾﻦ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺘﯽ
1069. Abbas Maleki & Mohsen Shalbaf, Policy Management of Joint Oil and Gas
Reservoirs: A Case Study of Iran-Iraq Joint Fields, Journal of Public Policy, pp. 49-51 (Feb.
2016), https://jppolicy.ut.ac.ir/article_58175.html?lang=en (in Persian). Author’s original
citation:  ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺘﮕﺪاری ادارە ﻣﺨﺎزن ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺘﯽ ﮔﺎزی،ﻣﺤﺴﻦﺷﺎﻟﺒﺎف وﻋﺒﺎس ﻣﻠﮑﯽ: ﻣﻄﺎﻟﻌﮫ ﻣﻮردی ﻣﯿﺎدﯾﻦ
،ﻣﺸﺘﺮک اﯾﺮان وﻋﺮاق
–ﻓﺼﻠﻨﺎﻣﮫ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ٥۱ ،٤۹  ﺻﻔﺤﮫ،۱۳۹٤  زﻣﺴﺘﺎن،٤  ﺷﻤﺎرە،۱  دورە،ﭘﮋوھﺸﯽ ﺳﯿﺎﺳﺘﮕﺪاری ﻋﻤﻮﻣﯽ
1070. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 87; see also Najemeh Ghaedizadeh & Hadi Khalili
Dizaji, Status of Iran’s Common Oil and Gas Reservoirs from the Perspective of
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This research describes each of the shared oil fields in order of their
location from North to South.
1. Naft Khana/Naft Shahr
The Naft Khana oil field is one of the oldest oil fields in Iraq, which
continuously produced oil from 1924 until the 1980s when it was shut down
during the Iraq-Iran War.1071 Naft Khana is located in Diyala Governorate,
which is one of the disputed territories between the Iraqi central
government and the Kurdistan regional government.1072 The total volume of
recoverable oil from the Naft Khana oil reserve on the Iraqi side is 430
million barrels,1073 and its production capability is estimated to be up to
16,000 barrels of oil per day.1074 The Iraqi Ministry of Oil offered a Chinese
oil company to resume exploration and production in 2018.1075
This oil reserve crosses the Iranian border, where it is recognized as “the
Naft Shahr” oil field. Uninterruptedly, Iran has transported oil production
from the Naft Shahr through a pipeline to Kermanshah Province since
1935.1076 Naft Shahr oil field on the Iranian side holds approximately 700
million barrels of recoverable oil, and its current production is more than
15,000 barrels per day.1077
2. Badra/Azar
Badra oil field is located in the Wasit Governorate in Iraq and holds three
billion barrels (bbl) of recoverable oil on the Iraqi side.1078 The operator of
the Badra oil fields, Gazprom Neft, has been producing 85,000 barrels of
oil per day, which is expected to double during the development phase in
International Law, Mon. Oil Gas Explor. Prod. (2014). Author’s original citation: ﻗﺎﺋﺪی ﻧﺠﻤﮫ
زادە وھﺎدی
 ﻣﺎھﻨﺎﻣﮫ ﻋﻠﻤﯽ، وﺿﻌﯿﺖ ﻣﺨﺎزن ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺖ و ﮔﺎز اﯾﺮان از ﻣﻨﻈﺮ ﺣﻘﻮق ﺑﯿﻦ اﻟﻤﻠﻞ،ﺧﻠﯿﻠﯽ دﯾﺰﺟﯽ- ﺗﺮوﯾﺠﯽ اﮐﺘﺸﺎف و
ﺗﻮﻟﯿﺪ ﻧﻔﺖ و
ﮔﺎز/ ۱۱۰  ﺷﻤﺎره/۱۳۹۲  اﺳﻔﻨﺪ-٤  ﺻﻔﺤﮫ،۱۳۹۳ ﻓﺮوردﯾﻦ
1071. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 97.
1072. Delshad Anwar, Exploiting Oil Potential While Baghdad Fights Kurds, Iran Wins,
NIQASH (Aug. 30, 2012), https://www.niqash.org/en/articles/economy/3109/.
1073. Mahendra K. Verma et al., Petroleum Reserves and Undiscovered Resources in the
Total Petroleum Systems of Iraq: Reserve Growth and Production Implications, 9 Geoarabia
51 (2004).
1074. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 97.
1075. Oil & Gas J., Iraq Awards Border-Field Rehab Contracts, (2018).
1076. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 97.
1077. Id.
1078. Id. at 93.
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upcoming years.1079 Azar is the name of the same oil reserve on the Iranian
side in the Ilam Province, which contains 2.5 bbl of recoverable oil and is
currently producing about 30,000 barrels per day.1080
3. Abu Ghraib/Dehloran
The Abu Ghraib oil field is located in the Maysan Governorate on the
Iraqi side, was discovered in 1971, and contains approximately 1.5 bbl of
recoverable oil.1081 The Missan Oil Company, a subsidiary of the Iraqi
Ministry of Oil, manages the Abu Graib oil filed.1082 Before the Iraq-Iran
War in 1980, Abu Ghraib was producing about 40,000 bpd.1083 On the
Iranian side of the border, it is described as “the Dehloran oil field” because
it is located within the territories of Dehloran City, Ilam Province. 1084 The
volume of recoverable oil from the Dehloran field is more than four bbl,
much larger than the Iraqi side, and the Iranian oil company has been
producing about 25,000 bpd from this oil field.1085
4. Fakka/West Paydar
Missan Oil Company of Iraq also owns the Fakka oil field, which
contains approximately 2.5 bbl of recoverable oil on the Iraqi side.1086
Missan Oil Company has not published the exact volume of oil production
from the Fakka field. However, the released data shows that the Chinese oil
enterprise, CNOOC — the operator of all three major oil fields of Missan
1079. John Lee, Gazprom Neft Halves Badra Production Target, Iraq-Business News (Jan.
12, 2018), https://www.iraq-businessnews.com/2018/01/12/gazprom-neft-halves-badraproduction-target/.
1080. Review of the Situation of the Iraqi Oil Industry and Potentials of the Country’s Oil
Cooperation with Iran, Deputy of Infrastructure Research and Production Affairs Office:
Energy, Industry and Mining Studies, https://perma.cc/RNH8-VL49. Author’s original
citation:  ﻣﺮﮐﺰ ﭘﮋوھﺶ ھﺎی،ﺑﺮرﺳﯽ وﺿﻌﯿﺖ ﺻﻨﻌﺖ ﻧﻔﺖ ﻋﺮاق و ﭘﺘﺎﻧﺴﯿﻞ ھﺎی ھﻤﮑﺎری ﻧﻔﺘﯽ اﯾﻦ ﮐﺸﻮر ﺑﺎ اﯾﺮان
ﻣﺠﻠﺲ ﺷﻮرای اﻧﻘﻼب

۱۳۹٤  اﺳﻔﻨﺪ،۱٤۷٦۰  ﺷﻤﺎره ﻣﺴﻠﺴﻞ،اﺳﻼﻣﯽ اﯾﺮان،
1081. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 98.
1082. Missan Oil Company, History of Company, https://moc.oil.gov.iq/index.php?
name=Pages&op=page&pid=131 (last accessed on June 3, 2019).
1083. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 98.
1084. Dehloran Oil Field, Petro Energy Information Network, https://www-shanair.translate.goog/news/277318/%D9%85%DB%8C%D8%AF%D8%A7%D9%86-%D9%86
%D9%81%D8%AA%DB%8C-%D8%AF%D9%87%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86?
_x_tr_sl=fa&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc.
Author’s
original
citation:
۱۳۹٦  ﺧﺮداد۳۱ ، ﻣﯿﺪان ﻧﻔﺘﯽ دھﻠﺮان،ﺷﺒﮑﮫ اطﻼع رﺳﺎﻧﯽ ﻧﻔﺖ و اﻧﺮزی ﺷﺎﻧﺎ
1085. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 98.
1086. Id.
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Oil Company, Abu Ghraib, Fakka, and Buzurgan oil fields — and its
Turkish partners, TPAO, pledged to increase the production rate in all three
of Missan’s oil fields to 450,000 bpd by 2017.1087 Approximately 190
million barrels of oil reserves cross the Iranian border and enter the
frontiers of the Khuzestan Province, where the oil field is called West
Paydar.1088 After presenting the new draft of the Iran Petroleum Contract
(IPC) model, the Iranian Ministry of Oil offered a Russian state-owned oil
firm, Zarubezhneft, the right to start developing the West Paydar oil field
and increase production to 15,000 bpd in upcoming years.1089
5. Majnoon/Azadegan
This shared oil reserve between Iraq and Iran is considered to be one of
the largest on-shore oil fields in the world, holding more than 50 bbl of
crude oil in place and about 19 bbl of recoverable oil from both sides in
total.1090 This super-giant oil reserve is called Majnoon on the Iraqi side,
where Royal Dutch Shell serves as the main operator, holding forty-five
percent of the contract’s shares.1091 Due to a disagreement with the Iraqi
government over the development budget plan, Shell announced its
intention to withdraw from the Majnoon oil field in 2018 after production
reached 235,000 bpd.1092
On the Iranian frontier, this giant oil field is referred to as “the Azadegan
oil field.”1093 The Iranian portion is divided into two parts, North Azadegan
1087. Chen Zhu, Cnooc Seals Deal on Iraq Oil Field, MarketWatch (May 18, 2010),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/chinas-cnooc-set-for-20-years-in-iraq-2010-05-18.
1088. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 98.
1089. PressTv, Russian firm to Re-Develop Iranian Oil Fields (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2018/03/14/555477/Russian-firm-to-redevelop-Iranian-oilfields.
1090. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 95 (stating that Majnoon oil field contains 23-25 bbl
of crude oil in place, in which up to 13 bbl of that is recoverable from the Iraqi side); see
also FINANCIAL TRIBUNE, Iran's Largest Joint Oil Field to Be Tendered by Summer
2018, Dec. 15, 2017, https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy-economy/77909/iranslargest-joint-oil-field-to-be-tendered-by-summer-2018 (stating that Azadegan oil field holds
more than 33 bbl of crude oil in place and about 6 bbl of that could be recovered from the
Iranian side).
1091. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 95 (stating that this contract aimed to reach the
production plateau of 1.8 million barrels of crude oil).
1092. Aref Mohammed Ahmed Rasheed, Shell to Hand Over Iraq's Majnoon Oilfield by
End June 2018: Iraqi Oil Officials, Reuters (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-iraq-oil-shell/shell-to-hand-over-iraqs-majnoon-oilfield-by-end-june-2018iraqi-oil-officials-idUSKBN1D817D.
1093. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 96.
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and South Azadegan.1094 A Chinese oil firm, CNPC, received a license to
operate the Azadegan oil field; however, CNPC withdrew from the contract
in 2014 as a result of the international sanctions imposed against Iran over
its nuclear program.1095 The overall current production of both the northern
and southern sections of the Azadegan oil field is 160,000 barrels of crude
oil per day.1096
6. Sinbad/Yadavaran
This joint oil field is shared between the Basra Governorate in Iraq and
the Khuzestan Province in Iran.1097 The exact volume of recoverable oil
from the Iraqi section of this joint field, Sindbad, is unknown, but the Iraqi
government offered a license to resume exploring the field in 2018 to a
Chinese enterprise.1098 According to the presented data by the Iraqi South
Oil Company, the Sindbad oil field holds a large volume of associated
gas.1099 A different appraisal of this oil field by the Iranian partner has
established that this joint field contains more than 34 bbl of crude in place,
and the Iranian section of this joint field, recognized as Yadavaran, holds
the majority of recoverable oil of this joint field.1100 In 2007, two
international oil firms obtained a license to develop the Yadavaran oil field
in Iran to reach the production plateau of this field up to 300,000 bpd.1101
1094. Financial Tribune, Iran's Largest Joint Oil Field to Be Tendered by Summer 2018,
Dec. 15, 2017, https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy-economy/77909/irans-largestjoint-oil-field-to-be-tendered-by-summer-2018.
1095. John Daly, Iran Tears up Azadegan Contract with China, Oil Price (May 3, 2014),
https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Iran-Tears-Up-Azadegan-Contact-With-China.
html.
1096. Arvandan Oil and Gas Company, NAFTOnline News Agency, https://wwwnaftonline-ir.translate.goog/vsnah4h9g%5Egcn.kic6149nw.t745,.5kcl4b4x6.66kgw.html?_
x_tr_sl=fa&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc.
Author’s
original
citation:
۱۳۹۸  آﺑﺎن۱۹ ، ﻣﻌﺮﻓﯽ ﻣﯿﺪان ﻧﻔﺘﯽ آزادﮔﺎن،ﺷﺮﮐﺖ ﻧﻔﺖ وﮔﺎز اروﻧﺪان
1097. Financial Tribune, Iran Solo Producer of Joint Oilfield (Jan. 07, 2015),
https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy/8506/iran-solo-producer-of-joint-oilfield.
1098. OIL & GAS J., Iraq Awards Border-Field Rehab Contracts, June 07, 2018,
https://www.ogj.com/exploration-development/article/17296684/iraq-awards-borderfieldrehab-contracts.
1099. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 97.
1100. Id.
1101. Tehran Times, Sinopec Still Negotiating to Develop Iran’s Yadavaran Oilfield (Aug.
18, 2019), https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/439379/Sinopec-still-negotiating-to-developIran-s-Yadavaran-oilfield (stating that SINOPEC, a Chinese oil firm, along with PEDEC had
signed a contract with Iran to develop Yadavaran oil field in 2007 but have not been able to
fulfil their commitment to reach the 300,000-bpd plateau yet. The current production rate of
Yadavarn is 85,000).
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7. South Abu Ghraib/Arvand
This joint field is also located within the frontiers of the Basra
Governorate in Iraq and Khuzestan Province in Iraq. The recoverable
volume of crude oil from the Iraqi side of this field, South Abu Ghraib, is
still unknown.1102 However, the operator of the Iranian section of this
field — which is called Arvand in Iran — estimates that about 150 million
barrels of oil are recoverable from the approximately 1 bbl crude in place in
the Arvand oil field.1103
B. Disputes Between Iran and Iraq Over Joint Oil Fields
Both Iraq and Iran value their joint oil fields as an economic opportunity
that will raise their petroleum revenue considerably. According to the
descriptions of the joint oil fields, the total recoverable volume of crude oil
from the fields between Iraq and Iran is more than 37 bbl.1104 The recovery
costs of these shared oil fields are much lower than the other petroleum
operations that these states run in other parts of their territories, particularly
the offshore ones, due to the uncomplicated geology and surface structure
of these fields.1105 Only a united development plan, which stems from close
cooperation between the neighboring states, can guarantee the maximum
1102. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 98.
1103. Bloomberg, Iran’s Arvandan sign agreement to develop oil field (Aug. 19, 2012),
https://gulfnews.com/business/markets/irans-arvandan-sign-agreement-to-develop-oil-field1.1063737 (stating that Iran signed a 135-million-dollar contract to increase the production
rate of this field up to 20,000 bpd.).
1104. The Naft Khana/Naft Shar joint oil field with 1.2 bbl, Badra/Azar with 5.5 bbl, Abu
Ghraib/Dehloran with 5.5 bbl, Fakka/West Paydar with 2.7 bbl, Majnoon/Azadegan with 19
bbl, Sindbad/Yadavaran with 3.5 bbl, and South Abu-Ghraib/Arvand with 0.2 bbl.
1105. See International Energy Agency, supra note 266, at 54 (stating that most Iraqi oil
fields, for instance, “are often located in relatively unpopulated and flat terrain, reducing the
costs of wells, pipelines and other facilities. The oil produced is of a medium grade,
requiring no specialist upgrading, and can be pumped and handled quite easily”); Nima
Shamsapour et al., Common Treasures: A Look at the Situation of Iran’s Joint Oil and Gas
Fields and Optimal Policies for their Extraction, Terjarat-e-Farda Weekly, https://wwwtejaratefarda-com.translate.goog/%D8%A8%D8%AE%D8%B4-%D8%A7%D9%82%D8%
AA%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%AF-%D8%B3%DB%8C%D8%A7%D8%B3%DB%8C-13/
922-%DA%AF%D9%86%D8%AC-%D9%87%D8%A7%DB%8C-%D9%85%D8%B4%D8
%AA%D8%B1%DA%A9?_x_tr_sl=fa&_x_tr_tl=en&_x_tr_hl=en&_x_tr_pto=sc. Author’s
original citation:
 ﮔﻨﺞ ھﺎی ﻣﺸﺘﺮک، ﻧﯿﻤﺎ ﺷﻤﺴﺎﭘﻮر وﻣﺤﺴﻦ ﺷﺎﻟﺒﺎف، ﻣﺤﻤﺪ ﺻﺎدق ﮐﺮﯾﻤﯽ،ﻋﺒﺎسﻣﻠﮑﯽ: ﻧﮕﺎھﯽ ﺑﮫ وﺿﻌﯿﺖ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺖ
وﮔﺎز اﯾﺮان
.۳۸  ﺻﻔﺤﮫ،۱۳۹٥  ﺷﮭﺮﯾﻮر۱۳ ،۱۹۱  ﺷﻤﺎرە، ﻣﺠﻠﮫ اﻗﺘﺼﺎد ﺳﯿﺎﺳﯽ – ﻣﯿﺎدﯾﻦ ﻣﺸﺘﺮک ﻧﻔﺘﯽ،ﺑﮭﯿﻨﮫ ﺑﺮای ﺑﺮداﺷﺖ آﻧﮭﺎ
وﺳﯿﺎﺳﺘﮕﺪاری
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recovery and economic value of the joint oil fields. However, Iraq and Iran
have been unable to reach an agreement to develop these fields jointly,
despite many political attempts and initiatives.1106 Unsurprisingly, Iraq and
Iran have accused each other of taking alternative steps, provoking violence
between the two states and leading to energy waste.
1. Initiatives
For decades, Iraq and Iran struggled for possession of more frontier land
and water in the areas between them, particularly on the southern frontiers
surrounding a majority of the joint fields.1107 Even the 1937 Treaty of
Tehran and the 1975 Algiers Agreement could not prevent the two
countries from entering into a long aggressive war that demolished the
majority of economic resources of both States from 1980 to 1988.1108 After
the fall of Saddam’s regime in 2003, Shi’a political groups — the majority
of the Iraqi population and supported by Iran — have run the Iraqi
government. Since then, the governments have experienced a peaceful
period of diplomatic relations.
To resolve the issue of the joint oil fields, Iraq and Iran approached each
other with initiatives for joint operations over shared oil reserves. In 2007,
the Iraqi government officially addressed the Iranian government with a
proposal for a shared “Border Committee” to inspect the geological
structure of all joint oil fields between Iraq and Iran.1109 In mid-2009, the
Iranian side showed its first initiative by discussing with Iraq, through
expert groups, the initial steps that petroleum officials could take to jointly
develop the shared reserves.1110 After five meetings between the expert
groups, the two countries signed their first memoranda of understanding
1106. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 87.
1107. Randall Lesaffer, The Iran-Iraq Border: A Story of Too Many Treaties, Oxford Pub.
Int’l L. Online (2015), https://opil.ouplaw.com/page/iran-iraq-border (stating that Iraq and
Iran disputed for many decades on “the ‘thalweg’ – the line formed by the lowest points in
the valley and the river – in the Shatt al-Arab,” which officially divides the southern
frontiers of Iraq and Iran.).
1108. Id. (stating that the Iraqi government, under Saddam’s leadership 1979-2003, had
rejected the agreed resolution of the 1975 Agreement and started a war with Iran in 1980,
which was ended in 1988 with no agreement over the border dispute until 1990 days before
the invasion of Kuwait).
1109. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 88 (Referring from Wikileaks, Iraqi Oil Ministry
Negotiating Unitization Of Cross-Border Fields, Cable Number 388 -Secret, (2009b, March
1), accessed on Mar. 23, 2015, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BAGHDAD530
_a.html).
1110. Id.
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(“MOU”) “on the management of cross-border oil fields and bilateral
energy issues, including research, training, and drilling services.”1111 The
MOU proposed the joint nomination of a neutral oil enterprise to develop
the shared reserves.1112 In May 2010, after the Fakka incident,1113 both
States agreed on “a Master Development Plan (“MDP”)” for five of their
joint reserves.1114 Iraq and Iran agreed to establish “expert committees” to
issue a technical and financial report regarding the joint oil fields in January
2011.1115 In Baghdad in 2013, the Iranian President, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, signed many agreements — including the settlement of
“territorial and ownership differences” and the institution of “joint
ventures” for joint petroleum reserves — with his Iraqi counterpart.1116
Since then, Iraq and Iran have invigorated their agreed development plan
for the joint fields almost every year.1117
Nevertheless, none of the MOUs or bilateral agreements between Iraq
and Iran have concluded unitization or joint operations of the shared oil
fields between the two neighboring states. The failure to unitize stems from
four principal reasons.
a) Sanctions Against Iran:
U.S. sanctions against the Iranian economy have prevented international
oil enterprises from investing and implementing modern technology in the
nation’s oil and gas industry since the Iranian revolution in 1979, when the
Islamic Republic of Iran became antagonistic towards the U.S.
government.1118 Major oil companies resumed investing in the highly
1111. Id. at 90 (referring from Kate Dourian, Oil Prices Surge as Iran Moves on Disputed
Iraqi Oilfield, The Asia Petrochemical Industry Conf. (APIC) (Dec. 21, 2009).
1112. Id.
1113. Id. at 87.
1114. Id. at 90-91.
1115. Id.
1116. Id. at 91.
1117. PressTv, Iraq Eyeing Development of Joint Fields (Mar. 14, 2015),
https://www.presstv.com/Detail/2015/03/14/401852/Iraq-eyeing-development-of-joint-fields
(stating that the Iraqi government emphasized the importance of joint development of shared
fields with Iran and Kuwait); Financial Tribune, Iran, Iraq Set to Jointly Develop Shared
Oilfields (Jan. 24, 2018), https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy-economy/80689/iraniraq-set-to-jointly-develop-shared-oilfields; Reuters, Iran Says Reaches Understanding with
Iraq to Develop Two Oilfields (Apr. 07, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-iraqoilfields/iran-says-reaches-understanding-with-iraq-to-develop-two-oilfields-idUSK
CN1RJ06U (stating that Iraq and Iran agreed on the joint development of two joint oil fields,
including Naft Khana/Naft oil field).
1118. Yergin, supra note 17.
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remunerative Iranian oil and gas industry in 2015, during the brief lift of
American and European sanctions.1119 The resumption of U.S. sanctions
against the Iranian oil and gas industry in 2018 compelled major oil
companies to quit multi-billion-dollar operations in Iran.1120 Furthermore,
the ongoing sanctions against Iran have targeted all international enterprises
investing in any sector of the Iranian oil and gas industry, including
exploration, production, development, transportation, and marketing.1121
Accordingly, the major international oil companies that obtained licenses in
Iraq are unable to enter into unitization agreements with neighboring
Iranian oil and gas interests because it would require investing on the
Iranian side of the joint oil field.1122
b) Lack of Mutual Trust:
Despite the post-2003 dominance of Iran over the Shi’a-led government
of Iraq, deep mistrust is still present between Iraq and Iran, which has
impacted the relationship between the two governments. Iraq and Iran
disputed their borderline for decades and entered into a bloody war in the
1980s.1123 The majority of Iraqi Sunnis and Kurds, along with “a bare

1119. Cameron Glenn, After Sanctions: Iran Oil & Gas Boom?, U.S. Inst. Peace (May 08,
2015),
https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2015/may/08/after-sanctions-iran-oil-gas-boom
(stating that European oil companies, including Total SA of France, ENI of Italy, Royal
Dutch Shell, and British Petroleum (BP) showed their high interest, investing in the Iranian
oil and gas industry after the U.S. and its European partners lifted their sanctions against Iran
in 2015 due to the nuclear deal); see also Najmeh Bozorgmehr et al., Iran Aims for More
Foreign Oil and Gas Investment After Total Deal, FIN. Times (Nov. 08, 2016),
https://www.ft.com/content/9db5e152-a5a9-11e6-8b69-02899e8bd9d1 (stating that Iran and
Total entered into a USD 4.8-billion contract to develop the South Pars gas field in 2016.).
1120. Cyril Altmeyer et al., Total Tells Iran It’s Quitting South Pars Gas Project,
REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-france-total-gas/totaltells-iran-its-quitting-south-pars-gas-project-idUSKCN1L51LH.
1121. Parisa Hafezi, U.S. Will Sanction Whoever Purchases Iran’s Oil, REUTERS (Sep.
8,
2019),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iran-oil/u-s-will-sanction-whoeverpurchases-irans-oil-official-idUSKCN1VT0H2 (stating that for instance, the U.S.
Department of Treasury blacklisted all oil tankers that ship the Iranian oil products).
1122. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 91-92 (referring to the cables of the U.S. Embassy in
Iraq, published by Wikileaks, stating that international oil companies in Iraq have avoided
entering into the development of cross-border oil fields between Iraq and Iran due to the
U.S. sanctions).
1123. Ian Black, Iran and Iraq Remember War That Cost More Than a Million Lives, The
Guardian (Sep. 23, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-waranniversary (stating that “the death toll [of the Iraq-Iran War], overall, was an estimated 1
million for Iran and 250,000-500,000 for Iraq”).
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majority of Iraqi Shi’as view Iran unfavorably.”1124 The Iraqi Shi’as, in
their nationwide protests against failure and corruption in the Iraqi
government, denounced Iranian dominance and interference in Iraq.
On the other hand, the similar nationalistic affiliation of the majority of
Iraqis — who are Arabs — with other Arab neighboring countries,
including Iran.1125 For decades, “the Iranian interest” and their “pan-Islamic
and pragmatic views” have been in complete contrast with Arab states of
the Persian Gulf.1126 More importantly, any Iraq-Iran deal over their joint
fields may escalate “the regional tension” among major oil-producing
countries.1127
c) Iraq-Kurdistan Disputed Areas:
Besides the ongoing disputes between the Iraqi central government and
the KRG over the budget share and the petroleum authority of the local
governorates, a major internal controversy between the two governments in
Iraq over disputed territories has remained unresolved, which continues to
threaten the stability and integrity of Iraq.1128 Among the joint oil fields of
Iraq and Iran, a few of them are located in the disputed areas between Iraq
and the KRG.1129 Notably, the territories — which contain Naft Khana and
Badra oil fields — are recognized as disputed areas between the Iraqi
government and the KRG.1130 Both the Iraqi central government and the
KRG have warned the international oil companies not to enter any
investment deal with one of the two governments over oil fields that are
located in the disputed areas.1131 The ongoing conflict between the KRG
1124. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 91-92 (stating that more than two-thirds of the Iraqi
population hold a strong view of mistrust against Iran).
1125. Id. at 106.
1126. Barzegar, supra note 1045, at 48.
1127. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 106.
1128. See Hanauer et al., supra note 1032.
1129. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 105.
1130. Sean Kane, Iraq’s Disputed Territories: A View of The Political Horizon and
Implications for U.S. Policy, 35 & N. 86 U.S. Ins. Of Peace (2011) (stating that the disputed
areas between the Iraqi government and the KRG includes, but not limited to, the District of
Khanaqin in the Diyala Governorate — which contains Naft Khana oil field — and the
District of Badra in the governorate of Wassit, containing Badra oil field).
1131. See Guy Chazan, BP Warned Off Oilfield Plans in Northern Iraq, Financial Times
(Jan. 29, 2013), https://www.ft.com/content/c824a016-6a36-11e2-a7d2-00144feab49a
(stating that the KRG declared that it would not accept and recognize any physical entering
of BP into an agreement with Baghdad to work in the oil fields in the disputed areas,
especially, in Kirkuk.); see also, Andrew E. Kramer, Iraq Criticizes Exxon Mobil for Its
Deal with the Kurds, The New York Times (Nov. 13, 2011), https://www.nytimes.
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and Baghdad over disputed areas has a significant impact on the
development of the disputed oil fields that are also shared with Iran,
meaning the IOCs will face substantial risk in investing in those joint oil
fields.
d) Lack of Oil and Gas Law and Affable Contract Model
The post-2003 Iraqi central government still relies on the oil and gas law
promulgated in the 1980s by the Saddam regime to run its petroleum
activities. The Iraqi government delivered a draft of a hydrocarbon law in
2007 to the Iraqi Parliament. However, the Iraqi political factions
representing Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish ethnic groups in the Parliament,
have not agreed to pass the law yet.1132 The main disagreements between
the parties include “the mode of distribution of privileges” and the
petroleum authority of the federal government and the local
governorates.1133 The lack of hydrocarbon law, which also influences the
“relationship between the government and operating companies,” is one of
the main concerns of foreign investors in the Iraq oil industry.1134
2. Incidents & Conflict
None of the initiatives between Iraq and Iran have resulted in joint
operations and development of their shared oil fields. These initiatives have
created a peaceful relationship between the two neighboring states for
continuing diplomatic dialogs, precluding them from hostile conduct
towards one another in the short term. However, the lack of any final
agreement resulting from these initiatives, along with the substantial
economic potential in the joint fields and growing need for both states to
generate more oil revenue, has induced both states to implement unfriendly
methods. The hostile actions have the potential to escalate into another
long-term war between the neighboring states and diminish the physical
security of the whole region.
One of these unfriendly methods implemented by Iraq and Iran is the
“unliteral development of shared oil fields.”1135 On the Iraqi side, top
com/2011/11/14/world/middleeast/iraq-criticizes-exxon-mobil-for-its-deal-with-the-kurds.
html (stating that the Iraqi government announced that the KRG oil deal with ExxonMobil
were illegal, particularly in the disputed areas).
1132. See Al-Khatteeb, supra note 1044, at 34.
1133. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 105.
1134. Nick Butler, The Dangers of Iraq’s Oil Law, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/da2b5cae-46d7-11e8-8ee8-cae73aab7ccb.
1135. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 92.
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government officials view unilateral operations as an alternative if the two
neighboring states cannot agree on unitization.1136 Additionally, the Iraqi
Ministry of Oil offered IOCs the opportunity to invest in and develop many
oil fields that cross the Iranian border without Iran’s permission or
cooperation. Three joint oil fields — Abu Ghraib, Fakka, and Majnoon —
were subjects of the two bidding rounds held by Iraq in 2009.1137 Since
then, Iraq has conducted unilateral operations in many oil fields that are
shared with Iran, including the Badra oil field,1138 Fakka oil field,1139
Majnoon oil field,1140 and Sindbad oil field.1141 Iran also conducted unliteral
operations in its portion of the joint oil field with Iraq despite the durable
and strict sanctions imposed by the U.S. Through domestic oil companies,
Iran started developing its oil fields that are shared with Iraq, including the
Naft Shahr oil field,1142 Azar oil field,1143 Azadegan oil field,1144 and Arvand
oil field.1145 In 2014, a national law required the Iranian government to
increase oil production of common fields to a rate that is no less than the
production volume of the neighboring state.1146 Both Iraq and Iran are
wasting valuable joint natural resources through unilateral operations. As a
result, both countries, and the global oil market, suffer from energy waste.
Another hostile approach considered by Iraq and Iran was military
confrontation to control their joint oil fields. In late 2009, the Iranian Army
crossed the Iraqi border, seized one of the Iraqi oil wells in the Fakka field,
and claimed ownership of the oil well.1147 Iraq rejected the Iranian claim,
1136. Id.
1137. Id.
1138. Id. at 98.
1139. See Presstv, supra note 1089.
1140. See Financial Tribune, Iran’s Largest Joint Oil Field to Be Tendered by Summer
2018 (Dec. 15, 2017), https://financialtribune.com/articles/energy-economy/77909/iranslargest-joint-oil-field-to-be-tendered-by-summer-2018.
1141. Tehran Times, supra note 1101.
1142. Lee, supra note 1079.
1143. Missan Oil Company, supra note 1082.
1144. Oil & Gas Journal, Iraq Awards Border-Field Rehab Contracts, (June 07, 2018),
https://www.ogj.com/exploration-development/article/17296684/iraq-awards-borderfieldrehab-contracts.
1145. See International Energy Agency, supra note 266, at 54 (stating that most Iraqi oil
fields, for instance, “are often located in relatively unpopulated and flat terrain, reducing the
costs of wells, pipelines and other facilities. The oil produced is of a medium grade,
requiring no specialist upgrading, and can be pumped and handled quite easily.”).
1146. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 93.
1147. Ranj Alaaldin, Iran's Mini-Incursion into Iraq, The Guardian (Dec. 21, 2009),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/dec/21/iran-incursion-iraq-oil-field.
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deployed troops to confront the Iranian soldiers, and asked them to pull
back.1148 The Fakka incident signified that significant disputes between the
two neighboring states over border demarcation and joint oil fields have the
potential to trigger another bloody war in the region.1149 In 1990, the
Saddam regime accused Kuwait of siphoning off the Iraqi oil from the joint
Zubair/Abdali oil field and then invaded Kuwait.1150 Hydrocarbons in the
Zubair oil field, which is located in South Basra Governorate of Iraq, cross
the border of Kuwait to form the Abdali and Ratqa oil fields in North
Kuwait.1151 As a result, the majority of Arab countries in the region, along
with their western allies, quickly fell into a broad regional war, which
ended in the complete defeat of the Iraqi Army and widespread destruction
of oil infrastructure in both Kuwait and Iraq. Such precedent, along with the
unsuccessful initiatives between Iraq and Iran and the 2009 Fakka incident,
could trigger military clashes between Iraq and Iran in upcoming years if
the issue of cooperative development of joint oil fields remains unresolved.
IV. Cross-Jurisdiction Unitization Agreement between Iran and Iraq
Implementing joint development operations over the oil and gas
reservoirs that straddle the borderlines between Iran and Iraq is the only
peaceful solution that could prevent the neighboring countries from
entering into another aggressive confrontation. Close cooperation between
the two countries to reach a legal agreement for joint development
operations over their shared oil reserves could avoid the escalation of
military confrontations between the two states. Furthermore, through
cooperation, both Iraq and Iran could minimize energy waste that results
from the unilateral operation, providing both countries with greater
recovery of hydrocarbons and increased revenue. Iraq and Iran can focus on
cross-jurisdiction unitization — one of the models for joint development of
hydrocarbons — because the countries have already established a
borderline, and no significant dispute exists between the two states over
boundary demarcation. For that purpose, both countries need to resolve all
political obstacles that preclude the two countries from signing joint
development operations. For instance, the U.S. sanctions against the Iranian

1148. Aref Mohammed, Iraqi and Iranian Forces Stand Off in Oil Well Row, Reuters
(Dec. 26, 2009), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-oil/iraqi-and-iranian-forces-standoff-in-oil-well-row-idUSTRE5BP10420091226.
1149. Ashwarya, supra note 1060, at 88.
1150. Id. at 87.
1151. Id.
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oil and gas industry have been an enormous obstacle, preventing Iran from
obtaining the financial and technical support to jointly develop its shared
reserves with Iraq. On the Iraqi side, the greatest political challenge to
address before joint development can commence is settling the
disagreement between the Iraqi government and KRG over disputed
territories.
Reaching an agreement for cross-jurisdiction unitization and unit
operation will require each country to implement adequate legal support in
advance, including the drafting of or modifying domestic hydrocarbon laws
and regulations, and entering into a treaty. Moreover, the technical,
financial, and legal sectors of each government will need to draft the details
of the unit operating agreement.
A. Legal Support
To implement the cooperative method of jointly operating oil fields,
opposed to the aggressive approach, both Iraq and Iran will need to adjust
their legal systems to facilitate the use of a cross-jurisdiction unitization
agreement. This type of conditional deal requires a legal system that
bestows both governments with the full authority to enter into a unitization
agreement. To that end, each government needs to amend its laws and
regulations so that it holds the legal authority to start negotiations with its
counterpart over shared oil fields and to implement primary steps toward
signing a unitization treaty. Each country’s law and model contracts need to
address the issue of transboundary oil fields, emphasize the necessity of
utilizing the cooperative approach, and grant a government body the
authority to carry out the joint development process. Subsequently, the
countries need to ratify an official agreement or treaty to implement the
cross-jurisdiction unit operations of joint fields.
1. National Hydrocarbon Laws
No existing legal support for joint management of shared oil fields exists
in the national oil and gas laws in Iran or Iraq. The Iraqi Parliament has not
passed its hydrocarbon law due to the conflict of interest among its political
parties and ethnic factions since 2007.1152 The Iranian oil law1153 does not
address the issue of transboundary oil fields, and there is no clarification as
to which part of the government holds authority over the shared fields.1154

1152. Clement-Davies, supra note 1025, at 146-147.
1153. Oil Law of 2001 (The Islamic Republic of Iran).
1154. Id.
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2. Model Contracts
The current Iraqi technical service contract1155 and the previous buy-back
model used by Iran1156 fail to clarify the issue of unitization and
transboundary oil fields. However, in 2015, Iran discussed the issue of joint
oil fields and unitization in its new version of the model contract, which is
known as the Iranian petroleum contract (IPC).1157 Based on the previous
Iranian model contract, the Ministry of Oil signed separate contracts with
oil companies for exploration, production, and development, giving the
Ministry the ability to combine the blocks and operate it as one field.1158
The new IPC does not have such feature and the Ministry will grant
contractors a license to explore, produce, and develop in one block, which
may be later discovered as a part of the shared oil field with another
contractor.1159 The Public does not have access to the details of
transboundary oil fields and cross-jurisdiction unitization in the new IPC of
Iran.
The silence and ambiguity of national laws and model contracts in both
Iran and Iraq, regarding cross-jurisdiction unitization and the joint fields,
presents a significant challenge for the governments, that desperately need
to increase revenue, and the well-equipped oil enterprises who are willing
to invest on the giant oil reservoirs between Iran and Iraq. Therefore, both
countries need to present and draft clear language in their laws and model
contracts in a way that encourages international enterprises to invest in the
development of the oil fields that straddle the border between Iran and Iraq.
One of the models that Iran and Iraq could implement to adjust their
national laws and model contracts is the legal model of the Kurdistan
region.
The Kurdistan hydrocarbon law devoted three separate Articles to
unitization matters.1160 Among them, Article 49 discusses the issue of crossjurisdiction unitization.
If a Reservoir lies across a Region border into areas that are
part of the domain of a neighbouring country, the Reservoir
shall be unitised in coordination with the Federal Government
1155. Technical Service Contract of Iraq – 2009 (The Republic of Iraq).
1156. Buy-back Contract of Iran – 1995 (The Islamic Republic of Iran).
1157. Id.
1158. Id.
1159. Id.
1160. Oil and Gas Law of The Kurdistan Region - Iraq No. 22 of 2007, Art. 47-49 (The
Kurdistan Region – Iraq).
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according to the provisions of the Federal Constitution and by
agreement with the concerned neighbouring country to ensure a
complete equitable benefit for both parties from the development
of Petroleum from the Reservoir, and subject to the approval of
the Kurdistan Parliament.1161
The Kurdistan model production sharing contract further clarifies as
follows:
For clarification and the avoidance of doubt . . ., in the event that
a Reservoir extends beyond the boundaries of the Contract Area
into an adjacent area which is not the subject of another
Petroleum Contract (as defined by the Kurdistan Region Oil and
Gas Law), the GOVERNMENT shall, upon the
CONTRACTOR’s request, take the necessary steps to extend
the boundaries of Contract Area so as to include the entire
Reservoir within the Contract Area, provided that the
CONTRACTOR can offer the GOVERNMENT a competitive
minimum work program for such adjacent area.1162
B. Unitization Agreements
Similar to the international practice, the unitization parties — which are
the neighboring states, their national oil companies, and international oil
enterprises — enter into a two-phase agreement to unitize the shared oil and
gas fields.1163 In the first phase, the neighboring states sign a unitization
treaty, which involves their national oil companies and, if necessary, one or
more international enterprises involved in the technical, financial, and legal
details of the cross-jurisdiction unit operation.1164
1. Unitization Treaty
The management and control of the implicated governments’ “property”
is considered a sovereignty issue; consequently, they want to ensure that the
unitization treaty respects and recognizes the ownership and control of the
frontier land and reservoirs located within their borders.1165
1161. Id.
1162. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – The Ministry of Natural Resources,
Model Production Sharing Contract 2007, art. 34.2.
1163. See e.g. Association of International Petroleum Negotiations, supra note 565, at 1-2.
1164. Weaver & Asmus, supra note 448, at 70.
1165. Nigel Bankes, Recent Framework Agreements for the Recognition and Development
of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources, 29 Int'l J. Marine & Coastal L. 666, 678 (2014).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2022

798

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 7

Iraq and Iran share seven oil fields that extend from the middle of the
frontier to the Persian Gulf on the southern borders. This allows the
countries to follow the model used in the 2005 United Kingdom-Norway
Framework Agreement,1166 which “facilitates the development of marginal
fields located close to the maritime boundary” in the North Sea.1167 The
U.K. and Norway created a sixty-kilometer “cooperation corridor” located
near the median line in the North Sea to cover all hydrocarbon deposits
located in the sea between the two states. The 2005 United KingdomNorway Framework Agreement could be a practical model for several
shared oil fields between Iran and Iraq, even though all of the joint fields
between Iraq and Iran are located inland. Following this model would allow
the governments to save time because they will not need to negotiate and
develop a separate agreement for each joint field.
Alternatively, Iraq and Iran could include all their joint oil fields in a
framework treaty. Border demarcation concerns exist in the Fakka area,
where a military accident occurred between Iran and Iraq in 2009,1168 could
also be resolved through a framework treaty between Iraq and Iran. Shalbaf
and Maleki present another opinion, suggesting that Iran and Iraq could
start unitizing their small joint oil fields to establish a precedent for
unitizing their larger and more complicated oil fields in the future.1169
The unitization treaty between Iraq and Iran needs to address various
factors, including the identification of cross-jurisdiction reservoirs, the
commencement of production in the transboundary fields after signing the
unit operating agreement, the establishment of joint entities, and procedures
for dispute resolution.1170
2. Unit Operating Agreement
The Unit Operating Agreement (UOA) manages the rights and
responsibilities of the parties during the different phases of unitization
1166. Framework Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway concerning
Cross-Boundary Petroleum Co-Operation, Apr. 4, 2005, U.K.-Nor., UK T.S. No. 20 (2007)
(Cm. 7206).
1167. Bankes, supra note 1165, at 669-670 (citing from U.K.- Norway North Sea
Cooperation Workgroup, Unlocking Value Through Closer Relationships, August 2002,
available at http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/kilde/oed/rap/2002/ooo5/ddd/pdfv/159318report-uk-norway workgroupfinal.pdf; accessed 15 September 2014).
1168. Alaaldin, supra note 1147.
1169. Mohsen Shalbaf & Abas Maleki, Best Interaction Policy in Joint Fields Governance
between States; the case of Iraqi-Iranian Joint Fields, Public Policy (2016).
1170. Id. at Ch. 4. P. 56-64.
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operations.1171 Many parties, either as participants or licensees, are involved
in the UOA. Technical, financial, and legal teams from each state will
negotiate, discuss, and decide the terms of the UOA. Each team needs to
share its full technical and geological information about their unit side with
other teams.1172 In the case of Iraq and Iran, both states own national oil
companies that will participate in the UOA. The National Iranian Oil
Company and the two Iraqi national oil companies — Missan Oil Company
and South Oil Company — will be the primary participants in the UOA.
Both governments and their national oil companies will need to involve
international enterprises because they need the investments and technology
to successfully unitize the giant oil fields.
The first step that participants and licensees need to take is to draft a
UOA that complies with the terms of the signed unitization treaty. Then, the
parties need to either identify a Unit Operator to control and manage
operations in all seven of the joint oil fields or choose a separate Unit
Operator for each individual field. In addition to selecting the Unit
Operator, “approval of the development plan, initial apportionment ratio
and any redeterminations thereof, and changes to the unit area,” in the
UOA, need to be approved by both States.1173 Because licensees are not
parties to the unitization treaty and the terms of the treaty would not impact
licensees, the countries could follow the model of the 2005 United
Kingdom-Norway Framework Agreement by signing “deeds with their
respective Licensees to undertake the obligations placed on them by the
treaty.”1174 Other factors that the parties must consider in the UOA include
the identification of unit area, determination of parties’ share, a
redetermination of parties’ share, and the establishment of a joint operating
committee. Both governments will need to approve all of these factors in
the UOA.

1171. Unit Operating Agreement, Oil and Gas Drilling Glossary, IADC Lexicon,
https://iadclexicon.org/unit-operating-agreement/.
1172. Jacqueline L. Weaver & David F. Asmus, Unitizing Oil and Gas Fields Around the
World: A Comparative Analysis of National Laws and Private Contracts, 28 Hous. J. Int'l L.
3 (2006) (citing from Bruce M. Kramer & Gary B. Conine, Joint Development and
Operations, in INTERNATIONAL PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 561-62 (Rocky
Mountain Mineral Law Foundation, 2d ed. 2000)); see also Bastida et al., supra note 574, at
398 (defining the cross-jurisdiction unitization agreements as “inter-licensee Unitization
Agreements.”).
1173. Bastida et al., supra note 574, at 355.
1174. Id. at 399 (citing John Wilkinson, Introduction to Oil and Gas Joint Ventures, 51
(1997)).
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V. Conclusion
Iraq and Iran have considerable capacity to increase oil recovery and
budget revenue by unitizing their shared oil fields in the frontier land. The
unit operation of these joint fields would also strengthen the positions of
Iran and Iraq in the global energy market, particularly among the OPEC
members. Despite the bloody history between the two countries, the Iraqi
and Iranian governments resumed excellent diplomatic relations after the
fall of Saddam in 2003, as a result of close cooperation between the Iraqi
Shi'a parties and the Islamic Republic of Iran. This diplomacy could lead
the governments to quickly enter into a unitization treaty and unit operating
agreement. However, political obstacles, such as the U.S. sanctions against
the Iranian oil and gas industry, have prevented the two countries and
international oil enterprises — including those that are still active in Iraq —
from commencing serious negotiations concerning potential unitization.
Nevertheless, it appears that the withdrawal of sanctions and the resolution
of Article 140 in the 2005 Iraqi Constitution relating to disputed territories
between Baghdad and Erbil, which include a couple of the joint fields, will
facilitate the unitization process over seven joint oil fields that are located
on the frontier lands of Iran and Iraq.
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CONCLUSION1175
I. Reiterating Key Research Points
The need for energy and energy security remains a top concern for many
countries. Indeed, access to sustained, stable, and affordable energy is a top
priority of humankind. Absent the physical elements of proper access and
availability, and in modern time, absent ancillary elements of affordability
and acceptability, energy security is not achievable. Access to energy, as an
element of energy security, requires countries to ensure that their energy
consumption needs are met, thus promoting economic development, a
higher standard of living, and political stability.
Assured access to petroleum energy depends on availability and on
global geopolitical stability, especially among leading energy-producing
countries. Availability, as an element of petroleum energy security, focuses
first on geology favorable to petroleum exploitation, second, on the ability
of investors to profit from exploitation, which implicates a producing
country’s petroleum fiscal terms, and third, on acceptable surface risk. To
prosper from petroleum exploitation, the producing country must promote
the use of modern and efficient petroleum technology while regulating the
use of the technology to protect health, safety, and environmental protection
and while capturing economic rents. To assure a durable economy, the
producing country should invest most of the rents in assets that are at least
as important as the petroleum resources that are being depleted. From an
importing country’s perspective, petroleum supplies must be secure but
affordable, but concerns over climate change will require additional costs to
reduce carbon emissions.
Taken together, the elements of energy security promote global
economic development. Satisfying these elements is not always achievable,
however. Countries supplying energy and countries dependent upon
receiving supply are not always friendly. Conflict stemming from
international energy disputes and geopolitics often make energy security
elusive. These problems can be partially ameliorated by intergovernmental
energy organizations and international energy treaties. At a most basic
level, energy conflicts between neighboring states have been resolved with
unitization agreements, the focus of this dissertation.
1175. Nawzad passed away before he was able to write a conclusion. This conclusion was
written by Piper B. Hampton, Professor John S. Lowe, Nawzad’s supervising professor, and
Professor Owen L. Anderson, Nawzad’s supervising LL.M. professor and member of his
dissertation committee.
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Unitization agreements serve a purpose to recover maximum oil and gas
deposits from petroleum reservoirs through joint development on behalf of
interest holders that share control over a common reservoir. Unitization
promotes production while also preventing waste resulting in economic
loss. Unitization agreements do not just benefit the immediate producers.
They benefit humankind by avoiding conflict and wasteful competition that
would lessen overall recovery and by supplying the unitized petroleum
resources to the market in an orderly fashion.
Unitization agreements fit into multiple categories. Two common
categories of unitization are the method of implementation and the location
of the unit. Categorizing a unitization agreement by implementation refers
to whether the unitization is voluntary or compulsory. In most countries,
IOC investors are encouraged to unitize voluntarily and then seek
government approval; however, if the investors fail to agree, then the host
government will order unitization. Categorizing a unitization agreement by
location refers to jurisdiction. If the unitization is subject to only one
sovereign, jurisdiction is sole. If unitization is subject to two or more
sovereigns, jurisdiction is shared on a cross-border basis. In other words,
sole-jurisdictional unitization agreements contemplate joint unit operation
by two or more IOC investors within a single jurisdiction. Compared to
cross-jurisdictional unitization agreements, sole-jurisdiction agreements are
simple because only one government is involved.
Cross-jurisdiction unitization is inherently more complicated than
unitization in a single jurisdiction. The degree of complexity turns foremost
on whether the involved countries have amicable or unfriendly relations. Is
one country a member of OPEC but not the other country? Variations in
regulation, fiscal terms, taxation, and bidding parameters can further
complicate unitization. Further, differences of opinion over the location and
extent of petroleum resources to be unitized can be very contentious.
Conflict can also arise over how best to exploit the unitized reserves, e.g.,
the number and location of wells, the rate of production, whether (and
what) enhanced recovery techniques should be utilized. Disputes can arise
over the allocation of sunk costs due to differences of opinion about
whether such costs added value to the petroleum asset.
The United States, unlike most other countries, adheres the accession
theory of ownership and control, which allows for private mineral
ownership of those petroleum resources that have been transferred from
government title. State conservation agencies regulate petroleum
development of privately-owned petroleum to prevent waste and protect
correlative rights, but both federal and state agencies manage petroleum
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resources owned respectively by federal or state governments. American
states prevent waste and protect correlative rights primarily through
compulsory “pooling” regulation, somewhat similar to small-scale
unitization. Pooling combines small tracts and interests to form a pooled
unit to avoid drilling unnecessary wells that could lead to wasteful
production. Unitization develops an entire (or most of a) reservoir, which
may underlie multiple tracts of land over a large area, most often to
facilitate enhanced recovery operations. Because the law of most states
require a specified level of voluntary agreement among the tract and
interest owners, unitization is fairly rare in the United States. Where federal
lands are involved, developers can seek “exploratory unitization,” which
may also include private lands.
Executing a unitization agreement in America is a lengthy process.
Interest owners must be willing to work an entire reservoir owned by
multiple parties. Once an owner is interested in unitizing an area, data
gathering occurs, and mineral interest owners are solicited into participating
in the unitization project with their ownership interest. Again, because
America allows private mineral ownership, mineral ownership tends to be
intensively subdivided and fractionalized. Thus, achieving the necessary
level of voluntary agreement is unlikely, which prevents unitization. The
usuals stumbling block to achieving the necessary threshold of voluntary
agreement is the allocation of costs and production. Calculating each
owner’s share of costs and production is a necessary component of
unitization, whether it is among private owners in America or between two
countries.
Unlike the United States, nearly all countries, except to a limited extent,
Canada and Trinidad & Tobago, adhere to a domanial theory of mineral
control or ownership. A few may adhere to a regalian theory. In either case,
this means government control or ownership of valuable minerals,
including petroleum. Often, these governments contract with private
enterprises, both foreign and domestic, to develop petroleum resources.
Also, unlike the United States, many countries have national (governmentowned or controlled) oil companies that participate in petroleum
exploitation in varying degrees, ranging from monopoly control to carried
participation, including competition with private investors. Because of
government ownership and control, unitization is more common and has
been more successful international than in the United States. The success of
unitization is due to a country licensing petroleum exploitation rights,
through direct negotiation or bid rounds, to a relatively small number of
IOCs, premised on regulations that require unitization of a common
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reservoir that crosses a block boundary. Some countries, however, have
complex petroleum regimes, multiple forms of contracts, and varying bid
round fiscal terms and bidding parameters that make unitization more
complex and difficult because the government’s interest in unitization
includes not only efficient and maximum production but an allocation of
production that will maximize government take.
If all blocks are awarded based on identical forms of contract and fiscal
terms, the government’s interest in unitization primarily concerns efficient
and maximum recovery of resources. IOCs may still quarrel over how to
allocate costs and production, but the government’s interest is unaffected.
Thus, a significant advantage to government ownership that differs from
private ownership in the United States is that most other countries have
only to protect the correlative rights of “working interest” investors; there
are no competing mineral-interest owners. A government with the same
“take” across blocks to be unitized will not be concerned about drainage.
Much of the detail will be left to the IOC investors who will typically enter
into a pre-unitization agreement, engage in technical research, determine
the unit operator, and agree on cost and production allocation. While the
government will reserve approval rights, it has little concern for details,
unless the IOC investors are stalemated on some issues.
A more complex unitization process occurs when mineral reservoirs go
beyond a country's borders. Cross-jurisdictional unitization agreements
potentially implicate international norms and treaties. Accounting for the
potential legal implications, cross-border agreements, typically executed by
host governments, are usually accompanied by unit operating agreements
executed by each country’s affected IOC investors. A cross-border
unitization agreement better assures that each country will receive a fair
share of petroleum-development benefits and more efficient and less
wasteful petroleum recovery. Indeed, although not requiring that countries
to agree to unitize, international law strongly encourages cross-border
unitization as a means of promoting peaceful and efficient mineral
development.
II. Implementing Cross-Jurisdictional Unitization Agreements
Between Iraq and Iran
Iraq and Iran that collectively sit atop several substantial but
undeveloped petroleum reserves. Large undeveloped reserves underlie both
countries along their shared inland border. Iraq and Iran have considerable
capacity to increase oil recovery and revenues by unitizing their common
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petroleum reservoirs. By implementing cross-jurisdictional unitization
agreements, both countries can capitalize on immense reserves that underlie
both countries. The unit operation of these joint fields would also
strengthen the positions of Iran and Iraq in the global energy market,
particularly among OPEC members. To achieve this result, however, the
countries must have a positive relationship, which until recently has been
elusive.
Despite decades of bloodshed and acrimonious relations, the Iraqi and
Iranian governments restored diplomatic relations after the fall of Saddam
Hussein and the Sunni dominated Baathist Party in 2003, resulting from
closer cooperation between the Iraqi Shi'a parties and the Islamic Republic
of Iran. The continued improvement in political and economic relations has
heightened diplomacy between them. The heightened diplomacy is largely
due to the shifting perception of cultural commonalities after 2003 owing to
Iraq’s divergence from Turkish and Arabian cultural and economic
influences. Both countries have further improved diplomatic relations
through a mutual desire by both governments to promote the visitation of
sacred Shi’a cities in Iraq.
Improved diplomatic ties between Iraq and Iran have also sparked
increased commodity trading between the countries, resulting in growing
Iraqi dependence on Iranian energy. Receiving a stable supply of Iranian
energy has allowed the Iraqi government to mitigate inefficiencies in its
electricity infrastructure, address unrestrained population growth in the
country, and improve its own electricity capacity. Further, the improved
relationship between the countries has allowed Iran to utilize Iraq as a
pathway to transport Iranian natural gas to European markets.
Through improving relations, both countries have developed disdain for
OPEC’s current policies that maintain low oil prices1176 and reduce global
oil production. They should take their cooperation further. In a mutual
desire and joint effort to increase production volume and petroleum
revenues, the Iraqi and Iranian governments should enter into unitization
treaties and unit operation agreements over the seven oil reservoirs along
their inland borderline. The countries could negotiate terms similar to the
2005 UK/Norway Framework Agreement, which collectively groups
multiple shared petroleum reservoirs into one agreement, rather than
separate agreements on a per-reservoir basis. Alternatively, Iraq and Iran
could negotiate a framework treaty, or by recommendation of the Shalbaf
and Malaki regions, to agree to unitize oil reservoirs incrementally, starting
1176. Nawzad’s dissertation predates the high oil prices of early 2022.
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with smaller ones, followed by unitizing the larger and likely more
contentious reservoirs.
Although both countries desire to gain petroleum revenues through joint
operations and agreements, these agreements have yet to occur for several
reasons. One reason for the absence of progress stems from international
sanctions imposed on Iran and Iranian oil. The United States and the
European Union have imposed trade restrictions on Iran that prevent
foreign investment directly into Iranian energy. These sanctions also ban
foreign investment in unitization projects with Iran’s neighbors to exploit
common reservoirs. These restrictions date back to the 1970s. The inability
of either country to agree on joint unitization is deeply rooted in
unfavorable opinions held by the people of both countries about each other.
Internally, Iraq’s conflicts between the Iraqi Government and the KRG
have also prevented any form of progress on unitizing common reservoirs
in the Kurdish Region of northern Iraq along its border with Iran. The
internal conflict threatens not only Iraq’s political stability but also deters
any investment from international oil companies due to the risk of
opposition and violence. Foreign investors are also equally dissuaded from
investment due to Iraq’s absence of a new and up-to-date petroleum code.
Though Iraq and Iran’s relationship has drastically improved within the
last twenty years, the inability to strike a deal to develop jointly their shared
petroleum reserves continues to escalate tensions, leading to hostile actions
between the two countries. Situations like the 2009 Fakka incident
provoked by the Iranian military and the unilateral development operations
of shared reservoirs by Iraq pose the risk of war between the two countries.
If the countries wage war over their petroleum reserves, the global oil
market inevitably suffers due to the likelihood of waste generated from
hostile sabotage of fields and heightened political tensions.
In the interest of Iraq, Iran, and the global oil market, peaceful
cooperation must occur over the joint development of petroleum reserves
common to both countries. Resorting to violence, military involvement, and
evasive production tactics will not accomplish the shared goal of improving
petroleum revenue for either country. Instead, these actions undermine any
progress made by either country to maintain a stable relationship with each
other. These actions also undermine any remedial efforts made with other
countries in hopes of obtaining foreign investment for joint energy projects.
Absent efforts to cooperate, these countries may put themselves on a
collision course with each other, resulting in waste, war, and depletion of
resources required for mutual prosperity and peace.
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Iran and Iraq’s collision course is avoidable through pursuing joint
development through cross-jurisdictional unitization agreements. These
agreements promote peace and avoid any destructive tactics to obtain
dominance in over petroleum production. These agreements also prevent
unnecessary over-drilling resulting in waste. By reducing waste through
excess drilling, both countries can maximize production efficiency and
generate a high likelihood of substantial returns.
Nevertheless,1177 pursuing unitization agreements present significant
challenges for both countries, including overcoming political obstacles,
ensuring adequate legal support, drafting or changing existing hydrocarbon
laws, and treaty negotiations. To even consider such agreements requires
both countries to remedy present political obstacles. Iran must continue to
advocate and negotiate for the removal of U.S. sanctions on Iranian oil.
Doing so will allow other countries to invest in the joint development of
Iraq and Iran’s cross-jurisdictional petroleum reservoirs. On the other hand,
Iraq must resolve internal conflicts between its government and the KRG
over disputed territories.1178
Because both countries do not presently have adequate petroleum laws
concerning joint development, both countries must amend their laws and
regulations to promote unitization negotiations and unitization operations
on a cross-border basis. Only then can the real work of negotiating and
implementing unitization agreements occur. Such laws must designate a
ministry within each government to hammer out unitization details and
implement unitized operations. These steps forward will potentially lead to
negotiating a unitization treaty and, eventually, unit operating agreements
to facilitate joint development.
Ultimately, the joint development of shared petroleum reservoirs
between Iraq and Iran provides far more benefits than detriments to both
countries. Agreement for joint development will promote a peaceful and
prosperous relationship between the countries and an opportunity to
capitalize on the shared resources in a noncompetitive and nonwasteful
manner. The revenues generated from jointly developing resources will
allow investment in infrastructure and economic development that will
provide long-term employment opportunities and prosperity for Iraqis and
Iranians. The benefits of joint unitization between Iraq and Iran go far
1177. Nawzad’s dissertation research predates renewed efforts to resolve sanctions against
Iran due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
1178. Nawzad’s dissertation research predates the 2022 decision of the Iraq Supreme
Court declaring the Kurdish petroleum law and resulting contracts with petroleum investors
to be unconstitutional.
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beyond their borders. By facilitation and cooperation, two countries with
some of the world’s largest oil reserves can become leading market players.
Generating new production from these untapped reserves will ensure
greater international energy security and promote global economic
development in the future.
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EDITORIAL ADDENDUM
I. Iranian Developments
After the election of Joe Biden in 2020, the United States and Iran
resumed discussions concerning U.S. sanctions re-imposed on Iran during
the Trump administration.1179 In 2021, the United States and Iran engaged
in negotiations to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
(“JPCOA”) passed under the Obama administration, which effectively
imposed restrictions on Iranian nuclear energy in exchange for sanction
relief.1180 On February 4, 2022, The United States declared the intent to
restore Iranian sanction waivers.1181 These waivers “allow third-party
participation in nuclear non-proliferation and safety projects, in particular
with respect to rising stockpiles of enriched uranium in Iran.”1182
During this time, the price of oil increased to over $90 a barrel. 1183 In
response to the increasing prices, Iran’s Oil Minister Javad Owji called on
the U.S. to withdraw sanctions imposed on Iranian oil to balance the global
oil markets.1184 While no decision to lift sanctions has been made, pressure
to act is elevating. Within the same month, Russia invaded Ukraine, causing
oil prices to climb well above $100. In response to this attack numerous
countries, especially NATO members, including the United States, imposed
increasingly tough sanctions on Russia, including the United States. The
United States imposed an outright ban the importation of Russian oil,
liquefied natural gas, and coal.1185 This ban also extended to new
investments in Russia’s energy sector by American businesses and financial
parties. Though the U.S. does not rely heavily on Russian oil, the effect of
its absence is observable elsewhere in the world. Because of Russia
1179. Humerya Pamuk, U.S. Restores Sanctions Waiver to Iran with Nuclear Talks in
Final Phase, Reuters (Feb. 4, 2022), https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/bidenadministration-restores-sanctions-waiver-iran-talks-final-phase-2022-02-04/.
1180. Id.
1181. Meghan Gordon & Aresu Eqbali, Iran Deal with Oil Sanctions Relief Not a Sure Bet
Despite Latest US Waiver: Analysts, S & P Global (Feb. 7, 2022), https://www.spglobal.|
com/commodity-insights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/020722-iran-deal-with-oilsanctions-relief-not-a-sure-bet-despite-latest-us-waiver-analysts.
1182. Id.
1183. Id.
1184. Id.
1185. FACT SHEET: United States Bans Imports of Russian Oil, Liquified Natural Gas,
and Coal, The White House Statements and Releases (Mar 8, 2022),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/03/08/fact-sheetunited-states-bans-imports-of-russian-oil-liquefied-natural-gas-and-coal/.
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invading Ukraine and the subsequent ban of Russian oil leading to soaring
oil prices, the need to remove Iranian sanctions is becoming more urgent
than ever.1186 Many foreign investors, including oil and gas companies have
left, or announced an intention to leave, Russia.
The added urgency created by the Russia-Ukrainian war may result in
the United States waiving sanctions on Iranian oil.1187 While this waiver
would not necessarily lift America’s ban on imports of Iranian oil, it could
potentially mean that Iran could seek investment from other countries
without risk of secondary sanctions.1188 Thus, the potential to commence
and successfully facilitate joint development of Iraqi and Iranian shared
petroleum reserves now seems somewhat more likely.
II. Iraqi Developments
Since 2020, Iraq has seen dramatic shifts in its oil and gas landscape. In
response to the global fears surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic, global
demand for oil came to a screeching halt.1189 The lack of demand for oil
coupled with increases in global supply due to an oil price war between
Russia and Saudi Arabia caused oil prices to plunge.1190 As a result of the
plunge, many oil-exporting countries suffered economically. The Kurdish
economy was among the many that were heavily and negatively
impacted.1191
To make matters worse for the Kurdish region, in February 2022, the
Iraqi Federal Supreme Court held that a 2007 law that gave the Kurdistan
Regional Government (“KRG”) authority over the petroleum resources,
was unconstitutional and warranted annulment.1192 Production-sharing
contracts entered into by the KRG with foreign petroleum investors were
1186. Golnar Motevalli, How an Iran Nuclear Deal Could Affect Oil, Trade and Security,
Bloomberg News (Mar. 7, 2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-0307/how-an-iran-nuclear-deal-could-affect-oil-trade-and-security.
1187. Id.
1188. Id.
1189. From the Barrel to the Pump: The Impact of COVID-19 Pandemic on Prices for
Petroleum Products, The Bureau of Labor Statistics Monthly Labor Review (Oct. 2020),
https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2020/article/from-the-barrel-to-the-pump.htm.
1190. Id.
1191. Simon Martelli, Iraq’s Supreme Court Rejects KRG Oil Autonomy, Energy
Intelligence (Feb. 15, 2022), https://www.energyintel.com/0000017e-fe8a-df96-a1feffeeb4760001.
1192. Baghdad Initiates Proceedings to Implement Supreme Court’s Decision on KRG’s
Oil Autonomy, Kurd Press (Feb. 16, 2022), https://kurdpress.com/en/news/2147/Baghdadinitiates-proceedings-to-implement-Supreme-Court's-decision-on-KRG's-oil-autonomy/.
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declared illegal. Additionally, the court held the KRG must “hand over all
the oil production from the oil fields in the Kurdistan region, and other
regions which the KRG’s Ministry of Natural Resources produces oil from,
to the federal government.”1193 The KRG condemned the court’s ruling as
unjust because it “violates the rights and constitutional authorities of the
Kurdistan region.”1194 If carried out, the court’s ruling will bear substantial
negative consequences for Iraq and the KRG and Kurdish region, especially
regarding foreign investment.

1193. Id.
1194. Alex MacDonald, Iraq: Kurds Denounce ‘unjust’ Oil and Gas Ruling as Energy
Feud Escalates, Middle East Eye (Feb. 16, 2022), https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraqkurds-denounce-unjust-oil-gas-ruling-energy-feud.
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